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ABSTRACT 
Eye gaze is one of the most important cues to convey social exclusion and social 
inclusion. In the present thesis, socially excluded and socially included individuals’ 
responses to others’ eye gaze were investigated in three empirical studies (Studies I-
III). The empirical studies were complemented by a literature review taking a broader 
look into how exclusion modulates processing of social information more generally 
(Study IV). 
The aim of Study I was to examine whether viewing direct gaze would ameliorate 
affective distress after exclusion. Two experiments found no evidence for this. 
Socially excluded participants showed similar levels of recovery of basic social needs 
between two measurement stages regardless of whether they viewed a video of a 
person portraying direct or downward gaze between the stages. Study II investigated 
how exclusion and inclusion in an online interaction modulate gaze direction 
judgments. The results showed that, when compared to inclusion and non-social 
control groups, socially excluded participants judged a narrower range of gaze 
directions as being pointed at them, possibly reflecting avoidance motivation. No 
differences in gaze direction judgments between inclusion and non-social control 
groups were found. Study III tested whether exclusion or inclusion would delay 
disengagement of attention from faces portraying direct gaze. Contrary to the 
hypotheses, only the social inclusion group showed delayed disengagement from 
direct gaze faces, as compared to downward gaze faces. Social exclusion and non-
social control groups responded similarly, showing no differences in disengagement 
of attention from faces portraying direct and downward gaze. 
A literature review in Study IV revealed that exclusion modulates several social 
cognitive processes. Exclusion alters evaluation of social information and allocation 
of attention towards social stimuli. These changes may be different depending on 
various individual traits and situational factors. Exclusion also improves memory for 
socially relevant information and even enhances social information processing at 
early processing stages, such as enhancing facial expression recognition. Importantly, 
however, several important gaps in the literature were identified, such as that 
previous research had not paid close attention to investigating the mechanisms 
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mediating the effects of exclusion on various cognitive functions involving 
processing of social information. Directions for future research were proposed. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Katse on yksi tärkeimmistä signaaleista, joilla ihminen viestii ryhmän ulkopuolelle 
sulkemista sekä sosiaalista hyväksyntää. Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkittiin, miten 
sosiaalinen hyljeksintä ja sosiaaliseen vuorovaikutukseen osallistuminen (inkluusio) 
vaikuttavat toisen ihmisen katseeseen reagoimiseen (tutkimukset I-III). Tämän 
lisäksi kirjallisuuskatsauksessa tarkasteltiin laajemmin, miten sosiaalinen hyljeksintä 
muuntaa sosiaalisen tiedon käsittelyä (tutkimus IV). 
Tutkimuksen I tavoite oli selvittää, tehostaako suoran katseen näkeminen 
hyljeksinnän jälkeistä mielialan palautumista. Kahdessa kokeessa tälle hypoteesille ei 
löydetty tukea. Sosiaalisesti hyljeksityksi tulleilla tutkittavilla kokemus sosiaalisten 
perustarpeiden täyttymisestä palautui kahden mittauskerran välillä samalla tavalla 
riippumatta siitä, näkivätkö tutkittavat mittausten välissä videon kohti katsovista vai 
alaspäin katsovista kasvoista. Tutkimus II tarkasteli, miten hyljeksintä ja inkluusio 
verkossa tapahtuvassa sosiaalisessa vuorovaikutuksessa vaikuttavat katsesuuntien 
arviointeihin. Tulokset osoittivat, että inkluusioryhmään ja ei-sosiaaliseen 
vertailuryhmään verrattuna hyljeksityksi tulleet tutkittavat arvioivat kapeammalle 
alueelle kohdistettujen katsesuuntien olevan suunnattu heihin. Tämän muutoksen 
toisten ihmisten katsesuuntien arvioinneissa tulkittiin liittyvän 
välttämismotivaatioon. Inkluusio- ja vertailuryhmien välillä ei ollut eroa 
katsesuuntien arvioinneissa. Tutkimus III testasi, hidastaako hyljeksintä tai inkluusio 
tarkkaavuuden irrottamista kohti katsovista kasvoista. Hypoteesien vastaisesti vain 
inkluusioryhmässä tarkkaavuuden irrottaminen oli hitaampaa kohti katsovista 
kasvoista alaspäin katsoviin kasvoihin verrattuna. Hyljeksintäryhmän ja ei-sosiaalisen 
vertailuryhmän välillä ei ollut eroa; molemmissa ryhmissä tarkkaavuuden siirtäminen 
pois kasvoista oli yhtä nopeaa riippumatta siitä, katsoivatko kasvot kohti vai alaspäin. 
Tutkimuksen IV kirjallisuuskatsaus osoitti, että hyljeksinnän on havaittu 
muuntavan sosiaalisen tiedon käsittelyä monin tavoin. Hyljeksintä muuntaa 
sosiaalisesta tiedosta tehtyjä tulkintoja ja vaikuttaa siihen, miten tarkkaavuutta 
suunnataan erilaisiin sosiaalisiin ärsykkeisiin. Nämä vaikutukset voivat olla erilaisia 
riippuen tilannetekijöistä ja hyljeksityksi tulleen henkilön yksilöllisistä piirteistä. 
Hyljeksintä myös parantaa sosiaalisesti merkityksellisen tiedon muistamista ja jopa 
parantaa sosiaalisen tiedon varhaista käsittelyä, kuten lisää tarkkuutta kasvonilmeiden 
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tunnistamisessa. Tutkimuskirjallisuudessa havaittiin kuitenkin useita merkittäviä 
aukkoja, kuten että alan tutkimuksessa ei oltu juurikaan tarkasteltu mekanismeja, 
jotka välittävät hyljeksinnän vaikutuksia sosiaalisen tiedon käsittelyyn. Näiden 
aukkojen paikkaamiseksi ehdotettiin jatkotutkimuksia. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Humans are fundamentally social beings. Most of us spend a great deal of time 
interacting with others, as well as thinking about our relationships. We are driven to 
maintain interpersonal bonds, because belonging is one of the most basic human 
needs, only surpassed by physiological needs, and a need for safety (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995; Maslow, 1943). Social exclusion is a common experience, which 
threatens the need for belonging (Williams, 2007). The term social exclusion 
encompasses various types of interpersonal behaviors, in which an individual is 
rejected, ostracized, or otherwise left out of social interactions and relationships (for 
definitions of different types of social exclusion, see e.g., Blackhart, Nelson, 
Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009; Williams, 2007). Even a brief experience of exclusion 
is aversive (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009), and prolonged exclusion can have adverse 
consequences, such as depression, anxiety (Leary, 1990), and in some cases, even 
violent behavior (Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003). 
Eye gaze is one of the most important nonverbal cues to communicate social 
exclusion and social inclusion. Direct gaze (gaze pointed at another individual’s eye 
area) signals that the looker is attending to the other person (Conty, George, & 
Hietanen, 2016), and it is often a starting point for social interaction. Direct gaze 
communicates motivation to approach the other individual (Adams & Kleck, 2005), 
and in the perceiver, it activates approach-related neural mechanisms (Hietanen, 
Leppänen, Peltola, Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008). Conversely, gaze aversion signals 
motivation to avoid interaction (Adams & Kleck, 2005), and it is one of the most 
frequently used cues to convey social exclusion (Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998). In 
the observer, gaze aversion evokes feelings of exclusion and low relational evaluation 
(Wirth, Sacco, Hugenberg, & Williams, 2010). 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how socially excluded and socially 
included individuals respond to others’ eye gaze, and more generally, how social 
exclusion influences social information processing. The dissertation includes four 
original publications. The first three contain empirical studies, in which we 
investigated 1) whether perceiving direct gaze ameliorates affective distress evoked 
by social exclusion, 2) how social exclusion and social inclusion in an online 
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interaction alters judgments of others’ gaze directions, and 3) whether social 
exclusion or social inclusion slows down attentional disengagement from faces 
portraying direct gaze. The empirical studies inspired us to take a wider look into 
how social exclusion influences processing of social information, and thus, the 
research on this topic was reviewed and evaluated in the fourth publication. 
Before presenting the current studies in detail, I will provide a short overview of 
previous research relevant for the present work. First, I will look into how eye gaze 
is used in social interaction and how another person’s gaze influences the perceiver’s 
attention and affect. After this, I will review previous research on how social 
exclusion influences excluded individual’s affect, motivation, and behavior, and how 
exclusion modulates processing of social information. 
1.1 Eye gaze in social interaction 
The primary function of the eyes is to receive visual information, but human beings 
also use eyes to communicate. Eyes are used, for instance, to regulate interactions, 
provide information, and to express intimacy (Kleinke, 1986). Averted gaze can 
signal that there is something important in the gazed-at location, but it can also 
indicate disinterest in the ongoing social interaction. Direct gaze, in turn, conveys 
interest in the other person and willingness to engage in an interaction. Because of 
its high social relevance, direct gaze evokes various responses in the perceiver, such 
as enhanced attention towards the looker’s face, and increased self-referential 
processing (for reviews, see Conty et al., 2016; Senju & Johnson, 2009). 
Humans allocate a large amount of attentional resources to others’ faces, and 
especially to faces portraying direct gaze. People tend to look longer at faces 
portraying direct gaze as compared to faces looking away (Mojzisch et al., 2006; 
Wieser, Pauli, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009). Interestingly, people do not only 
voluntarily engage attention with faces portraying direct gaze, but direct gaze seems 
to efficiently capture the observer’s attention. Faces showing direct gaze are located 
more rapidly from a crowd of faces than faces with other gaze directions (Böckler, 
van der Wel, & Welsh, 2014; von Grünau & Anston, 1995; for criticism, see Cooper, 
Law, & Langton, 2013), and perceiving direct gaze, relative to averted gaze, evokes 
stronger physiological attention orienting responses (Akechi et al., 2013). Receiving 
direct gaze takes up cognitive resources, so that performance in concurrent cognitive 
tasks may be impaired (Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, 2010). 
Importantly, it has also been proposed that when an individual shifts attention from 
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a face to another stimulus, direct gaze may slow down the attentional disengagement 
(Senju & Hasegawa, 2005; Ueda, Takahashi, & Watanabe, 2014).  
The eye area is vital in communicating affective information. The muscles around 
the eyes are used to form various facial expressions (Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997), 
and the looker’s gaze direction also conveys affectively salient information to other 
people. Adams and Kleck (2005) showed that recognition of facial expressions of 
approach-related emotions (joy and anger), was enhanced when the face was 
portraying direct gaze, relative to averted gaze, whereas averted gaze facilitated 
recognition of avoidance-related emotional expressions (fear and sadness). In 
addition to signaling the looker’s emotions, gaze direction also influences the 
perceiver’s affective state. Direct gaze can sometimes be aversive, especially if the 
looker simultaneously signals threat with an angry facial expression (Lamer, Reeves, 
& Weisbuch, 2015), or if the perceiver suffers from social anxiety (Myllyneva, Ranta, 
& Hietanen, 2015; Wieser et al., 2009). However, in socially neutral contexts, direct 
gaze is generally experienced as a positive cue. Viewing direct gaze, compared to 
averted gaze, causes more activation in the facial muscles related to positive facial 
emotions (Hietanen et al., 2018), and attenuates the startle reflex evoked by aversive 
noise (Chen, Peltola, Dunn, Pajunen, & Hietanen, 2017). Receiving direct gaze also 
increases subjective feelings of connectedness (Wesselmann, Cardoso, Slater, & 
Williams, 2012), and speeds up recognition of positively valenced affective words 
(Chen, Helminen, & Hietanen, 2017; Chen, Peltola, Ranta, & Hietanen, 2016). 
Together with findings showing that faces with direct gaze are evaluated more 
positively than faces looking away (Ewing, Rhodes, & Pellicano, 2010; Mason, 
Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005), these studies strongly suggest that direct gaze is generally 
experienced as a positive, affiliative social cue (for a review, see Hietanen, 2018). 
There is no clear-cut boundary for what constitutes as direct gaze, but people 
view a range of gaze directions as direct. This range, called the cone of gaze (Gamer 
& Hecht, 2007), can be modulated by the perceiver’s individual characteristics as well 
as by various situational factors. A number of studies have shown that the gaze cone 
is particularly wide among socially anxious individuals, suggesting that these 
individuals are biased to view others as looking at them (Harbort, Witthöft, Spiegel, 
Nick, & Hecht, 2013; Schulze, Lobmaier, Arnold, & Renneberg, 2013). The looker’s 
facial expression also influences gaze direction judgments, as the gaze cone is wider 
when the observed face is portraying an angry or a happy expression, compared to 
fearful and neutral expressions (Ewbank, Jennings, & Calder, 2009; Lobmaier & 
Perrett, 2011; Lobmaier, Tiddeman, & Perrett, 2008). Interestingly, also the 
perceiver’s internal states, which vary from one situation to another, can influence 
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the width of the gaze cone. Rimmele and Lobmaier (2012) showed that cold-induced 
stress, compared to a control manipulation, widened the gaze cone, which the 
authors interpreted as enhanced alertness to social stimuli under stressful situations. 
Most importantly for the present research, Lyyra, Wirth, and Hietanen (2017) 
recently reported that also social exclusion modulates judgments of others’ gaze 
directions. They found that the width of the gaze cone was wider among participants 
who had been socially excluded in a virtual ball-tossing game as compared to socially 
included participants. It was suggested that exclusion widened the gaze cone, 
reflecting coping with this adverse experience by seeking affiliative cues. 
1.2 Affective and behavioral responses to social exclusion 
When people are socially excluded, they show various negative outcomes, such as 
lowered mood (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009) and increased aggression (Leary, Twenge, 
& Quinlivan, 2006). The temporal need-threat model (Williams, 2007) is one of the 
most impactful theories describing the affective responses to social exclusion. 
According to this theory, the most crucial effect of exclusion is that it threatens the 
basic social needs of belonging, control, meaningful existence, and self-esteem. The 
responses to exclusion can be divided into three separate stages. The initial, reflexive 
reaction is a rapid warning signal, which alerts the individual of the threat of 
exclusion. In the following reflective stage, the individual attempts to fortify the 
threatened basic needs. If exclusion is prolonged and the individual is unsuccessful 
in restoring basic needs, he or she may end in the final, resignation stage. To date, 
empirical research on the resignation stage has been scarce, but it has been proposed 
that individuals who enter this stage become withdrawn, alienated, and helpless, as 
they give up on trying to restore basic needs (Riva, Montali, Wirth, Curioni, & 
Williams, 2017; Williams, 2007). 
During and immediately following social exclusion (i.e., at the reflexive stage), 
individuals do not only report lowered mood (Blackhart et al., 2009; Williams, 
Cheung, & Choi, 2000) and lowered satisfaction of basic needs (Hartgerink, van 
Beest, Wicherts, & Williams, 2015), but they also report experiencing pain (Chen, 
Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008). Some researchers have argued that the social 
pain evoked by exclusion is more than a figure of speech, and that physical and social 
pain operate via shared neural mechanisms (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; 
Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). While this 
view is controversial (for criticism, see Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelley, 2006; Woo 
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et al., 2014), the function of physical and social pain is thought to be similar: they 
warn the individual of physical and social harm, respectively (MacDonald & Leary, 
2005). They are also similar in that these responses are automatic and difficult to 
suppress. A physical injury may unavoidably cause physical pain, and similarly social 
exclusion necessarily leads to affective distress, even when being excluded is 
inconsequential or even beneficial for the individual (Van Beest & Williams, 2006; 
Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). 
The rapid early response to exclusion is followed by the reflective stage, during 
which the excluded individual attempts to fortify threatened basic needs (Williams, 
2007). In laboratory studies, participants’ affect recovers within minutes after 
exclusion (Wesselmann, Ren, Swim, & Williams, 2013; Wirth & Williams, 2009), 
although socially anxious individuals may show lowered mood as long as 45 minutes 
after an exclusion manipulation, suggesting that these individuals are particularly 
strongly influenced by exclusion (Zadro, Boland, & Richardson, 2006). Being socially 
included helps individuals recover from exclusion. Excluded individuals’ affect 
improves more after an inclusive social interaction compared to the passing of time 
(Zwolinski, 2014), and after an online chat compared to a solitary video game (Gross, 
2009). Interestingly, even receiving negative feedback from others may be sufficient 
to cause recovery from exclusion (Rudert, Hales, Greifeneder, & Williams, 2017). 
This may suggest that even unfriendly acknowledgment may sometimes be better 
than being completely ignored (see also O’Reilly, Robinson, Berdahl, & Banki, 2014). 
Importantly, exclusion evokes various motivational and behavioral responses, 
which are thought to reflect coping in the reflective stage. Researchers have 
identified three different motivational and behavioral tendencies as a response to 
exclusion (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). First, excluded individuals may act in 
affiliative ways: for instance, they may show interest in joining group activities 
(Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007), and they may mimic others’ 
nonverbal behavior (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008), which may be attempts to 
restore one’s sense of belonging. Secondly, people may respond to exclusion by 
acting in aggressive ways (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Warburton, 
Williams, & Cairns, 2006), which has been suggested to be a way to regain sense of 
control (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). Finally, individuals sometimes respond by 
seeking solitude and by withdrawing from social interactions, which could be an 
attempt to protect oneself from further hurt (Ren, Wesselmann, & Williams, 2016).  
One important aim in the current social exclusion research is to understand why 
exclusion evokes these different, even seemingly conflicting behavioral and 
motivational responses. Smart Richman and Leary (2009) proposed a multimotive 
 18 
model, according to which the behavioral response to exclusion is determined by 
various contextual factors and the individual’s inferences of the exclusion episode. 
Behavior is influenced by, for instance, whether the excluded individual has access 
to alternate relationships, whether the individual is able to reaffiliate with the 
excluder, and whether the person sees the exclusion as unfair or fair. The relationship 
between exclusion and behavior is presumably quite complex, as several different 
factors likely moderate the effects of exclusion on motivation and behavior. The 
current empirical research has identified only some of these factors (Maner et al., 
2007; Sunami, Nadzan, & Jaremka, 2018; Warburton et al., 2006), and researchers 
are still actively discussing which factors determine whether an excluded individual 
will act in affiliative, aggressive, or socially avoidant ways (DeWall & Richman, 2011; 
Shilling & Brown, 2016; Wesselmann, Ren, & Williams, 2015). 
1.3 Social exclusion and processing of social information 
Several studies have suggested that exclusion alters processing of social information, 
and causes individuals to become highly attentive to social information. Gardner, 
Pickett, and Brewer (2000) showed that exclusion (vs. control manipulations) 
improved recall of diary entries containing social information, but impaired recall of 
non-social entries. Partly based on this finding, they proposed that humans possess 
a social monitoring system, whose purpose is to help an individual regulate the need 
for belonging (see also Pickett & Gardner, 2005; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 
2004). It was argued that activation of the social monitoring system enhances social 
information processing, which increases chances of success in social interactions, 
allowing one to satisfy the thwarted need for belonging. 
Subsequent studies have provided further evidence that socially excluded 
individuals perform particularly well in various social information processing tasks. 
In one of the earliest studies on the issue, Pickett et al. (2004) reported that high self-
reported need for belonging was correlated with better acuity in identification of 
facial expressions and affective valence of vocal tones. Another study showed that 
participants reflecting on exclusion, compared to control groups, were more accurate 
in identifying whether faces were portraying genuine or fake smiles (Bernstein, 
Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 2008). In addition, one research group found 
that exclusion improved accuracy at differentiating between faces belonging to two 
different categories (e.g., a happy and an angry face), but impaired acuity at 
distinguishing between faces belonging to the same category (e.g., two faces differing 
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in the intensity of an angry expression; Sacco, Wirth, Hugenberg, Chen, & Williams, 
2011). They argued that exclusion enhances between-category discrimination 
accuracy, which is highly important for achieving reinclusion, at the expense of 
within-category discrimination accuracy, which is less critical for excluded 
individuals. 
Several studies have also found that exclusion influences the way participants 
attend to affective social stimuli. DeWall, Maner, and Rouby (2009) conducted 
several experiments, in which exclusion increased attention allocation towards 
smiling faces. Exclusion, compared to control manipulations, enhanced visual search 
performance for smiling faces, but not for faces showing other expressions 
(Experiment 1), increased fixations to smiling faces in an array of different affective 
faces (Experiments 2-3), and increased a tendency to shift attention towards smiling 
faces instead of faces showing a neutral expression (Experiment 4). Some later 
studies have found convergent evidence that exclusion increases allocation of 
attention to smiling faces (Buckner, DeWall, Schmidt, & Maner, 2010; Tanaka & 
Ikegami, 2015; Xu et al., 2015), although some studies have also found increased 
attention to angry faces (Tuscherer et al., 2015) and sad faces as well (Kraines, 
Kelberer, & Wells, 2018). 
While much of the research in this field has investigated how excluded individuals 
process and attend to different facial expressions, there is some evidence suggesting 
that exclusion also modulates responses to others’ eye gaze. One study found that 
the gaze-cuing effect (the inclination to shift attention towards the direction of 
another person’s gaze) was amplified among socially excluded participants and 
participants with low self-esteem, compared to included participants and participants 
with high self-esteem, respectively (Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009; but for a 
recent finding that exclusion decreased the gaze-cuing effect, see Capellini, Riva, 
Ricciardelli, & Sacchi, 2019). Excluded individuals might increase attention to others’ 
eyes, as they seek reinclusion opportunities, and direct gaze might be an especially 
important inclusive cue. Consistent with this, it has been reported that excluded 
participants looked more in the eyes of their interaction partners than included 
participants did, possibly because they tried to get into eye contact (Böckler, Hömke, 
& Sebanz, 2014). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Lyyra et al. (2017) found that 
the gaze cone (the range of gaze directions judged as direct) was wider among 
excluded participants, compared to included participants. These findings suggest 
that, as a part of their coping strategies, excluded individuals respond to others’ eye 
gaze in an altered way. However, there has been relatively little research on this issue 
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to date, and thus we do not currently have a detailed understanding on how and why 
exclusion influences responses to others’ gaze. 
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2 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
2.1 Direct gaze and recovery from exclusion 
As described in the introduction, the affective responses to exclusion can be divided 
into an initial reflexive stage and a latter reflective stage, during which an individual 
attempts to fortify basic needs (Williams, 2007). Excluded individuals have such a 
powerful need to be acknowledged that not only pleasant social interactions (Gross, 
2009; Zwolinski, 2014), but even negative feedback from others (Rudert et al., 2017) 
alleviates the affective distress evoked by exclusion. Excluded individuals attend to 
affiliative cues, such as smiling faces (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009), and are biased 
to view others as portraying direct gaze (Lyyra et al., 2017), possibly because 
receiving cues of acceptance and acknowledgment can ameliorate the adverse effects 
of exclusion. As direct gaze signals that one is attended to by the looker (Conty et 
al., 2016) and increases feelings of connectedness (Wesselmann et al., 2012), we 
hypothesized that viewing direct gaze would facilitate recovery of affect after social 
exclusion. 
Study I contained two experiments, in which we investigated whether receiving 
direct gaze would help individuals recover from social exclusion. At the beginning 
of the experiments, participants were excluded or included in Cyberball (Williams & 
Jarvis, 2006). In this widely used social exclusion manipulation, participants play a 
virtual ball-tossing game, supposedly with other participants, but in actuality with 
preprogrammed characters, who either exclude or include the participants in the 
game. After the manipulation, participants were shown a video of a person 
portraying either direct gaze or looking downwards. Satisfaction of basic social needs 
were measured using a standard questionnaire (Molet, Macquet, Lefebvre, & 
Williams, 2013; Wirth & Williams, 2009) both right after the social exclusion 
manipulation (reflexive stage) and after viewing the eye gaze video (reflective stage). 
Our first hypothesis was that, in the reflexive stage, excluded participants would 
report lower satisfaction of basic needs than included participants. Second, we 
hypothesized that excluded participants would report higher basic need satisfaction 
in the reflective stage than in the reflexive stage, indicating recovery between the two 
measurements. Most importantly, we hypothesized that excluded participants who 
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viewed the direct gaze videos would report higher satisfaction of basic needs in the 
reflective stage, compared to the excluded participants who viewed videos with 
downward gaze. This would suggest that receiving direct gaze facilitates recovery of 
basic needs among excluded participants. 
2.2 Exclusion and gaze direction judgments 
An earlier finding that socially excluded participants had a wider gaze cone as 
compared to included participants (i.e., accepted a wider range of gaze directions as 
direct), was interpreted to reflect excluded participants’ attempts at seeking 
reinclusion (Lyyra et al., 2017). However, as discussed earlier, excluded individuals 
do not always attempt to cope with exclusion by seeking reinclusion, but they may 
also withdraw from social interactions or act aggressively. According to the 
multimotive model (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009), a prosocial, affiliative response 
is likely when the excluded individual has an opportunity for reaffiliation. However, 
when there is no possibility for reaffiliation, the individual is likely to withdraw from 
social interactions (for similar suggestions, see also Cuadrado, Tabernero, & Steinel, 
2015; DeWall & Richman, 2011; Romero-Canyas et al., 2010). If widening of the 
gaze cone indeed reflects an affiliative response to exclusion (Lyyra et al., 2017), then 
this effect might not occur in a context where affiliation is not possible. In such 
context, exclusion might possibly cause narrowing, rather than widening of the gaze 
cone. 
In Study II, we investigated the possibility that exclusion might lead to narrowing 
of the gaze cone when there is no opportunity for reaffiliation. Like in the Lyyra et 
al. (2017) study, participants were socially excluded or included in Cyberball (or as a 
novel contribution, completed a non-social control task, which will be described 
later) and, after the manipulation, judged whether faces showing varying degrees of 
gaze aversion were looking at them or not. However, unlike in the previous study, 
participants were led to believe the Cyberball game was played online with other 
participants located in other laboratories, rather than through a local area network 
with other participants located in the same room. Thus, excluded participants would 
have no opportunity for reaffiliation, and the social interaction was limited to the 
ball-tossing game. We hypothesized that excluded participants would have a 
narrower gaze cone than included participants, and participants in the control group. 
Alternatively, if situational factors do not modulate the effects of exclusion on gaze 
 23 
direction judgments, exclusion should lead to widening of the gaze cone, compared 
to the other groups, as in the previous study (Lyyra et al., 2017). 
2.3 Exclusion and disengagement of attention from direct gaze  
It has been proposed that direct gaze holds a perceiver’s attention; when attention 
has to be disengaged from a face, the disengagement is delayed if the face is 
portraying direct gaze (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). As exclusion leads to increased 
allocation of attention to faces showing affiliative facial expressions (DeWall, Maner, 
& Rouby, 2009) and enhances attentional shifts triggered by averted gaze (Wilkowski 
et al., 2009), exclusion might also amplify the attention holding effect of direct gaze. 
Investigating whether exclusion would enhance attention holding by direct gaze 
was the main aim of Study III. Participants’ feelings of social exclusion and social 
inclusion were again manipulated using Cyberball, or they underwent a non-social 
control manipulation. After the manipulation, participants completed an attentional 
disengagement task, similar to the one used in the study by Senju and Hasegawa 
(2005). Participants were presented with a face showing direct or downward gaze in 
the fixation, and after a short delay, a small line appeared to either the left or right 
side of the face. Participants’ task was to identify the line orientation, and to press a 
corresponding keyboard button as quickly as possible. Response times in identifying 
the line orientation were measured. We hypothesized that the response times would 
be longer on direct gaze trials than downward gaze trials, which would indicate 
delayed attentional disengagement from direct gaze. Most importantly, we expected 
the difference in response times between the two types of trials to be larger in the 
social exclusion group, than in the control group, indicating that exclusion slows 
down disengagement of attention from direct gaze. 
2.4 Disentangling effects of social exclusion and social inclusion 
While the Cyberball manipulation has been used in hundreds of studies (Hartgerink 
et al., 2015), an important limitation of most of these experiments is that they have 
not been able to disentangle effects of social exclusion from the effects of social 
inclusion. Typically, researchers have used social inclusion as the only control group 
and have interpreted differences between exclusion and inclusion groups to reflect 
effects of social exclusion (for exceptions using other types of controls, see Brown, 
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Young, Sacco, Bernstein, & Claypool, 2009; Dvir, Kelly, & Williams, 2018; Riva, 
Williams, Torstrick, & Montali, 2014). However, there are compelling reasons to 
believe that social inclusion can also influence participants in various ways. Engaging 
in social interactions and perceiving affiliative cues evoke positive affective 
responses (Chen et al., 2016; McIntyre, Watson, Clark, & Cross, 1991). Furthermore, 
meta-analytic evidence shows that social exclusion studies using neutral control 
groups report smaller effects on mood than studies comparing excluded participants 
to socially accepted participants (Blackhart et al., 2009). One study found that 
reflecting on social inclusion, as compared to exclusion and control groups, 
decreased interest in joining low-prestige social groups (Sacco & Bernstein, 2015). 
Brown and colleagues (2009) provided direct evidence that social inclusion in 
Cyberball can evoke responses in participants. They found that inclusion, but not 
exclusion, as compared to a no manipulation condition, increased interest in mating 
behavior. These findings are important, because they show that not only exclusion, 
but also inclusion can evoke effects that should be investigated. They also suggest 
that inclusion is not always an appropriate control condition when examining effects 
of exclusion, and thus findings from studies lacking additional control conditions 
cannot be taken as firm evidence that exclusion was driving the observed effects. 
In Studies II and III, we employed a non-social control manipulation, to which 
we compared the exclusion and inclusion groups. Participants assigned to this 
condition played a ball-tossing game, which was similar to that in the other 
conditions, but contained no social interaction. Rather than tossing a ball with other 
characters, participants were throwing a ball into baskets. This control manipulation 
had advantages over other non-social control tasks used in previous Cyberball 
studies. In these studies, participants in non-social control groups were asked to 
imagine natural scenery (Dvir et al., 2018; Riva et al., 2014) or were given no 
manipulation at all (Brown et al., 2009). Like these control conditions, the control 
ball-tossing game used in our studies contained no social interaction, but it more 
closely resembled the standard version of Cyberball, making it a more appropriate 
control condition. 
By using the non-social control group, we could investigate whether social 
inclusion would influence participants’ affect (as measured by a basic need, mood, 
and pain questionnaire in Studies II-III) as well as the width of the gaze cone (Study 
II), and attentional disengagement from direct gaze (Study III). Based on previous 
research, it seemed likely that inclusion would have little or no effect on affect (Dvir 
et al., 2018; Riva et al., 2014). However, there was some basis to expect social 
inclusion to influence responses to others’ gaze. It has been reported that a positive 
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mood induction, relative to induction of neutral or negative mood, increased eye 
contact in a subsequent interaction (Natale, 1977), and that priming participants with 
sentences related to positive or self-related social sentences, as compared to control 
sentences, increased the effect of direct gaze on self-reported arousal (McCrackin & 
Itier, 2018). It seems plausible, then, that an inclusive social interaction could also 
modulate the gaze cone (in Study II), or slow down disengagement of attention from 
direct gaze (in Study III). 
2.5 Review of studies on exclusion and social information 
processing 
The empirical studies inspired us to take a broader look on how social exclusion 
modulates social information processing. The research on the topic was reviewed 
and critically discussed in Study IV. The first goal was to describe the types of social 
information processing effects that exclusion research had found. A second 
important aim was to evaluate this research and the conclusions researchers had 
drawn from the studies, by looking at the field from the perspective of cognitive 
psychology. Research in this area has typically paid relatively little attention to the 
specific cognitive processes, on which exclusion exerts its effects. By taking a 
cognitive psychology perspective, we aimed to examine what the current body of 
evidence reveals about the issue. Vitally, we aimed to identify gaps that earlier 
research had left and to provide directions for future studies on the topic. 
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3 METHODS AND RESULTS 
3.1 General methodology of the empirical studies 
Participants in all of the empirical studies (Studies I-III) were adults, predominantly 
Finnish students. All participants reported no psychiatric or neurological disorders. 
They signed a form of informed consent, and received partial course credit or a 
movie ticket for participation. At the end of each experiment, participants were 
thoroughly debriefed. Ethical statements for the studies were obtained from the 
Ethics Committee of the Tampere region. 
Participants arrived in the laboratory in groups of three (Study I, Exp. 2, Study 
III) or four (Study I, Exp. 1), or alone (Study II). In all of the experiments, feelings 
of social exclusion and social inclusion were manipulated with Cyberball 4.0 
(Williams & Jarvis, 2006; see Figure 1A). In this manipulation, participants played a 
ball-tossing game on a computer, in which three (Study I, Exp. 2, Studies II-III) or 
four (Study I, Exp. 1) characters were throwing a ball with each other. One of the 
characters was controlled by the participant, and the participants were led to believe 
the other characters were controlled by the other participants present in the 
laboratory (Studies I and III), or by participants located in other laboratories, playing 
the game online (Study II). In reality, the other characters were controlled by the 
computer, and their actions were preprogrammed. Participants were either included 
in the game, receiving the ball as often as the other characters (inclusion condition), 
or excluded from the game, so that they received the ball only once from each 
character in the beginning of the game (exclusion condition). The game lasted for 30 
(Studies I, Exp. 2, Studies II-III) or 45 throws (Study I, Exp. 1) in total. The number 
of throws differed between the experiments so that participants in the inclusion 
group made the same number of throws regardless of whether the experiment used 
the three- or four-player version of the game. The reason for changing to the three-
player version after the first experiment was that scheduling the experiment session 
was easier for three participants than for four participants at a time and because the 
three-player version is more commonly used (Hartgerink et al., 2015). 
Studies II and III also contained a non-social control group, to which we 
compared the excluded and included participants, so that the effects of social 
 27 
exclusion could be disentangled from the effects of social inclusion (see Figure 1B). 
Participants assigned to the control group played a similar ball-tossing game, but 
instead of throwing a ball with other characters, they were throwing a ball into 
baskets. After each throw, the ball returned to the participant’s character. 
Participants in the non-social control group made 10 throws in the game, i.e., the 
same number as in the inclusion condition. The pace of the game in all conditions 
was adjusted so that the duration of the game was similar across conditions.  
 
Figure 1.  Illustrations of the social inclusion and exclusion conditions (A) and the non-social control 
condition (B) in Cyberball. 
Participants were randomly assigned in one of these conditions. In Studies II and 
III, participants who had to be excluded from the analyses (see below for details) 
were replaced to ensure a sufficient number of participants in all conditions. 
Immediately following the manipulation, participants filled in a questionnaire 
measuring basic need satisfaction, positive and negative mood, and social pain during 
the game. The questionnaire has been used in several earlier studies on social 
exclusion (e.g., Molet et al., 2013; Wirth & Williams, 2009). It contains five items 
measuring each of the four basic social needs proposed by Williams (2007; 
belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence, control), and four items measuring 
positive mood and negative mood. Participants responded on a 1-5 scale (Studies I 
and III), or on a visual analog scale, scored 0-100 (Study II), based on what they felt 
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during the game. In Studies II and III, the questionnaire was abbreviated, so that 
only one item for each basic need and both positive and negative mood was included. 
This was done so that the interval between the manipulation and the main 
measurement of the study was as short as possible. In all of the studies, the basic 
need items were reverse scored when necessary, and averaged to create a basic need 
satisfaction index. We also asked participants to assess the amount of pain they 
experienced during the game on a 0-100 visual analog scale. 
In each study, we led participants to believe the study was investigating “mental 
visualization”, which is a typical cover story used in studies utilizing the Cyberball 
manipulation. Participants were instructed to mentally visualize the Cyberball game. 
To enhance the cover story, in the beginning of each experiment, participants filled 
in a questionnaire ostensibly measuring their tendency to mentally visualize. 
Participants’ awareness of the deception in Cyberball was probed at the end of 
each experiment. In Study I, Exp. 1, and Study II, suspicion was inquired with an 
informal, unstructured interview. In Study I, Exp. 2, and Study III, suspicion was 
measured with a funnel-type questionnaire with six open-ended questions. Full 
details are available in the original publication of Study III. 
All materials in the studies were presented on 19” LCD monitors with 1280 × 
1024 resolution and 60 Hz refresh rate. In Studies II and III, participants’ head 
position was fixed at 63 cm and 57 cm from the screen, respectively. E-Prime® 2.0 
software was used for stimulus presentation and for acquiring data. Firefox Internet 
browser was used to present the Cyberball game. 
For the sake of legibility, only the main findings of the statistical analyses will be 
presented here. All details of the statistical analyses can be found in the original 
publications. 
3.2 Study I 
3.2.1 Methods of Study I 
Study I contained two experiments with a similar design, both investigating whether 
direct gaze alleviates distress caused by exclusion. For Exp. 1, 80 participants 
volunteered (21 males, Mage = 25.6 years, SDage = 6.0). We excluded four 
participants from the analyses, three for expressing suspicion about the Cyberball 
manipulation (all in the exclusion group), and one for withdrawing the consent. 
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Thus, the final sample in Exp. 1 contained 76 participants (nexcluded, direct = 18, 
nexcluded, downward = 18, nincluded, direct = 20, nincluded, downward = 20). A 
total of 82 participants volunteered for Exp. 2 (20 males, Mage = 24.8 years, SDage 
= 6.3). One participant was excluded from the analyses for being familiar with 
Cyberball, and thus the final sample in Exp. 2 consisted of 81 participants 
(nexcluded, direct = 21, nexcluded, downward = 22, nincluded, direct = 20, 
nincluded, downward = 18). In this experiment, no participants were excluded due 
to suspicion because the level of suspicion was not correlated with the dependent 
variables. It should be noted however, that participants in the exclusion group 
indicated significantly more suspicion in the post-experiment questionnaire than 
participants in the inclusion group. 
Immediately following social exclusion or inclusion in Cyberball (reflexive stage), 
participants filled in a basic need, mood, and pain questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was followed by the eye gaze manipulation (see below for details) and, afterwards, a 
reflective stage basic need, mood, and pain questionnaire. The questionnaire was the 
same as the one used in the reflexive stage, except participants were asked to answer 
based on what they felt at the moment, instead of during the game. For the sake of 
brevity, only the basic need data are presented below, as all measurements produced 
largely similar results. For the rest of the data, see the supplement of the original 
publication. 
In the gaze direction manipulation, participants viewed a video of a person 
portraying either direct gaze, or downward gaze. In Exp. 1, the video showed a 
person portraying direct or downward gaze for one minute. The model person stayed 
still, except for minor movements and eye blinks. Eight different individuals (four 
females, four males) acted as models in the videos. To maintain the cover story, 
participants were instructed to mentally visualize an interaction with the individual 
in the video. In Exp. 2, the videos were 25-28 seconds in length, and the 
manipulation was designed to be less distracting than the one-minute video of a still 
face in Exp. 1. In the videos of Exp. 2, a model person (one female, one male) gave 
instructions on how to fill in the following questionnaire, while either portraying 
direct gaze, or downward gaze. To familiarize participants with the model, they were 
shown, in the beginning of the experiment, a 23-second video depicting the model 
person giving task instructions while alternating between direct and downward gaze. 
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3.2.2 Results of Study I 
For mean basic need scores in each experimental group in reflexive and reflective 
stages in both experiments of Study I, see Figure 2. The results showed that in both 
experiments, excluded participants reported significantly lower basic need 
satisfaction than included participants immediately after the Cyberball game 
(reflexive stage). Excluded participants reported significantly higher basic need 
satisfaction in the latter, reflective stage, compared to the reflexive stage, suggesting 
that their basic need satisfaction improved between the two measurements. In the 
inclusion group, however, basic need satisfaction declined between the two stages 
significantly in Exp. 1, and marginally in Exp. 2. There were no differences between 
excluded and included participants in basic need satisfaction in the reflective stage 
in Exp. 1, suggesting that the effects of the exclusion manipulation on basic need 
satisfaction dissipated by the second measurement. In Exp. 2, however, excluded 
participants still reported significantly lower basic need satisfaction than included 
participants in the reflective stage, suggesting that the effects of the manipulation 
persisted until the latter stage. Most importantly, in both experiments, the gaze 
direction manipulation had no effect on participants’ basic need satisfaction. 
Excluded participants reported similar levels of basic need satisfaction in the 
reflective stage, regardless of whether they viewed videos with direct or downward 
gaze. 
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Figure 2.  Mean basic need satisfaction scores in each experimental group in both the reflexive and 
the reflective stage in Experiments 1 and 2 of Study I. Error bars denote standard error of 
the mean. 
As is widely recognized, null findings can be difficult to interpret. To more 
meaningfully interpret our results, we wanted to compare the effects of the gaze 
manipulation and another type of manipulation on basic need recovery. We did this 
by conducting two small-scale meta-analyses (Cumming, 2014). In the first one, we 
evaluated the effect size of the direct gaze vs. downward gaze manipulation on 
excluded participants’ basic need recovery in the current experiments. In the second 
meta-analysis, we investigated how diverting attention to another task (such as 
focusing attention on the present, writing about an irrelevant topic, or praying), as 
compared to a no distraction condition, influences excluded participants’ basic need 
recovery. Several studies had investigated this question using very similar 
experimental designs and dependent variables as the current experiments, making it 
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possible to compare the results of the two meta-analyses (Hales, Wesselmann, & 
Williams, 2016, Experiments 1 and 3; Molet et al., 2013; Wesselmann et al., 2013). 
The most important finding of these analyses was that the confidence intervals for 
the combined effect sizes of the two types of manipulations did not overlap (see 
Figure 3). This shows that after exclusion, distraction facilitates basic need recovery 
significantly more effectively than viewing a face with direct gaze. 
Figure 3. Effect sizes of seeing GLUHFW gaze (Meta-analysis 1), and diverting attention to another 
task (Meta-analysis 2) on recovery of basic needs after social exclusion in Cyberball. The 
horizontal lines represent the 95% CIs of the effect sizes of each study. The diamonds 
represent the combined effect sizes of the studies in each meta-analysis. The square 
sizes represent the weight of the study in the respective meta-analysis. 
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3.3 Study II 
3.3.1 Methods of Study II 
In Study II, we investigated whether exclusion would narrow or widen the gaze cone 
when there is no opportunity for reaffiliation. We also examined whether social 
inclusion, as well as exclusion, influences the width of the gaze cone and affect. A 
total of 81 volunteers participated in the experiment (19 males, Mage = 25.9 years, 
SDage = 7.7). We excluded 14 participants from the analyses. Nine were excluded 
for correctly indicating that they were deceived in the Cyberball game (one in the 
inclusion condition, eight in the exclusion condition). Four participants were 
excluded because the width of the gaze cone could not be calculated for these 
participants due to the number of “direct” responses exceeding 50 % for all gaze 
directions (see Ewbank et al., 2009). Finally, one participant was excluded as an 
outlier, as the calculated gaze cone width was not within three standard deviations 
from the sample mean. The final, analyzed sample consisted of 67 participants 
(nexcluded = 22, nincluded = 22, ncontrol = 23). 
After a social exclusion, social inclusion, or a non-social control manipulation, 
participants filled in the basic need, mood, and pain questionnaire (see above for 
details), and then completed the main measurement of this study, the gaze cone task. 
On each trial of the task, a fixation cross was shown for 800 ms, followed by a face 
stimulus, shown for 150 ms. Pictures of faces of four different individuals (two 
females, two males), created with a 3D animation software DAZ Studio, were used 
as stimuli. The faces were portraying either direct or slightly averted gaze (2°, 4°, 6°, 
and 8° to the left and to the right). For examples of the stimuli, see Figure 4. After 
seeing the face, participants were shown two consecutive response windows. In the 
first response window, participants indicated whether they felt the person was 
looking directly at him/her or not, using the keyboard (1 = yes, 2 = no). In the 
second response window, participants assessed the strength of the feeling on a 3-
point scale (1 = strong, 2 = intermediate, 3 = weak). The task consisted of two blocks 
of 36 trials each, resulting in 72 trials in total. In each block, each of the gaze 
directions of two randomly chosen individuals (a male and a female) were shown 
twice. Half of the pictures were horizontally flipped to eliminate any effect caused 
by face asymmetry. In the second block, the faces of the other two individuals were 
shown. 
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Figure 4.  Examples of face stimuli used in Study II. The three stimuli shown here, from left to right, 
are portraying direct gaze, gaze averted 2° to the left, and 8° to the right, respectively. In 
the experiment, the stimuli were shown in full color. 
To determine the width of the gaze cone, we first calculated the point of subjective 
equality (PSE), i.e., the point where the individual cannot distinguish between two 
different stimuli (Lyyra et al., 2017). This was done by calculating a binary logistic 
regression model individually for each participant based on the answers in the first 
response window. For the purposes of this analysis, the trials with gaze averted to 
the left and the right were collapsed, which resulted in five different gaze directions 
(0°, 2°, 4°, 6°, 8°). Trials with no responses within 7 s in the first response window 
(0.6%) were excluded from the data. From the regression model, we calculated the 
gaze deviation degree, which the participant was equally probable to indicate as direct 
and averted gaze. The width of the gaze cone was defined as the distance from zero 
degrees to the PSE, multiplied by two to cover both sides. We also analyzed eye 
contact impression strength, combining data from both response windows, but will 
not present the analyses here, as both analytic strategies yielded comparable results. 
3.3.2 Results of Study II 
See Table 1 for means and standard deviations for basic need, mood, and pain scores 
in each group in Study II. The results indicated that exclusion, compared to inclusion 
and control tasks, significantly lowered satisfaction of basic social needs and positive 
mood. In negative mood, we only found a significant difference between exclusion 
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and inclusion groups, but not between any of the other groups. The manipulation 
had no effect on self-reported levels of pain.  
Table 1.  Basic need, mood and pain scores for each group in Study II 
 Exclusion M (SD) Inclusion M (SD) Control M (SD) 
Basic needs 28.6 (16.2) 63.0 (16.4) 61.1 (19.8) 
Positive mood 33.6 (19.2) 71.7 (15.8) 65.1 (30.2) 
Negative mood 31.5 (26.1) 6.2 (13.8) 17.9 (24.3) 
Pain 9.8 (13.4) 4.6 (6.9) 7.4 (15.7) 
Note. Basic need satisfaction, mood, and pain scores are on a 0-100 visual analog scale 
Most importantly, the manipulation had an effect on the width of the gaze cone (see 
Figure 5). In the exclusion group, the gaze cone was significantly narrower than in 
the inclusion group, and marginally narrower than in the control group. There were 
no differences between the inclusion and the control group in the width of the gaze 
cone. 
 
Figure 5.  Means and standard deviations for gaze cone widths in all experimental groups in Study II. 
The mean width is projected on the observer’s eye region (interpupillary distance 64 mm). 
3.4 Study III 
3.4.1 Methods of Study III 
Study III contained an experiment, in which we examined whether social exclusion 
or inclusion delays disengagement of attention from faces with direct gaze. The 
effects of the exclusion and inclusion manipulations on affect were also investigated. 
For this experiment, 74 participants volunteered (26 males, Mage = 25.4 years, 
SDage = 6.8). All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision. We 
excluded 11 participants (two in the inclusion group, nine in the exclusion group) 
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from the sample because they indicated awareness of the deception in Cyberball in 
a questionnaire presented at the end of the experiment. One more participant was 
excluded as an outlier, as the difference in response times (RT) between direct and 
downward gaze trials was very large for this participant (over three standard 
deviations above the mean difference in the sample). Thus, the final sample consisted 
of 62 participants (nexclusion = 21, ninclusion = 21, ncontrol = 20). 
After the Cyberball manipulation, participants filled in a short basic need and 
mood questionnaire (see above for details). After this, they completed an attentional 
disengagement task, consisting of two blocks of 128 trials each. On each trial, 
participants first saw a fixation cross for 650-850 ms, after which it was replaced with 
a picture of a face portraying either direct or downward gaze (two female and two 
male faces were used, created with a 3D animation software). After a 200-ms or 500-
ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), a target stimulus (a vertical or a horizontal 
line, 1.3° of visual angle) was placed 15.5° to the left or right of the face. Participants 
were instructed to identify the line orientation by pressing a corresponding button 
on a keyboard as quickly as possible while trying not to make mistakes. The response 
time in identifying the line orientation was the main dependent variable in this study. 
For an illustration of a single trial, see Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Illustration of a trial in the attentional disengagement task in Study III. A fixation cross was 
displayed for a random duration between 650-850 ms, followed by the face stimulus 
depicting direct or downward gaze. After a 200 / 500 ms SOA, a target stimulus appeared 
to the left or right of the face. Participants identified the target stimulus as quickly as 
possible by pressing a corresponding key on a keyboard. 
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Mean RTs for each combination of gaze direction, SOA, and block position were 
calculated individually for each participant. We removed trials with no responses (< 
0.1 % of all trials), trials with incorrect responses (3.8 % of all trials), and trials with 
RTs outside 2.5 SD from the individual mean (2.6 % of remaining trials). To correct 
for non-normal distribution of the data, a square root transformation was conducted 
for the analyses, but untransformed scores are presented for clarity. 
3.4.2 Results of Study III 
For means and standard deviations for basic need, mood, and pain ratings in each 
group in Study III, see Table 2. These data show that exclusion evoked the expected 
affective responses. Excluded participants reported significantly lower basic need 
satisfaction and positive mood, and significantly higher negative mood and pain than 
the inclusion group or the control group. Included participants did not differ 
significantly from the control group on any of these measurements, although basic 
need satisfaction was marginally higher in the inclusion group. 
Table 2.  Basic need, mood and pain scores for each group in Study III 
 Exclusion M (SD) Inclusion M (SD) Control M (SD) 
Basic needs 2.01 (0.84) 3.85 (0.65) 3.46 (0.78) 
Positive mood 2.14 (1.06) 3.67 (1.24) 3.10 (1.21) 
Negative mood 2.29 (1.19) 1.10 (0.30) 1.20 (0.52) 
Pain 24.4 (23.3) 1.5 (3.8) 6.0 (16.8) 
Note. Basic need satisfaction and mood scores are on a 1-5 scale; pain scores are on a 0-
100 visual analog scale 
For mean RTs in each condition in the attentional disengagement task, see Figure 7. 
Surprisingly, the results showed that, in general, there were no differences in RTs 
between direct and downward gaze trials. Most importantly, we found an interaction 
between inclusionary status and gaze direction (see Figure 8). RTs were significantly 
longer for direct gaze trials, compared to downward gaze trials in the inclusion group, 
but not in the exclusion and control groups. In these groups, the RTs tended to be 
longer for downward gaze trials than direct gaze trials, although the difference was 
not statistically significant in either group. There were no differences between groups 
in RTs on either direct or downward gaze trials. 
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Figure 7.  Mean response times in each condition in Study III. The error bars denote standard error 
of the mean. 
 
Figure 8.  Mean response times on direct and downward gaze trials in the exclusion, inclusion and 
control groups, averaged over the two blocks and SOAs. Error bars denote standard error 
of the mean. *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10 
3.5 Study IV 
In Study IV, we took a wider perspective on how social exclusion influences 
processing of social information. A review of the literature revealed that various 
types of effects on social information processing had been reported. First, several 
studies had shown that exclusion improves memory for social information, allowing 
excluded individuals to better remember information that is highly important for 
them (e.g., Bernstein, Sacco, Young, & Hugenberg, 2014; Gardner et al., 2000). 
Second, research had revealed that exclusion alters the way individuals view and 
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evaluate social information: sometimes they rate social stimuli particularly positively 
and sometimes negatively, possibly reflecting the excluded individuals’ motivational 
and emotional states (e.g., DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Maner et 
al., 2007). Third, it had been reported that exclusion modulates performance in 
perceptual tasks, such as enhancing facial expression recognition accuracy (e.g., 
Bernstein et al., 2008). Finally, exclusion had been found to influence attention, for 
instance, increasing the tendency to shift attention towards smiling faces and 
increasing engagement of attention with smiling faces (e.g., DeWall, Maner, & 
Rouby, 2009; Buckner et al., 2010). In other studies, increased attention towards 
negative faces had been reported as well (e.g., Kraines et al., 2018; Tuscherer et al., 
2015). 
While many intriguing social information processing effects had been 
demonstrated, we also identified significant gaps in the literature. Some impactful 
ideas were not firmly supported by the existing empirical evidence. For instance, 
there is a popular notion that exclusion generally increases allocation of attention to 
social information (e.g., Pickett et al., 2004; Shilling & Brown, 2016), but the 
hypothesis had not been tested in a way that allow determining whether attention 
was increased towards social stimuli specifically. In a similar vein, the increased 
attention to affective social stimuli, such as smiling faces, had often been interpreted 
as increased attention to affective social stimuli specifically, but because non-social 
control conditions had typically not been used, the findings could also reflect 
increased attention to affective stimuli generally, including affective non-social 
stimuli. 
From the point of view of cognitive psychology, relatively little attention had 
been paid to investigating the mechanisms, which mediate the reported effects of 
social exclusion on processing of social information. For instance, no study had 
investigated whether the improved memory for social information reflects changes 
in memory retrieval processes specifically, or changes at earlier information 
processing stages, later allowing more memory to be retrieved. For effects found in 
other studies, researchers had discussed possible mediating mechanisms, but there 
was little empirical research testing the explanations. Some researchers had attributed 
the enhanced facial expression recognition accuracy to increased attention to the 
stimuli (Pickett et al., 2004), but other researchers had argued that the effect is driven 
by exclusion directly altering the perceptual processes, which organize visual 
information (Sacco et al., 2011). Similarly, different explanations had been offered 
regarding the mechanisms that mediate the effects of exclusion on attention. 
According to one influential idea, humans have a specialized social monitoring 
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system, which directs attention to socially salient information when the need for 
belonging is threatened (Pickett & Gardner, 2005). Alternatively, the attentional 
effects could reflect excluded individuals’ learned emotion regulation strategies (cf. 
Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012). However, no studies had 
stringently tested these different explanations, and thus it is not possible to 
conclusively determine which explanations best account for the various effects of 
exclusion on social cognitive processes. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
The present studies investigated how socially excluded and socially included 
individuals respond to others’ eye gaze, and more broadly, how social exclusion 
influences processing of social information. First, we investigated whether viewing a 
face with direct gaze would alleviate distress caused by exclusion. In Study I, two 
experiments found no evidence that recovery of basic needs after exclusion was 
facilitated by viewing a video of a person portraying direct gaze. A second aim was 
to examine how exclusion influences gaze direction judgments in a context where 
there is no opportunity for reaffiliation with the excluders or others. The results of 
Study II showed that the range of gaze directions judged as direct (i.e., the gaze cone) 
was narrower among participants excluded in an online ball-tossing game than in an 
inclusion group or a non-social control group. Thirdly, we investigated whether 
social exclusion would delay attentional disengagement from faces with direct gaze. 
We found no evidence for this in Study III. The response times in identifying 
peripheral stimuli were similar on direct and downward gaze trials in both the social 
exclusion group and the non-social control group. There were also no differences in 
response times between the groups. 
The fourth aim of this research was to investigate whether social inclusion, in 
addition to exclusion, would influence affect, gaze direction judgments, and 
attentional disengagement from direct gaze. We found no significant differences 
between inclusion and control groups in self-reported basic need satisfaction, 
positive or negative mood, or pain (in Studies II-III), or in the width of the gaze 
cone (in Study II). Intriguingly, however, inclusion influenced attentional 
disengagement in Study III. The response times in identifying peripheral stimuli were 
longer for direct gaze trials than downward gaze trials in the inclusion group, but not 
in the exclusion and control groups. 
Finally, we took a broader look into how exclusion modulates social information 
processing, by reviewing and evaluating research on the topic from a cognitive 
psychology perspective in Study IV. Exclusion had been found to influence memory 
for social information, and to influence performance in perceptual tasks, such as 
improving facial expression recognition. Exclusion had also been found to modulate 
evaluations of social stimuli, sometimes causing individuals to judge others 
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particularly positively, and sometimes negatively. Finally, exclusion had been found 
to influence attention allocation, such as increasing the tendency to shift attention 
towards smiling faces, but sometimes towards threatening faces as well. Importantly, 
there were also notable gaps in the literature. Some of the conclusions drawn from 
the studies were not firmly supported by the evidence, or there were several 
alternative explanations for the findings. The cognitive mechanisms driving the 
reported social information processing effects had also not been carefully 
investigated. 
I will next discuss these findings in more detail. First, I will dissect the empirical 
studies’ (Studies I-III) findings regarding excluded individuals’ responses to others’ 
eye gaze. After this, I will put these findings into a larger context, discussing what 
they, along with Study IV, suggest about social exclusion, social information 
processing, and emotion regulation. I will then discuss what Studies II and III 
revealed about effects of social inclusion and what implications these findings have. 
4.1 Social exclusion and responses to eye gaze 
4.1.1 Recovery from exclusion 
In both experiments of Study I, social exclusion evoked the expected affective 
responses, as excluded participants, compared to included participants, reported 
lower basic need satisfaction immediately after the manipulation (consistent with 
earlier studies; Hartgerink et al., 2015). After this reflexive stage measurement, 
participants were shown a video of a person portraying direct or averted gaze, 
followed by another measurement of basic needs in the reflective stage. As the 
temporal need-threat model predicts (Williams, 2007), excluded participants’ affect 
recovered between the two measurements. Most importantly, however, the gaze 
manipulation had no effect on recovery in either experiment. Excluded participants 
reported similar levels of basic need satisfaction in the reflective stage, irrespective 
of whether they were shown direct gaze or downward gaze videos. Notably, 
however, this result does not conclusively show that direct gaze has no effect on 
recovery at all, as the experiments may have been underpowered to detect small to 
medium effects. However, the two follow-up meta-analyses showed that even if this 
effect was not zero, it was nevertheless quite small. Simply diverting attention on 
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another task moderates excluded individuals’ basic need recovery significantly more 
than seeing direct gaze. 
Of course, an intriguing question is why direct gaze had little or no effect on 
recovery from exclusion even though direct gaze is an affiliative cue which would be 
expected to increase feelings of connectedness (Hietanen et al., 2018; Wesselmann 
et al., 2012; Wirth et al., 2010). It is unlikely that this was because excluded 
participants experienced direct gaze as signaling threat instead of affiliation (Lamer 
et al., 2015). Previous research has shown that acknowledgment of any kind, even 
hostile acknowledgment, can ameliorate effects of exclusion (Rudert et al., 2017). 
Thus, even if excluded participants had experienced direct gaze as threatening, they 
might still have preferred this cue to being entirely ignored (cf. O’Reilly et al., 2014). 
Another, more plausible explanation is that this affiliative cue does not make 
excluded individuals feel reconnected if it does not genuinely convey 
acknowledgment by another person. Previous research showing that 
acknowledgment or inclusion moderated recovery from exclusion involved real or 
ostensibly real interactions with other people (e.g., Gross, 2009; Rudert et al., 2017; 
Zwolinski, 2014). In Study I, however, participants were undoubtedly aware that they 
were not attended to by another person, as they viewed a video rather than a live 
person. Recent evidence shows that direct gaze seen in a video does not evoke similar 
physiological responses as direct gaze portrayed by a live person, even if attempting 
to vividly mentalize that the other person is physically present (Lyyra, Myllyneva, & 
Hietanen, 2018). One reason why pictorial and live faces do not always evoke similar 
responses in the perceiver (e.g., Hietanen et al., 2008; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, 
Leppänen, & Hietanen, 2011) is the perceiver knowing that pictures do not look 
back (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015). Even affiliative cues may not facilitate recovery 
if the perceiver believes that they do not convey relevant information about one’s 
inclusionary status. An important implication of this proposition is that direct gaze 
portrayed by a live person might facilitate recovery from exclusion, even though 
direct gaze in a video might not. 
Testing this hypothesis would be rather challenging, however. Social interaction 
before the latter reflective stage would have to be limited to viewing of the live 
model’s face to ensure that any additional interaction, such as a conversation, would 
not cause recovery of basic needs. Doing this in a natural way that would not allow 
participants to figure out the purpose of the study would be difficult. In addition, 
the live model would have to be presented to all participants immediately after the 
first, reflexive stage measurement to minimize spontaneous recovery between the 
measurement stages. This should either be done for several participants 
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simultaneously, requiring multiple live models, or the experiment would have to be 
run for each participant individually. Both options would have been too resource 
intensive for the current study, and thus we did not test the hypothesis that a live 
person’s direct gaze would facilitate recovery. However, this might be worth 
investigating in future research. 
If recovery from exclusion were indeed only facilitated by cues that genuinely 
convey acknowledgment by another person, but not by pictorial acknowledgment 
cues, it would suggest that high-level cognitive processes are an integral part of the 
recovery. The excluded individual’s affective state does not fluctuate depending on 
what types of stimuli they perceive as such, but rather depending on how they assess 
the situation and their social standing. Consistent with the notion that high-level 
cognitive appraisal is involved in recovery from exclusion, previous research has 
found that basic need recovery is thwarted if attributing exclusion to a feature salient 
to one’s identity (gender), as compared to attributing exclusion to an arbitrary group 
membership (blue/green color of the character in Cyberball; Wirth & Williams, 
2009). An important implication of this proposition is that manipulations may not 
influence recovery from exclusion similarly in all individuals, but the effects may be 
dependent on how the person appraises the situation. For instance, even if genuine 
eye contact would facilitate recovery, the effect might be diminished in individuals 
suffering from social anxiety, as they tend to view the cue as conveying threat instead 
of affiliation (Myllyneva et al., 2015; Wieser et al., 2009). 
4.1.2 Gaze direction judgments 
The main finding of Study II was that socially excluded participants, compared to 
control and inclusion groups, judged a narrower range of gaze directions as being 
pointed at them. Narrowing of the gaze cone may reflect avoidance motivation, as 
people devalue their relationships with others who are averting their gaze (Wirth et 
al., 2010) and may be inclined to avoid individuals looking away (cf. Hietanen et al., 
2008). Avoidance motivation is associated with a tendency to interpret ambiguous 
facial expressions as angry (Nikitin & Freund, 2015), and similarly, excluded 
individuals’ tendency to judge others as hostile or rejecting has been attributed to a 
motivation to avoid social interactions or to aggress (DeWall, Twenge, et al., 2009; 
Smart Richman, Martin, & Guadagno, 2016). The current results may suggest that a 
socially avoidant motivational response to exclusion also biases gaze direction 
judgments accordingly. Notably, however, we cannot conclusively determine 
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whether narrowing of the gaze cone reflects avoidance motivation, as we did not 
measure participants’ motivations directly, and thus there are alternative explanations 
for the finding. Firstly, excluded participants may have attempted to avoid self-
relevant stimuli and the resulting increases in self-awareness, which excluded 
individuals may experience as aversive (cf. Hess & Pickett, 2010; Twenge, Catanese, 
& Baumeister, 2003). Alternatively, excluded participants may have aimed to avoid 
falsely judging a rejecting individual as affiliative, thus decreasing chances of further 
rejection (cf., error management theory; Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 
2013). 
Importantly, the study demonstrated that exclusion can influence gaze direction 
judgments differently in different contexts. A previous experiment employing similar 
methods found an opposite response, as excluded participants had a wider gaze cone 
than included participants (Lyyra et al., 2017). The factor that most likely explains 
the different outcomes in the two experiments is a difference in the social exclusion 
and inclusion manipulations. In the previous study, participants engaged in a ball-
tossing game ostensibly with other participants present in the laboratory, whereas in 
the current study, the game was supposedly played online with people located 
elsewhere. Because participants were alone in the laboratory, they had no 
opportunity for affiliating with the excluders or others. According to the multimotive 
model proposed by Smart Richman and Leary (2009), individuals are likely to 
respond to exclusion in a socially avoidant way if there is no opportunity for 
reaffiliation (see also Cuadrado et al., 2015; DeWall & Richman, 2011; Romero-
Canyas et al., 2010). As a caveat, however, we cannot definitively ascertain whether 
this factor accounts for the differing effects in the two studies, as the possibility for 
reaffiliation was not manipulated within the experiment. We conducted an additional 
small-scale experiment (N = 42) in which we investigated if exclusion vs. inclusion 
in Cyberball influences self-reported affiliation-, avoidance-, and aggression-related 
motivations differently depending on whether the interaction partners are present in 
the laboratory or not, but the results were inconclusive because the manipulations 
had no effects on participants’ responses in the questionnaires (see the original 
publication of Study II for details of this experiment). To provide support for the 
hypothesis that possibility for reaffiliation moderates the effects of exclusion on gaze 
direction judgments, it should be demonstrated that widening and narrowing of the 
gaze cone occurs in the presence and absence of reaffiliation opportunities, 
respectively. However, this would require an experiment with a very large sample 
size, as both participants’ inclusionary status and reaffiliation opportunities would 
have to be manipulated within the same experiment. Running this kind of 
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experiment with sufficient statistical power to detect effects on the gaze cone was 
outside the scope of the current study, and thus further research on the issue is still 
required. 
4.1.3 Attentional disengagement 
The results of Study III showed that response times in identifying peripheral stimuli 
were longer on direct gaze trials vs. downward gaze trials only in the social inclusion 
group, but not in the social exclusion group or the non-social control group. There 
were no significant differences in response times between the groups on either direct 
or downward gaze trials. Thus, social exclusion did not delay attentional 
disengagement from faces with direct gaze, contrary to what was predicted based on 
earlier studies reporting that exclusion increased allocation of attention to faces 
showing affiliative facial expressions (e.g., DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009), and that 
exclusion enhanced attention shifts triggered by averted gaze (Wilkowski et al., 
2009). This was not due to the manipulation failing to evoke feelings of exclusion, 
as excluded participants reported experiencing lower basic need satisfaction and 
mood, and more pain than the other groups. 
There are two important distinctions between Study III and earlier studies on 
effects of exclusion on attention to faces (e.g., Buckner et al., 2010; DeWall, Maner, 
& Rouby, 2009; Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015; Tuscherer et al., 2015), suggesting possible 
interpretations for the finding. Firstly, this was the first study to investigate the 
effects of exclusion on attention to faces portraying direct gaze. Previous research in 
this field has mostly investigated attention allocation towards different facial 
expressions. A possible interpretation is that people may allocate attention towards 
smiling faces but not towards direct gaze faces as a response to exclusion, possibly 
because they may see a smile as a more affiliative cue than direct gaze on a neutral 
face. Secondly, this was the first reported experiment in this field to examine the 
effects of exclusion on attentional disengagement rather than visual search, or the 
stages of attentional shifting or engagement. It has been proposed that attentional 
biases to affiliative cues help excluded individuals in detecting and identifying socially 
relevant stimuli (Shilling & Brown, 2016). Detection and identification might not be 
facilitated by delayed disengagement from the stimuli, and thus exclusion might not 
exert its influence at this component of attention. However, both these 
interpretations are speculative at this point. Future studies could provide more 
insight into which kinds of cues excluded individuals allocate their attention towards, 
 47 
and which attentional processes exclusion modulates. It could be investigated 
whether exclusion enhances the tendency to shift attention towards faces showing 
direct gaze (e.g., Böckler, van der Wel, & Welsh, 2014; von Grünau & Anston, 1995), 
or slows down disengagement from faces with different facial expressions. 
Although it was secondary to the main aims of this study, it was noteworthy that 
direct gaze did not generally influence response times to the peripheral stimuli. Thus, 
Study III did not replicate an earlier result by Senju and Hasegawa (2005) even 
though both studies used a very similar attentional disengagement task and the 
current study had more statistical power. Our finding is somewhat consistent with a 
few other recent studies reporting that direct gaze did not influence attentional 
disengagement from a face. It has been reported that saccadic latencies from face 
pictures to peripheral stimuli were similar on direct and downward gaze trials 
(Dalmaso, Castelli, & Galfano, 2017; but see Ueda et al., 2014). Another experiment 
even found shorter, rather than longer, response times to peripheral targets when 
live faces with direct gaze, compared to downward gaze, were presented in the 
fixation (Hietanen, Myllyneva, Helminen, & Lyyra, 2016). Thus, Study III 
contributes to a growing body of evidence suggesting that direct gaze might not 
generally delay attentional disengagement from a face, contrary to what has been 
argued earlier. 
4.1.4 Social information processing and emotion regulation 
The literature review in Study IV suggested that exclusion influences social 
information processing in various different ways, such as modulating attention 
allocation, affective evaluations, and even early face processing. These changes in 
social cognitive processes presumably aid excluded individuals in regulating social 
needs and mood. However, it seems unlikely that excluded individuals attend to 
affiliative face pictures (Buckner et al., 2010; DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009) or 
evaluate ambiguous face pictures positively (Lyyra et al., 2017; Maner et al., 2007) to 
enhance their affective state as such. This would not be a particularly efficient 
strategy for directly facilitating recovery from exclusion, considering that Study I 
showed that a simple distraction would alleviate distress significantly more than 
viewing a (pictorial) cue of acknowledgment. Rather, such social cognitive biases 
might be related to individuals’ motivations and behavior, and could influence, for 
instance, whom they choose to approach or avoid. 
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From this perspective, it is understandable why exclusion can, under some 
conditions, also evoke effects that presumably foster socially avoidant behavior, such 
as narrowing of the gaze cone (Study II), or increased attention towards threatening 
faces (Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015; Tuscherer et al., 2015). If viewing direct gaze had a 
strong influence on recovery from exclusion, it would be adaptive to show widening 
of the gaze cone (Lyyra et al., 2017) regardless of the situation. However, different 
kinds of motivational responses and associated social cognitive changes could be 
advantageous in different situations. A socially avoidant response may generally seem 
counterproductive, but if the individual deems reaffiliation implausible, this 
motivational tendency could be an effective way of protecting oneself from further 
rejection, at least in the short term. In the long term, however, such tendencies could 
be deleterious, as they might further increase isolation and its associated problems 
(Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009). 
As these changes in social information processing may be an important part of 
excluded individuals’ emotion regulation, it would be useful to form a detailed 
picture of how the effects emerge. A central finding of Study IV was that many 
studies in this field have been rather vague in differentiating the precise cognitive 
mechanisms mediating the effects of exclusion on social information processing. It 
is not clear, for instance, whether enhanced memory for social information or 
enhanced facial expression recognition accuracy are caused by changes in memory 
or perceptual processes, respectively, or if these effects reflect, for instance, altered 
attention allocation, such as increased attention to the tasks or specific features of 
the stimuli. Notably, the present empirical studies also have the same limitation, and 
thus we cannot for instance determine the cognitive processes mediating the altered 
gaze direction judgments in Study II. Such questions could be investigated in the 
future by employing additional control tasks that allow ruling out alternative 
explanations for the results (for examples, see e.g., Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 
2002; Cohen, Alvarez, & Nakayama, 2011; Firestone & Scholl, 2016). 
Future research should also examine whether specialized mechanisms mediate 
the effects of exclusion on attention as the impactful social monitoring system 
hypothesis posits (Pickett & Gardner, 2005; Pickett et al., 2004). It would be 
important to stringently test predictions of the hypothesis, such as the idea that 
exclusion increases allocation of attention to social information generally. It would 
also be important to show that the reported information processing effects are 
specific to social stimuli, and that similar effects are not observed for non-social 
stimuli (as done in, e.g., Capellini et al., 2019; Claypool & Bernstein, 2014; Gardner 
et al., 2000). However, even these tests of the hypothesis would not allow 
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determining whether the attentional effects were driven by an inherent social 
monitoring system, as similar responses could also be related to learned emotion 
regulation strategies (Todd et al., 2012). Future research could more directly examine 
whether there are specialized systems for mediating the effects of exclusion on 
attention, by investigating the neural basis of the hypothesized system. 
Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether the various social information 
processing effects are driven by voluntary or involuntary processes. Many studies in 
this field have investigated processing stages that are partly under voluntary control, 
such as evaluative judgments, or late stages of attention deployment, when attention 
can be voluntarily oriented. Future research could investigate whether exclusion also 
modulates involuntary processes, such as automatically triggered affective responses 
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) or early, involuntary attentional shifts (Carrasco, 2011). 
Changes at these early stages may shape responding at later, conscious stages, and 
thus research on these questions could illuminate whether the social information 
processing effects reflect intentional or automatized emotion regulation (see also 
DeWall et al., 2011). 
4.2 Effects of social inclusion 
We made three noteworthy findings regarding the effects of social inclusion in 
Studies II and III. First, there was no evidence that social inclusion influenced affect, 
as there were no statistically significant differences on self-reported basic need 
satisfaction, mood, or pain between inclusion and control groups in either 
experiment. Interestingly, there was a marginal difference between inclusion and 
control groups in basic need satisfaction in Study III, possibly reflecting a slightly 
enhanced affective state in the inclusion group (consistent with results by Blackhart 
et al., 2009). However, strong conclusions should not be drawn from this finding 
because the difference was not statistically significant, and because the result differed 
from Study II. Our findings were mostly consistent with earlier studies suggesting 
that social inclusion in Cyberball does not evoke strong affective responses (Dvir et 
al., 2018; Riva et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the possibility cannot conclusively be ruled 
out, as our experiments may have been underpowered to detect small effects. 
A second notable finding was that, in Study II, social inclusion had no effect on 
gaze direction judgments, as the gaze cone was equally wide in the inclusion and 
control groups. Previous research has not been able to disentangle effects of 
exclusion and inclusion on gaze direction judgments due to using inclusion as the 
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only control task (Lyyra et al., 2017), but the present results suggest that the 
difference between excluded and included participants is indeed driven by exclusion. 
The third and most intriguing finding was that, in Study III, social inclusion 
influenced attentional disengagement from the faces. As mentioned earlier, the 
response times to peripheral stimuli were longer on direct gaze trials than downward 
gaze trials in the social inclusion group, but not in the other groups. Because the 
result was not anticipated a priori, it is difficult to ascertain what the effect reflects. 
A possible interpretation is that an inclusive social interaction activated cognitive 
processes related to affiliation, which made included participants experience direct 
gaze as a particularly salient cue (cf. McCrackin & Itier, 2018) and thereby increasing 
allocation of attention towards faces with direct gaze. However, further research 
would be needed to fully understand the unexpected result. 
An important reason for investigating the effects of inclusion in Cyberball is to 
ascertain whether inclusion is a valid control condition when investigating effects of 
exclusion. Cyberball has been used in hundreds of studies, and the vast majority of 
these studies have used social inclusion as the only control condition, assuming any 
between-group differences to be caused by exclusion (Hartgerink et al., 2015; 
Williams & Jarvis, 2006). This assumption was previously challenged by a finding 
that inclusion, but not exclusion, increased interest in mating, when compared to a 
no-manipulation condition (Brown et al., 2009). Our results provide further evidence 
that some of the differences between excluded and included participants are driven 
by inclusion. Thus, future research using Cyberball and other exclusion 
manipulations would benefit from including non-social control conditions to be able 
to disentangle the effects of exclusion from the effects of inclusion. Importantly, 
however, we are not suggesting that the earlier findings of the effects of exclusion 
on social cognitive processes, reviewed in Study IV, were driven by the used control 
manipulations. While a significant portion of these studies used social inclusion or 
acceptance as the only control condition (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2014; Sacco et al., 
2011; Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015), similar effects had also been reported in studies 
using other types of controls (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2008; DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 
2009; van Bavel, Swencionis, O’Connor, & Cunningham, 2012). 
The non-social ball game used in the present research would be a useful control 
manipulation for future Cyberball studies as well. It more closely resembles the 
standard exclusion and inclusion conditions than non-social controls used in 
previous studies, such as a no-manipulation condition (Brown et al., 2009) or tasks 
involving mental visualization of nature (Dvir et al., 2018; Riva et al., 2014), the latter 
having the additional limitation that natural scenes can evoke positive affective 
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responses (Ulrich et al., 1991). However, while the current control task is suitable 
for disentangling the effects of exclusion and inclusion, it cannot control for all 
potentially relevant factors. For instance, differences between exclusion and control 
groups could result from reductions in mood, rather than reflecting aversive social 
experiences specifically. Therefore, ruling out mood effects would require an 
affectively negative non-social control condition (cf. Maner et al., 2007). Another 
potentially relevant factor this task cannot control for is expectancy violation. Some 
of Cyberball’s effects on brain activity may be driven by the exclusion condition 
violating participants’ expectations, resulting in increased processing of cognitive 
conflict (Somerville et al., 2006). 
4.3 Limitations 
One potential limitation of the empirical studies (Studies I-III) was that the exclusion 
manipulation aroused suspicion in participants, resulting in several of them inferring 
that they were being deceived in the experiment. The problem with participants 
figuring out the deception is that it could diminish the effects of the manipulation, 
or alternatively demand characteristics could drive these participants’ responding 
(Nichols & Maner, 2008). In the current studies (except in Study I, Exp. 2), the issue 
was dealt with by removing suspicious participants from the analyses. It is 
noteworthy, however, that this approach could potentially introduce new issues, 
such as skewing of the final sample due to conditional exclusion of participants from 
analyses. The issue of suspicion may be difficult to fully solve in social exclusion 
studies that involve deceiving participants. This is because expectancy violation, 
inherent to many social exclusion experiences (Wesselmann, Wirth, & Bernstein, 
2017), likely increases cognitive processing of the incident (cf. Somerville et al., 
2006), allowing some excluded participants to figure out that they are being deceived. 
This may not be an issue when investigating reflexive affective responses, because 
the initial reaction to exclusion is similar regardless of whether the individual thinks 
the situation is genuine or not (Zadro et al., 2004), but dealing with suspicion 
becomes important when investigating later responses, as they are moderated by the 
individual’s inferences about the situation (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). 
Another limitation of the empirical studies was the lack of non-social control 
stimuli in the eye gaze manipulations and tasks. In Studies I and III, faces with direct 
gaze were compared to faces with downward gaze, but not to any other stimuli. 
Thus, it is possible that the faces as such, regardless of their gaze direction, had some 
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effect on the measurements of interest. For instance, in Study I, perception of faces 
may have had some effect on basic need recovery so that direct gaze did not offer 
any additional benefit. Similarly, exclusion could have influenced disengagement 
from faces in general in Study III. Even though no differences in response times 
between the exclusion group and the control group were found, it is possible, for 
instance, that exclusion delayed attentional disengagement from faces, but the effect 
was cancelled out by enhanced arousal evoked by exclusion (Kelly, McDonald, & 
Rushby, 2012). Moreover, because non-social control stimuli were not used in Study 
II, we cannot determine whether narrowing of the gaze cone reflects altered 
responding to eye gaze specifically. Showing that exclusion modulates judgments of 
gaze directions, but not judgments of directions of non-social, motivationally 
irrelevant stimuli such as arrows, would provide further evidence that changes in the 
gaze cone reflect changes in motivational states. 
Finally, a limitation of the present research was the relatively modest sample size 
in the empirical studies. While the sample sizes were comparable to many other 
studies in this field (e.g., DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009; Lyyra et al., 2017; Xu et 
al., 2015), the experiments may have been underpowered to detect smaller effects. 
Null findings regarding effects of the exclusion and inclusion manipulations should 
therefore be interpreted cautiously. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
The present research described what is currently known about effects of exclusion 
on processing of social information, and extended this literature by investigating 
excluded and included individuals’ responses to others’ eye gaze. Contrary to our 
expectations, direct gaze did not alleviate distress caused by exclusion, and excluded 
participants did not show difficulties in disengaging attention from direct gaze, 
suggesting that socially excluded individuals may not respond to direct gaze 
particularly strongly. Information conveyed by others’ eye gaze is nevertheless 
important for navigating different kinds of social environments, and this may be 
especially true for individuals whose social status is threatened. Exclusion alters gaze 
direction judgments, and these changes are modulated by situational factors, possibly 
reflecting excluded individuals’ inferences of the situation and their reaffiliation 
opportunities. 
Future research could investigate mechanisms driving the effects of exclusion on 
social cognitive processes. It would be interesting to determine if effects such as 
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altered gaze direction judgments or attention allocation reflect changes only in high-
level voluntary processes, or also in earlier, automatic processes. Moreover, future 
research could examine boundary conditions for elicitation of these different effects, 
allowing researchers to form better understanding on why exclusion influences social 
information processing differently in different people (Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015; 
Tuscherer et al., 2015). This would be important, as social cognitive biases, such as 
a tendency to attend to threatening cues and to judge others as hostile, mediate the 
effect of exclusion on aggressive behavior (Dodge et al., 2003) and are an important 
determinant of problems such as depression, anxiety and loneliness (Cacioppo & 
Hawkley, 2009; Leppänen, 2006; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
Holker, 2002). Seemingly maladaptive responses to exclusion, such as aggression or 
social withdrawal, have been considered puzzling (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; 
Wesselmann et al., 2015). However, they may become understandable when 
considering how excluded individuals view the world around them. For a person 
who views the environment as hostile and threatening, withdrawal or aggression may 
seem like the only way to cope. A person who instead responds to exclusion by 
seeking affiliative cues is more likely to act in ways that will allow restoring a sense 
of belonging. 
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WHEN A LOOK IS NOT ENOUGH: NO EVIDENCE FOR 
DIRECT GAZE FACILITATING RECOVERY AFTER SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION
Aleksi H. Syrjämäki, Pessi Lyyra, Mikko J. Peltola, and Jari K. Hietanen
University of Tampere, Finland
Direct gaze has been suggested to convey inclusion. We hypothesized that 
receiving direct gaze could alleviate distress caused by social exclusion. 
In two experiments, participants were first either included or excluded, 
and then shown a video of a person portraying either direct or downward 
gaze. Basic need satisfaction was measured immediately after the exclu-
sion manipulation and after viewing the eye gaze stimuli. In Experiment 
1, after watching the one-minute eye gaze video and “mentally visual-
izing” an interaction with the person, basic need satisfaction of excluded 
participants had recovered completely, regardless of the gaze direction. In 
Experiment 2, participants were shown shorter eye gaze videos in which 
the person gave task instructions. Participants recovered partially by the 
delayed measurement, but gaze direction did not moderate this recovery. 
These results indicate that seeing direct gaze has little or no effect on re-
covery after social exclusion.
Keywords: ostracism, eye gaze, eye contact
Social exclusion is a common phenomenon that threatens the fundamental human 
need to belong (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007). Social exclusion 
can take many forms, such as ostracism (Williams, 2007), rejection (e.g., Maner, 
DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007), and discrimination (e.g., Smart Richman, 
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Martin, & Guadagno, 2016).1 Even short-term exclusion is distressing, as it low-
ers mood (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009), thwarts satisfaction of basic social needs of 
belonging, control, meaningful existence, and self-esteem (Hartgerink, van Beest, 
Wicherts, & Williams, 2015), and can even be painful (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, 
& Williams, 2003). According to the temporal need-threat model (e.g., Williams, 
2007), this immediate, reﬂexive reaction to exclusion is followed by a delayed re-
ﬂective reaction, during which excluded individuals attempt to fortify thwarted 
basic needs, usually by seeking reconnection with others. This idea is supported 
by ﬁndings that excluded participants, compared to controls, are more interested 
in forming new relationships and working with others, and rate others as nicer, 
friendlier, and more attractive (Maner et al., 2007). To promote their relational sta-
tus, excluded individuals may work harder (Williams & Sommer, 1997), and in 
order to ﬁt in, they may comply (Riva, Williams, Torstrick, & Montali, 2014), con-
form (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), imitate others’ body movements (Lakin, 
Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008), and buy speciﬁc products (Mead, Baumeister, Stillman, 
Rawn, & Vohs, 2011).
A few studies have examined how afﬁliation with others moderates the affec-
tive impact of social exclusion. Being accompanied by a close other (Teng & Chen, 
2012) or even a dog (Aydin et al., 2012) during exclusion can attenuate distress in 
the immediate, reﬂexive stage. Recovery from exclusion can also be moderated by 
successful reafﬁliation. In one study, a friendly interaction with an experimenter 
after exclusion reduced aggression more than a neutral interaction (Twenge et al., 
2007). In another study, excluded participants showed greater recovery of self-
esteem and affect after chatting with a peer online than after playing a solitary 
game of Tetris (Gross, 2009). Zwolinski (2014) found that an inclusive interaction 
alleviated affective distress after exclusion more than the passing of time.
As afﬁliation can ameliorate aversive outcomes of exclusion, excluded individu-
als could be highly attentive to afﬁliative cues (see also Shilling & Brown, 2016). 
Indeed, attention to smiling faces is increased in participants expecting exclusion 
(DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009), as well as in participants excluded from a vir-
tual ball-tossing game (Xu et al., 2015). In one study, excluded participants were 
more accurate than included participants at distinguishing between happy and 
angry faces (Sacco, Wirth, Hugenberg, Chen, & Williams, 2011). In another study, 
reﬂecting on exclusion made participants more accurate at distinguishing genu-
ine smiles from smiles that were not genuine (Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & 
Claypool, 2008).
Not only facial expressions of positive affect, but also direct gaze could be an 
afﬁliative cue for excluded individuals. Several authors have suggested that di-
rect gaze signals inclusion (Wesselmann, Cardoso, Slater, & Williams, 2012; Wirth, 
1. While ostracism, rejection, discrimination, and other related concepts have their own distinct 
deﬁnitions, they have a lot in common (see e.g., Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). There may be 
important distinctions between these phenomena, but because the psychological outcomes are 
relatively similar, the terms are often used interchangeably (see e.g., Williams, 2007). Discussing 
differences between these concepts is beyond the scope of the current article, and thus we will simply 
use the umbrella term social exclusion to refer to all related phenomena.
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Sacco, Hugenberg, & Williams, 2010). It has been reported that a brief eye contact 
with a passerby can increase feelings of connectedness (Wesselmann et al., 2012), 
and being in eye contact (vs. seeing averted gaze) increases the perceived value of 
the relationship (Wirth et al., 2010). Seeing another person portraying direct gaze 
has also been shown to elicit positive affective reactions in the observer (Chen, 
Helminen, & Hietanen, 2017; Chen, Peltola, Ranta, & Hietanen, 2016), and activate 
brain mechanisms related to approach motivation (Hietanen, Leppänen, Peltola, 
Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008). Because direct gaze communicates that one is being 
attended to (see Conty, George, & Hietanen, 2016), it could be an especially signiﬁ-
cant cue for excluded individuals. Excluded participants, compared to included 
participants, have been shown to look more in the eyes of their interaction part-
ners, suggesting that they attempt to make eye contact in order to get reintegrated 
in the interaction (Böckler, Hömke, & Sebanz, 2014). In a recent study, excluded 
participants, compared to included participants, accepted a wider range of gaze 
directions as being direct, possibly because seeing direct gaze could make them 
feel reconnected (Lyyra, Wirth, & Hietanen, 2017). It seems, thus, that excluded in-
dividuals seek direct gaze, possibly as a coping strategy that could make them feel 
reconnected. If direct gaze can convey inclusion, it would be expected to alleviate 
the aversive effects of exclusion as well.
Even though direct gaze can signal inclusion and elicit various positive reac-
tions, it should be noted that it can also be perceived as threatening (see Kleinke, 
1986). This is especially true when direct gaze is accompanied with an angry fa-
cial expression (see Adams & Kleck, 2005). Seeing angry faces portraying direct 
gaze can lower self-esteem (Lamer, Reeves, & Weisbuch, 2015), and thus seeing 
threatening faces could further bolster the adverse effects of social exclusion. On 
the other hand, recent research indicates that even negative feedback can alleviate 
distress caused by social exclusion (Rudert, Hales, Greifeneder, & Williams, 2017). 
An excluded individual may prefer even negative attention to being ignored al-
together (see also O’Reilly, Robinson, Berdahl, & Banki, 2014). Thus, even if direct 
gaze were interpreted as a sign of threat, it could be expected to alleviate the ad-
verse effects of exclusion.
The purpose of the current study was to ﬁnd if receiving direct gaze could al-
leviate distress caused by social exclusion. In two experiments, participants’ feel-
ings of exclusion were manipulated using Cyberball (Williams & Jarvis, 2006), a 
virtual ball-tossing game in which participants are either included or ostracized 
(i.e., ignored and excluded). After the exclusion manipulation, the participants 
were shown a video of a person portraying either direct or downward gaze. Par-
ticipants’ basic need satisfaction was measured immediately after the manipu-
lation (reﬂexive stage) and after viewing the eye gaze stimuli (reﬂective stage). 
We hypothesized that after the exclusion manipulation, in the reﬂexive stage, 
excluded participants would report lower basic need satisfaction than included 
participants, indicative of affective distress (see Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). Based 
on the temporal need-threat model (Williams, 2007), and earlier research on recov-
ery of basic needs after exclusion (e.g., Wirth & Williams, 2009), we hypothesized 
that excluded participants would show recovery by the delayed, reﬂective stage 
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measurement, but would still report more distress than included participants. Our 
main hypothesis was that excluded participants shown a video with direct gaze 
would report less distress in the reﬂective stage than excluded participants shown 
a video with downward gaze.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, participants were included or socially excluded in a four-player 
game of Cyberball, a ball-tossing game used as a social exclusion manipulation 
(see Williams & Jarvis, 2006). After Cyberball, participants were shown a one-min-
ute video of a person portraying either direct or downward gaze.
METHOD
Participants. The participants were 80 adults (21 males, Mage = 25.6, SDage = 6.0) 
with no diagnosed psychiatric or neurological disorders. They were rewarded 
with course credit or a movie ticket. Participants signed a form of informed con-
sent. An ethical statement for the study was obtained from the Ethics Committee 
of the Tampere Region.
Participants were randomly assigned to be either included or excluded in Cy-
berball, and to be shown a video with either direct or downward gaze. The sample 
size of 80 participants was determined before data collection based on the sug-
gestion of 20 participants per cell (see Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). To 
ﬁnd if this sample size has sufﬁcient power to detect the interaction of interest, a 
power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007). We were interested in how the gaze direction manipulation 
modulates recovery of excluded participants, and thus we simpliﬁed the analysis 
by focusing on this most important interaction (however, see Muller, LaVange, 
Ramey, & Ramey, 1992 for caveats for such an approach). We estimated the re-
quired sample size for a 2 (Gaze Direction, between-subjects factor) × 2 (Recovery 
Stage, within-subjects factor) design with only the exclusion group. Using very 
similar experimental designs as the present study, but with different manipula-
tions, previous research has found the comparable interaction of interest to yield 
effect sizes ranging from η2p = .1 (Hales, Wesselmann, & Williams, 2016) to η2p = 
.29 (Molet, Macquet, Lefebvre, & Williams, 2013). Anticipating an effect size of η2p 
= .1, power of .80, and p = .05 (Cohen, 1992), and a correlation coefﬁcient of .13 
between the two measurements (Hales et al., 2016), the power analysis suggested 
34 participants in the exclusion group (17 participants per cell), and thus a total 
sample size of 68.
Apparatus and Stimuli. All materials were presented on a 19-inch LCD monitor 
with a resolution of 1280 × 1024 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. E-Prime® 2.0 software 
was used to control the stimulus presentation and to acquire data. Cyberball was 
presented on Firefox 17.0.5. Internet browser. Participants wore acoustic earmuffs 
to prevent distracting noises.
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For the eye gaze manipulation, we ﬁlmed one-minute video clips portraying 
eight different individuals (four females) with direct and downward gaze. The 
models had a neutral facial expression, but were instructed to maintain a slight 
muscle tonus in the lower part of their faces to avoid a sullen face. Minor head 
movements and eye blinks were allowed. The resolution of the videos was 1024 × 
768. The faces were approximately 13.5 cm (11°) × 18.5 cm (15°) in size. The gen-
ders and identities of the models were counterbalanced across all conditions and 
genders of the participants.
Procedure. Participants arrived in the laboratory in groups of four. Participants 
were told that the purpose of the experiment was to study “mental visualization,” 
and that they would do mental visualization tasks. To enhance the cover story, 
participants completed a bogus mental visualization questionnaire. After this, 
they played a game of Cyberball 4.0 (Williams & Jarvis, 2006) that lasted for 45 
throws. They were told to mentally visualize the interaction in detail. Participants 
were led to believe that the game was played with the other participants through 
a local area network. In reality, the course of the game was predetermined. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to inclusion and exclusion groups. Participants in 
the inclusion group received approximately 25% of the throws, and participants in 
the exclusion group only received the ball three times, once from each character in 
the beginning of the game, and then never again.
Immediately after Cyberball (reﬂexive stage), participants completed a question-
naire measuring the four basic social needs (belonging, self-esteem, meaningful ex-
istence, and control), mood, and pain (e.g., Wirth & Williams, 2009). The question-
naire was on a 1–5 Likert scale. For the sake of brevity, results of the mood and pain 
measurements are presented in Supplementary Materials.2 The basic need items 
were reverse-scored where necessary, combined and averaged to create an index of 
basic need satisfaction (α = .97). As a manipulation check, participants were asked 
to assess the percentage of all ball tosses they received. Participants were also asked 
to indicate whether they were ignored and excluded during the game.
After the questionnaire, participants were shown the one-minute eye gaze vid-
eo. In both the inclusion and exclusion groups, half of the participants saw the 
video portraying a model with direct gaze, and half were shown the video with 
downward gaze. To preserve the cover story, participants were asked to mentally 
visualize an interaction with the person in the video. The manipulation was fol-
lowed by the reﬂective stage questionnaire. The questionnaire was the same as in 
the reﬂexive stage, but instead of asking participants to rate their feelings during 
the game, they were asked to answer based on what they felt right now (αbasic needs 
= .94). As a manipulation check, participants were asked to assess the percentage 
of the time the person in the video was looking directly at them. Participants were 
also asked to indicate whether they were ignored and excluded during the video.
After all participants were ﬁnished with the experiment, they were given an 
opportunity to express doubts about the experiment, and to ask questions. After 
this, they were thoroughly debriefed. At the end of the experiment, we measured 
2. Supplementary Materials can be obtained from http://www.uta.ﬁ/yky/en/research/hip/
publications/When_a_look_is_not_enough_Supplementary_Materials.pdf
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participants’ situational self-awareness, personality traits, and trait self-esteem. 
These measurements and their results are presented in Supplementary Materials.
Data Analysis. Four participants (two males) were excluded from the analyses, 
one for withdrawing the consent and three for expressing suspicion concerning 
the Cyberball manipulation before debrieﬁng. The analyses yielded similar results 
with or without these data exclusions. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 76 partici-
pants (nincluded, direct = 20, nincluded, downward = 20, nexcluded, direct = 18, nexcluded, downward = 18).
Basic need scores were subjected to a three-way mixed design ANOVA with 
Inclusionary Status (included/excluded) and Gaze Direction (direct/downward) 
as between-subject factors, and Recovery Stage (reﬂexive/reﬂective) as a within-
subject factor. Signiﬁcant interactions were broken down with t-tests. When a Lev-
ene’s test for equality of variances revealed unequal variances between groups, 
Welch’s t-test was used (for similar analytic strategies, see Hales et al., 2016; Wirth 
& Williams, 2009).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Manipulation Checks. After the reﬂexive stage measurements, excluded partici-
pants reported receiving less of the total number of tosses (M = 9.6%, SD = 8.5) 
than included participants (M = 28.2%, SD = 13.0), t(74) = 7.30, p < .001, d = 1.69, 
95% CI [13.49, 23.63], in the Cyberball game. Excluded participants also indicated 
being more ignored (Mexcluded = 4.11, SDexcluded = 0.78, Mincluded = 1.55, SDincluded = 0.92), 
t(74) = 13.12, p < .001, d = 3.00, 95% CI [-2.95, -2.17], and excluded (Mexcluded = 4.17, 
SDexcluded = 0.81, Mincluded = 1.33, SDincluded = 0.66), t(74) = 16.87, p < .001, d = 3.85, 
95% CI [-3.18, -2.51], than included participants. After the reﬂective stage measure-
ments, participants in the direct gaze group reported that the person in the video 
was portraying more direct gaze (M = 85.5%, SD = 21.6) than participants in the 
downward gaze group (M = 5.6%, SD = 17.6), t(74) = 17.70, p < .001, d = 4.06, 95% 
CI [70.97, 88.98]. Compared to the direct gaze group, participants in the down-
ward gaze group indicated being more ignored (Mdownward = 3.42, SDdownward = 1.43, 
Mdirect = 2.45, SDdirect = 1.47), t(74) = 2.94, p = .004, d = 0.67, 95% CI [-1.64, -0.31], and 
excluded (Mdownward = 2.82, SDdownward = 1.37), t(74) = 2.73, p = .008, d = 0.63, 95% CI 
[-1.41, -0.22].
Basic Need Satisfaction. For basic need scores in each experimental group, see Table 
1. A three-way mixed design ANOVA revealed a main effect of Inclusionary Status 
on basic need satisfaction, F(1, 72) = 44.48, p < .001, η2p = .38, 95% CI [0.58, 1.07]. 
Excluded participants reported lower basic need satisfaction (M = 2.75, SD = 0.55) 
than included participants (M = 3.58, SD = 0.52). A main effect of Recovery Stage 
was also found, F(1, 72) = 22.79, p < .001, η2p = .24, 95% CI [-0.71, -0.16]. Basic need 
satisfaction was higher in the delayed, reﬂective stage (M = 3.40, SD = 0.73) than in 
the immediate, reﬂexive stage (M = 2.97, SD = 1.04). The main effect of Gaze Direc-
tion was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 72) = 1.57, p = .214, η2p = .02, 95% CI [-1.54, 0.46].
The main effects were qualiﬁed by an Inclusionary Status × Recovery Stage 
interaction, F(1, 72) = 69.30, p < .001, η2p = .49. Immediately after the exclusion 
manipulation, in the reﬂexive stage, excluded participants reported signiﬁcantly 
lower basic need satisfaction than included participants, t(74) = 11.34, p < .001, d 
WHEN A LOOK IS NOT ENOUGH 607
= 2.60, 95% CI [1.36, 1.94], showing that they felt excluded as expected. Excluded 
participants reported higher basic need satisfaction in the reﬂective stage than in 
the reﬂexive stage, t(35) = 9.58, p < .001, d = 1.91, 95% CI [-1.59, -1.03], indicating 
signiﬁcant recovery, whereas included participants reported lower basic need sat-
isfaction in the reﬂective stage than in the reﬂexive stage, t(39) = 2.51, p = .016, d 
= 0.51, 95% CI [0.07, 0.64]. Importantly, however, in the reﬂective stage, the two 
groups did not differ in basic need satisfaction, t(74) = 0.07, p = .948, d = 0.01, 95% 
CI [-0.35, 0.32], suggesting the effect of the exclusion manipulation had dissipated 
by the second measurement in the exclusion group. There were no other interac-
tions (largest F was for Inclusionary Status × Gaze Direction × Recovery Stage 
interaction, F(1, 72) = 0.20, p = .654, η2p = .00). Most importantly, excluded partici-
pants shown direct versus downward gaze videos reported similar levels of basic 
need satisfaction in the delayed, reﬂective stage, t(34) = 0.99, p = .328, d = 0.33, 95% 
CI [-0.25, 0.72].
We did not ﬁnd support for our hypothesis that seeing direct gaze could al-
leviate distress caused by social exclusion, but we could not refute it, either. The 
complete recovery of excluded participants can possibly be attributed to the dis-
traction caused by the video viewing task, and the concurrent mental visualization 
task. A one-minute break after exclusion in Cyberball is enough to allow for some, 
but not complete, recovery of basic needs and mood (Wirth & Williams, 2009). 
However, previous research has also shown that when excluded participants are 
distracted with a task in which they are asked to observe changes in video clips, 
they can completely recover in less than two minutes (Wesselmann, Ren, Swim, & 
Williams, 2013). The eye gaze manipulation, and the concurrent mental visualiza-
tion task, may have distracted the participants in our experiment, allowing for 
complete recovery of basic needs. Alternatively, excluded participants may have 
completely recovered because the mentally visualized interaction was sufﬁcient to 
make them feel reconnected.
TABLE 1. Basic Need Scores For Each Experimental Group In Both Recovery Stages (Experiment 1)
Direct gaze  
M (SD)
Downward gaze 
M (SD)
Overall mean 
M (SD)
Reflexive stage
Included 3.84 (0.57) 3.67 (0.66) 3.75 (0.61)
Excluded 2.16 (0.63) 2.04 (0.69) 2.10 (0.66)
Overall mean 3.04 (1.04) 2.90 (1.06) 2.97 (1.04)
Reflective stage
Included 3.45 (0.72) 3.35 (0.79) 3.40 (0.75)
Excluded 3.53 (0.71) 3.29 (0.72) 3.41 (0.71)
Overall mean 3.49 (0.71) 3.32 (0.75) 3.40 (0.73)
Note. The measurements were made on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale
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EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, participants were, again, included or excluded in Cyberball. To 
ensure participants would not recover completely by the delayed, reﬂective stage, 
we designed a different eye gaze manipulation. During the experiment, the par-
ticipants were given instructions in video format by a model. After the reﬂexive 
stage measurements completed immediately after the exclusion manipulation, the 
model gave instructions while portraying either direct or downward gaze. Unlike 
in Experiment 1, there was no concurrent mental visualization task, to render the 
gaze direction manipulation less distracting.
METHOD
Participants. The participants were 82 adults (20 males, Mage = 24.8, SDage = 6.3) 
with no diagnosed psychiatric or neurological disorders. They were rewarded with 
course credit or a movie ticket. Participants signed a form of informed consent.
Participants were, again, randomly assigned to be either included or excluded in 
Cyberball, and to be shown a video with either direct or downward gaze. One par-
ticipant (included in Cyberball, shown a video with downward gaze) was excluded 
from the analyses for being familiar with Cyberball. The analyses yielded similar 
results with or without this data exclusion. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 81 par-
ticipants (nincluded, direct = 20, nincluded, downward = 18, nexcluded, direct = 21, nexcluded, downward = 22).
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1, except par-
ticipants wore acoustic earmuffs with integrated audio instead of standard acous-
tic earmuffs.
We ﬁlmed short video clips portraying faces of two different models (female and 
male). The ﬁrst video, which lasted for 23 seconds, was shown before Cyberball to 
familiarize participants with the model. The model repeated the instructions for 
Cyberball in a neutral tone, and also reminded participants to mentally visualize 
the interaction. The model alternated between looking at the camera (direct gaze; 
50% of the time) and looking down (50% of the time). For the eye gaze manipula-
tion video, shown between the reﬂexive and reﬂective stage measurements, two 
clips for each model were ﬁlmed. The models were instructed to act identically 
in each video, except for the gaze direction: they looked directly at the camera in 
one video, and down in the other.3 The model gave instructions for the following 
3. Before conducting the experiment, we ensured that the models acted similarly in the direct and 
downward gaze videos. We covered the eyes of the models with a black rectangle, and asked raters, 
blind to the purpose of the study, to rate a few characteristics of the model on a 1–5 scale. Only one 
video was rated by each person. The videos of the male model were rated by 102 raters, and the 
videos of the female model by 43 raters. Between-subject t-tests found no statistically signiﬁcant 
differences between ratings of direct and downward gaze videos. For comparisons of each individual 
characteristic, the p-values were as follows: friendly: pmale = .279, pfemale = .896; approachable: pmale = 
.495, pfemale = .826; threatening: pmale = .610, pfemale = .603; attractive: pmale = .539, pfemale = .209; happy: pmale 
= .551, pfemale = .056; inspiring: pmale = .169, pfemale = .685; angry: pmale = .877, pfemale = .106; dominating: 
pmale = .746, pfemale = .244; trustworthy: pmale = .226, pfemale = .305; scary: pmale = .540, pfemale = .305; ﬂuent 
in speech: pmale = .167, pfemale = .336; convincing: pmale = .966, pfemale = .351; understandable: pmale = .076, 
pfemale = .382.
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reﬂective stage questionnaire in a neutral tone. The videos were between 25–28 
seconds in length.
Procedure. Participants arrived in the laboratory in groups of three. The experi-
menter was blind to the condition of each participant. The same mental visual-
ization cover story was used as in Experiment 1. After instructions and the ﬁrst 
video, participants played Cyberball. The manipulation was otherwise identical to 
Experiment 1, except the game included three characters instead of four, and the 
game lasted for 30 throws in total. Participants in the inclusion condition received 
approximately 33% of the throws, and participants in the exclusion condition re-
ceived it once from each character in the beginning of the game.
The reﬂexive stage measurements were administered identically to Experiment 
1 (αbasic needs = .98). After the questionnaire, participants were shown one of the eye 
gaze videos, described above. This was followed by the reﬂective stage measure-
ment. The basic need (α = .91), mood, and pain measurements were identical to 
Experiment 1. Results for mood and pain measurements are presented in Supple-
mentary Materials. As a manipulation check, participants assessed the percentage 
of the time the model was looking at them. We also probed participants’ suspicion,4 
asked them to complete a self-awareness questionnaire, and to rate a few charac-
teristics of the model. Details and results of these measurements are presented in 
Supplementary Materials. Finally, participants were thoroughly debriefed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Manipulation Checks. After the reﬂexive stage measurements, excluded partici-
pants reported receiving less of the total number of tosses (M = 10.1%, SD = 8.6) 
than included participants (M = 31.8%, SD = 7.4), t(79) = 12.08, p < .001, d = 2.70, 
95% CI [18.14, 25.29], in the Cyberball game. Compared to included participants, 
excluded participants also indicated being more ignored (Mexcluded = 4.30, SDexcluded 
= 0.89, Mincluded = 1.58, SDincluded = 0.83), t(79) = 14.24, p < .001, d = 3.17, 95% CI [-3.10, 
-2.34], and excluded (Mexcluded = 4.35, SDexcluded = 0.97, Mincluded = 1.40, SDincluded = 
0.64), t(79) = 15.92, p < .001, d = 3.60, 95% CI [-3.32, -2.59]. After the reﬂective stage 
measurements, participants in the direct gaze group reported that the model was 
portraying more direct gaze (M = 86.6%, SD = 19.4) than participants in the down-
ward gaze group (M = 29.5%, SD = 28.9), Welch’s t(68.0) = 10.40, p < .001, d = 2.32, 
95% CI [46.09, 67.98].
Basic Need Satisfaction. For basic need scores in each experimental group, see 
Table 2. A three-way mixed design ANOVA revealed a main effect of Inclusionary 
Status on basic need scores, F(1, 77) = 104.40, p < .001, η2p = .58, 95% CI [0.90, 1.34]. 
Excluded participants reported lower basic need satisfaction (M = 2.72, SD = 0.50) 
4. We measured participants’ suspicions concerning the Cyberball manipulation with a funnel-type 
questionnaire with open-ended questions. Although we did ﬁnd that many participants, especially 
in the exclusion group, were suspicious, we did not ﬁnd evidence that the level of suspicion was 
correlated with self-reported basic need satisfaction in either the reﬂexive or the reﬂective stage. 
Thus, we found no evidence that suspicion buffered against feelings of exclusion, or that demand 
characteristics drove the effect of the exclusion manipulation. Therefore, we did not exclude 
suspicious participants from the analyses. See supplementary materials for details and results of 
these measurements.
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than included participants (M = 3.85, SD = 0.49). A main effect of Recovery Stage 
was also found, F(1, 77) = 99.21, p < .001, η2p = .56, 95% CI [-0.99, -0.52]. Basic need 
satisfaction was higher in the reﬂective stage (M = 3.63, SD = 0.60) than in the re-
ﬂexive stage (M = 2.87, SD = 1.15), indicating recovery between the measurements. 
The main effect of Gaze Direction was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 77) = 2.21, p = .141, η2p 
= .03, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.53].
The main effects were qualiﬁed by an Inclusionary Status × Recovery Stage in-
teraction, F(1, 77) = 143.34, p < .001, η2p = .65. Immediately after the exclusion ma-
nipulation, in the reﬂexive stage, excluded participants reported lower basic need 
satisfaction than included participants, t(79) = 15.06, p < .001, d = 3.37, 95% CI [1.70, 
2.22], showing that they felt excluded as expected. Excluded participants reported 
higher basic need satisfaction in the delayed, reﬂective stage than in the reﬂexive 
stage, t(42) = 13.93, p < .001, d = 2.48, 95% CI [-1.77, -1.32], indicating signiﬁcant 
recovery, consistent with the temporal need-threat model of ostracism (e.g., Wil-
liams, 2007). Included participants’ basic need satisfaction was marginally lower 
in the reﬂective stage, compared to the immediate, reﬂexive stage, t(37) = 1.76, p 
= .087, d = 0.26, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.30]. In the delayed, reﬂective stage, excluded par-
ticipants reported lower basic need satisfaction than included participants, t(79) 
= 2.17, p = .033, d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.02, 0.54], indicating that, in this experiment, 
excluded participants had not completely recovered by the second measurement. 
This suggests that, unlike in Experiment 1, the delay between measurements did 
not allow for complete recovery of basic needs among excluded participants. There 
were no other interactions (largest F was for Inclusionary Status × Gaze Direction 
interaction, F(1, 77) = 1.97, p = .164, η2p = .03). Most importantly, the Inclusionary 
Status × Gaze Direction × Recovery Stage interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 77) 
= 0.26, p = .614, η2p = .00. Comparison of basic need scores of excluded participants 
in the direct and downward gaze groups in the delayed, reﬂective stage clearly 
demonstrates that the gaze directions did not differently moderate recovery from 
exclusion, Welch’s t(31.9) = 0.01, p = .992, d = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.41, 0.41].
We designed the second experiment to address the possibility that the complete 
recovery of excluded participants in the ﬁrst experiment was due to a distract-
ing eye gaze manipulation. In the ﬁrst experiment, excluded participants reported 
thwarted basic need satisfaction in the immediate, reﬂexive stage, but did not dif-
fer from the inclusion group in the reﬂective stage, possibly because the eye gaze 
manipulation with a mental visualization task distracted them. In Experiment 2, 
we administered the eye gaze stimuli in a way that was less distracting than in 
the ﬁrst experiment, and would not allow for complete recovery of the effects of 
social exclusion. We succeeded in this goal, as excluded participants still reported 
lower basic need satisfaction than included participants in the reﬂective stage.5 
However, excluded participants shown videos with different gaze directions re-
5. It is also possible that the different outcome between the experiments was not due to different 
eye gaze manipulations, but rather because the delay between reﬂexive and reﬂective stage 
measurements was not identical. Excluded participants may have recovered less in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 1, simply because less time passed between the exclusion manipulation and the 
reﬂective stage questionnaire.
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ported similar levels of basic need satisfaction in the reﬂective stage, suggesting 
that direct eye gaze did not facilitate recovery of affective distress after exclusion.
META-ANALYSES
In two experiments, we did not ﬁnd evidence that seeing direct gaze could fa-
cilitate basic need recovery after social exclusion. However, the true effect may be 
weaker than we had anticipated, and thus our experiments may have lacked sta-
tistical power to detect it. Following the suggestion by Cumming (2014), we con-
ducted a meta-analysis of our two experiments to estimate conﬁdence intervals for 
the effect size. The analysis was conducted using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 
software. We were interested in the standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) be-
tween excluded participants in the direct and downward gaze groups. The effect 
size for both experiments was calculated using means and standard deviations of 
reﬂexive and reﬂective stage basic need scores (i.e., pre- and post-scores, respec-
tively) in the two groups, and the correlation between these scores (Borenstein, 
Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). A random effects model suggested an effect 
size of d = 0.08, p = .724, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.52]. Thus, we found no evidence that see-
ing direct gaze, compared to seeing downward gaze, moderates recovery of basic 
needs after exclusion. However, this possibility cannot be conclusively ruled out, 
either, as the conﬁdence interval for the effect of gaze on basic need recovery in-
cludes relatively large effect sizes.
We originally suggested that excluded individuals may seek direct gaze as a 
coping strategy that can make them feel reconnected. If this is the case, it would 
seem likely that the effect of direct gaze on basic need recovery would be no small-
er than that of simple, low-effort coping strategies such as distraction. A search of 
the literature revealed that a few studies have found that directing attention away 
from exclusion by distraction (Wesselmann et al., 2013), self-afﬁrmation, prayer 
(Hales et al., 2016), or focused attention (Molet et al., 2013), facilitates recovery of 
basic needs after social exclusion. These studies have used very similar experi-
mental designs and dependent variables as our experiments. We subjected these 
TABLE 2. Basic Need Scores For Each Experimental Group In Both Recovery Stages (Experiment 2)
Direct gaze 
M (SD)
Downward gaze 
M (SD)
Overall mean 
M (SD)
Reflexive stage
Included 4.04 (0.53) 3.78 (0.61) 3.92 (0.57)
Excluded 1.96 (0.66) 1.94 (0.54) 1.95 (0.60)
Overall mean 2.97 (1.21) 2.77 (1.09) 2.87 (1.15)
Reflective stage
Included 3.96 (0.40) 3.58 (0.57) 3.78 (0.51)
Excluded 3.50 (0.80) 3.49 (0.47) 3.49 (0.64)
Overall mean 3.72 (0.67) 3.53 (0.51) 3.63 (0.60)
Note. The measurements were made on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale
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studies to a small-scale meta-analysis to ﬁnd if the effect of these manipulations 
was different from that of seeing direct gaze. We used the same analytic strat-
egy as in the analysis of the results of our own experiments. All manipulations 
were pooled into one group, and this group was compared to the control group 
in which participants’ attention was not directed away from exclusion. Study 2 
by Hales and colleagues (2016) was excluded because there was no control group. 
When the correlation between pre- and post-scores was not available, the effect 
size was calculated using the mean basic need scores in the reﬂexive and reﬂective 
stages and the F-statistic of the respective interaction. The meta-analysis suggested 
a large effect size of d = 0.85, p < .001, 95% CI [0.61, 1.10], showing that directing 
attention to another task is highly effective in facilitating basic need recovery. Re-
markably, the conﬁdence intervals of our two meta-analyses do not overlap (see 
Figure 1 for forest plots). This clearly shows that, even if seeing direct gaze would 
have some effect on basic need recovery after exclusion, this effect is smaller than 
that of directing attention to another task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main aim of the current study was to investigate if receiving direct gaze allevi-
ates affective distress caused by social exclusion. In two experiments, participants 
excluded in Cyberball, compared to included participants, reported lower basic 
need satisfaction immediately after the manipulation, consistent with previous 
research (Hartgerink et al., 2015). In the ﬁrst experiment, both excluded and in-
cluded participants reported similar levels of basic need satisfaction in the delayed 
measurement, suggesting that excluded participants had recovered completely. 
This was possibly due to distraction caused by the eye gaze video and the concur-
rent mental visualization task. In our second experiment, we used an eye gaze 
manipulation that was designed to be less distracting than the one used in the ﬁrst 
experiment. Excluded participants recovered signiﬁcantly, but not completely by 
the delayed, reﬂective stage, offering support for Williams’s temporal need-threat 
model (e.g., Williams, 2007). Importantly, our main hypothesis was not supported, 
as the eye gaze manipulation did not moderate recovery of basic needs among 
excluded participants in either experiment.
It was surprising that seeing direct gaze did not alleviate the effects of exclusion 
in the present study, as previous research has demonstrated that even minimal 
acknowledgment can facilitate recovery after exclusion (Rudert et al., 2017). How-
ever, there is one important distinction between the current study and previous 
research examining how acknowledgment or inclusion moderates the effects of 
exclusion (Gross, 2009; Rudert et al., 2017; Twenge et al., 2007; Zwolinski, 2014). In 
the previous studies, participants either interacted with other people, or believed 
that they did. In our experiments, participants were shown a cue of acknowledg-
ment, but participants were well aware that they were not in a genuine eye contact 
with another person. A growing body of evidence shows that live faces and pic-
tures of faces do not always elicit similar physiological, behavioral, and experien-
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tial responses in the observer (see e.g., Hietanen et al., 2008; Hietanen & Hietanen, 
2017; Pönkänen, Alhoniemi, Leppänen, & Hietanen, 2011; Risko, Richardson, & 
Kingstone, 2016), possibly because the person is aware that a pictorial face does 
not actually look back (see Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015). Seeing visual cues of ac-
knowledgment may not be sufﬁcient to alleviate the effects of exclusion if the cues 
do not genuinely indicate that one is being attended to by another individual. Fu-
ture research could examine if seeing direct gaze portrayed by a live person would 
facilitate recovery from exclusion, even if direct gaze by a pictorial face does not.
While a picture of another person cannot be a source of genuine acknowledg-
ment, these stimuli still seem to be of particular signiﬁcance for excluded individ-
uals. A number of studies show that excluded participants, compared to controls, 
tend to allocate more attention to pictures of faces showing positive facial expres-
sions (Buckner, DeWall, Schmidt, & Maner, 2010; DeWall et al., 2009; Tanaka & 
Ikegami, 2015; Xu et al., 2015; but see Tuscherer et al., 2015). Not only do excluded 
individuals tend to look at pictures of smiling faces, but they may also ﬁxate more 
FIGURE 1. Effect sizes suggested by the two meta-analyses. The analyses examined the 
effectiveness of seeing direct gaze (Meta-analysis 1), and directing attention away from 
exclusion (Meta-analysis 2) at facilitating recovery of basic needs after exclusion in Cyberball. 
Sizes of the squares represent the proportional weight of the study in the meta-analysis. The 
different manipulations in the experiments by Hales et al. (2016) were combined into one 
group for the purposes of this analysis.
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on the eyes than included participants (Böckler et al., 2014), and be more likely to 
consider that pictures are portraying direct gaze (Lyyra et al., 2017). We originally 
proposed that this tendency to seek direct gaze would be a coping strategy that 
could make excluded individuals feel reconnected. However, the current study 
suggests that seeing a face portraying direct gaze is not sufﬁcient to moderate 
recovery from exclusion. Our results show that merely focusing attention to an-
other task has more effect on recovery of basic needs than perceiving direct gaze. 
Perhaps excluded individuals seek direct gaze, not to regulate their own affective 
state, but to obtain information about potential for social interaction. Receiving 
direct gaze might increase afﬁliative behavior, and help the excluded individual 
attain reinclusion, even though the perception of this cue, as such, has little or no 
effect on basic need recovery.
While people often respond to exclusion by trying to reafﬁliate, they can also 
sometimes aggress or withdraw from interactions (see Smart Richman & Leary, 
2009). A tendency to seek eye contact may be related to the afﬁliation motivation, 
but other motivational responses to exclusion might be associated with different 
types of gaze behavior. As well as afﬁliative tendencies, displays of aggression 
tend to be accompanied with direct gaze (see Kleinke, 1986), and therefore an ag-
gressive response to exclusion may also be associated with increased ﬁxations to 
the eye region. However, when individuals respond to exclusion by seeking soli-
tude (Ren, Wesselmann, & Williams, 2016), they might avoid eye contact. These 
hypotheses could be examined in future studies. 
LIMITATIONS
One limitation of our experiments is the lack of a non-social control condition in 
the eye gaze manipulation. We cannot determine if the video viewing task as such 
had an effect on participants’ basic need satisfaction, regardless of the model’s 
gaze direction. All participants were shown a video of a person, and in Experiment 
1, they imagined an interaction with the individual. Because of the quasi-social 
nature of this task, it may have been a mildly exclusionary or inclusionary experi-
ence, and could have inﬂuenced participants’ affect more than a comparable non-
social task or passing of time would have.
CONCLUSION
Previous research has suggested that excluded individuals seek eye contact, pre-
sumably because direct gaze signals inclusion. We hypothesized that receiving 
direct gaze would alleviate affective distress caused by exclusion. However, this 
hypothesis was not supported. In two experiments, receiving direct gaze had no 
effect on recovery of basic needs after social exclusion. Perhaps excluded individu-
als seek direct gaze, not because it makes them feel reconnected as such, but as a 
means to an end—to facilitate reconnection.
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
I don’t need your attention: 2VWUDFLVPFDQQDUURZWKHFRQHRIJD]H

$OHNVL+6\UMlPlNL3HVVL/\\UD	-DUL.+LHWDQHQ
+XPDQ,QIRUPDWLRQ3URFHVVLQJ/DERUDWRU\)DFXOW\RI6RFLDO6FLHQFHV3V\FKRORJ\),8QLYHUVLW\RI7DPSHUH
7DPSHUH)LQODQG


$EVWUDFW
3UHYLRXVUHVHDUFKKDVVKRZQWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVVHHNLQFOXVLYHFXHVVXFKDVJD]HGLUHFWHGDWWKHPZKHQWU\LQJ
WRUHDIILOLDWH+RZHYHULQVWHDGRIVHHNLQJUHLQFOXVLRQRVWUDFL]HGLQGLYLGXDOVPD\VRPHWLPHVZLWKGUDZIURP
LQWHUDFWLRQVLIQRWRIIHUHGDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQ,QWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\DIWHUDQRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQZLWKQR
UHDIILOLDWLRQRSSRUWXQLW\SDUWLFLSDQWVMXGJHGZKHWKHUIDFHVSRUWUD\LQJGLUHFWJD]HRUVOLJKWO\DYHUWHGJD]HWRWR
WKHOHIWDQGWRWKHULJKWZHUHORRNLQJDWWKHPRUQRW&RPSDUHGWRDQLQFOXVLRQJURXSDQGDQRQVRFLDOFRQWUROJURXS
RVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVDFFHSWHGDVPDOOHUUDQJHRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDVEHLQJGLUHFWHGDWWKHPLHWKH\KDGDQDUURZHU
“cone of gaze”. 7KHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHZDVHTXDOO\ZLGHLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSV:HSURSRVHWKDW
ZLWKRXWDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVPD\VWDUWWRYLHZRWKHUSHRSOHDVSDUWLFXODUO\
XQDSSURDFKDEOHSRVVLEO\LQGLFDWLYHRIDPRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQF\WRGLVHQJDJHIURPLQWHUDFWLRQV


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,QWURGXFWLRQ

(\HJD]HKDVDSLYRWDOUROHLQKXPDQFRPPXQLFDWLRQ,WLVXVHGDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVWRH[SUHVVLQWLPDF\UHJXODWH
LQWHUDFWLRQVDQGH[HUFLVHVRFLDOFRQWUROVHH.OHLQNH$QHVSHFLDOO\VDOLHQWFXHLVGLUHFWJD]HLHDQRWKHU
individual’s JD]HGLUHFWHGDWWKHSHUFHLYHU'LUHFWJD]HFRPPXQLFDWHVWKDWanother’s DWWHQWLRQLVGLUHFWHGWRWKHVHOIVHH
&RQW\*HRUJH	+LHWDQHQ
%HLQJORRNHGDWVKLIWVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHORRNHU%|FNOHUYDQGHU:HO	:HOVKLQFUHDVHVDXWRQRPLFDURXVDO
+HOPLQHQ.DDVLQHQ	+LHWDQHQDQGDXWRPDWLFDOO\HOLFLWVSRVLWLYHDIIHFWLYHUHDFWLRQV&KHQ+HOPLQHQ	
+LHWDQHQ6HHLQJVRPHRQHSRUWUD\GLUHFWRUDYHUWHGJD]HDOVRHOLFLWVEUDLQUHVSRQVHVLQGLFDWLYHRIDWHQGHQF\WR
DSSURDFKRUDYRLGUHVSHFWLYHO\+LHWDQHQ/HSSlQHQ3HOWROD/LQQDDKR	5XXKLDOD7KXVKXPDQVPD\EH
OLNHO\WRDSSURDFKLQGLYLGXDOVSRUWUD\LQJGLUHFWJD]HDQGWRDYRLGLQGLYLGXDOVORRNLQJDZD\
 'LUHFWJD]HPD\EHHVSHFLDOO\VLJQLILFDQWIRULQGLYLGXDOVZKRKDYHEHHQRVWUDFL]HGLHLJQRUHGDQG
H[FOXGHGE\RWKHUV:LOOLDPV,QRQHVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVZKRZHUHH[FOXGHGIURPDQLQWHUDFWLRQFRPSDUHGWR
LQFOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVIL[DWHGPRUHRQWKHH\HVRIWKHLULQWHUDFWLRQSDUWQHUVVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKH\DWWHPSWHGWRPDNHH\H
FRQWDFWWRJHWEDFNLQWRWKHLQWHUDFWLRQ%|FNOHU+|PNH	6HEDQ]%HLQJGHQLHGothers’GLUHFWJD]HFDQ
HQJHQGHUIHHOLQJVRIRVWUDFLVPLWORZHUVPRRGDQGVDWLVIDFWLRQRIIRXUEDVLFVRFLDOQHHGVRIEHORQJLQJFRQWUROVHOI
HVWHHPDQGPHDQLQJIXOH[LVWHQFH:LUWK6DFFR+XJHQEHUJ	:LOOLDPV,QGHHGJD]HDYRLGDQFHKDVEHHQ
GHHPHGWKHPRVWFRPPRQFXHWRLQGLFDWHRVWUDFLVP:LOOLDPV6KRUH	*UDKH
7KHUHLVQRFOHDUFXWRIISRLQWIRUZKHQH\HJD]HLVMXGJHGDVGLUHFWRUDYHUWHGEXWSHRSOHLQWHUSUHWD
UDQJHRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDVGLUHFWHJ*DPHU	+HFKW6WR\DQRYD(ZEDQN	&DOGHU7KHZLGWKRIWKLV
UDQJHcalled “cone of gaze”, is moderated by individual factors such as social anxiety (e.g.&KHQ1XPPHQPDD	
+LHWDQHQ*DPHU+HFKW6HLSSW	+LOOHU6FKXO]H/REPDLHU$UQROG	5HQQHEHUJDQGYLVXDO
SURSHUWLHVRIWKHWDUJHWVXFKDVIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQ(ZEDQN-HQQLQJV	&DOGHU/REPDLHU	3HUUHWW
+DUERUW:LWWK|IW6SLHJHO1LFN	+HFKW$UHFHQWVWXG\VXJJHVWHGWKDWEHLQJRVWUDFL]HGFDQZLGHQWKHJD]H
FRQH/\\UD:LUWK	+LHWDQHQ3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHHLWKHURVWUDFL]HGRULQFOXGHGLQDYLUWXDOEDOOWRVVLQJJDPH
&\EHUEDOOVHH:LOOLDPV	-DUYLVDIWHUZKLFKWKH\ZHUHDVNHGWRMXGJHZKHWKHUIDFHVSRUWUD\LQJYDU\LQJJD]H
GLUHFWLRQVZHUHORRNLQJDWWKHPRUQRW2VWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVDFFHSWHGDZLGHUUDQJHRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDVEHLQJGLUHFW
,WZDVVXJJHVWHGWKDWRVWUDFLVPFDXVHGZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHZKLFKFRXOGKHOSRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVDWWDLQ
UHLQFOXVLRQ$VGLUHFWJD]HFDQVLJQDOVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQ:HVVHOPDQQ&DUGRVR6ODWHU	:LOOLDPV:LUWK6DFFR
HWDOWKHILQGLQJVXJJHVWVWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHELDVHGWRYLHZRWKHUVDVSRUWUD\LQJDQDIILOLDWLYHFXH
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7KHILQGLQJWKDWRVWUDFLVPZLGHQHGWKHJD]HFRQHFRQWULEXWHGWRDJURZLQJERG\RIUHVHDUFKUHSRUWLQJ
WKDWRVWUDFLVPFDQHOLFLWFRJQLWLYHELDVHVWKDWPLJKWIRVWHUDIILOLDWLYHEHKDYLRU$VRVWUDFLVPWKUHDWHQVWKHIXQGDPHQWDO
QHHGIRUEHORQJLQJand can be detrimental to one’s wellbeing,RVWUDFL]HGLQGLYLGXDOVRIWHQVWULYHIRUUHLQFOXVLRQ6PDUW
5LFKPDQ	/HDU\:LOOLDPV%HLQJVRFLDOO\LQFOXGHGLVDQHIIHFWLYHZD\RIFRSLQJZLWKRVWUDFLVPHJ
=ZROLQVNLDQGWKXVH[FOXGHGLQGLYLGXDOVPD\DFWLQDQDIILOLDWLYHPDQQHUVXFKDVFRQIRUPLQJZLWKDgroup’s 
opinions (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), and mimicking others’ nonverbal behavior (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 
2VWUDFL]HGLQGLYLGXDOVPD\DOVRVKRZFRJQLWLYHELDVHVWKDWKHOSWKHPDWWDLQUHLQFOXVLRQ)RULQVWDQFHH[FOXVLRQ
DVFRPSDUHGWRFRQWUROPDQLSXODWLRQVKDVbeen found to increase participants’ allocation of attention to positive social 
FXHV'H:DOO0DQHU	5RXE\;XHWDODQGFDXVHWKHPWRMXGJHRWKHUSHRSOHDVPRUHIULHQGO\DQG
DWWUDFWLYH0DQHU'H:DOO%DXPHLVWHU	6FKDOOHUDQGWRUDWHLQDQLPDWHIDFHVDVPRUHDOLYH3RZHUV:RUVKDP
)UHHPDQ:KHDWOH\	+HDWKHUWRQ
+RZHYHUVRPHWLPHVRVWUDFLVPFDQDOVRHYRNHRWKHUPRWLYDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHVVXFKDVLQFUHDVLQJVRFLDOO\
DYRLGDQWWHQGHQFLHV5HQ:HVVHOPDQQ	:LOOLDPV6PDUW5LFKPDQ	/HDU\$FFRUGLQJWRWKH
PXOWLPRWLYHPRGHOSURSRVHGE\6PDUW5LFKPDQDQG/HDU\VHYHUDOVLWXDWLRQDODQGLQGLYLGXDOIDFWRUVGHWHUPLQH
WKHPRWLYDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHWRH[FOXVLRQEXWRQHLPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWLVZKHWKHUWKHLQGLYLGXDOSHUFHLYHVDQ
RSSRUWXQLW\IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQ:KHQWKHUHLVQRVXFKRSSRUWXQLW\WKHLQGLYLGXDOPD\ZLWKGUDZDQGVHHNVROLWXGHIRU
VLPLODUVXJJHVWLRQVVHHDOVR&XDGUDGR7DEHUQHUR	6WHLQHO5RPHUR&DQ\DVHWDODQGVWDUWWRYLHZ
RWKHUSHRSOHDVSRUWUD\LQJOHVVDIILOLDWLYHFXHV6PDUW5LFKPDQ0DUWLQ	*XDGDJQR:KLOHWKHRUHWLFDOPRGHOV
KDYHGHVFULEHGWKHIDFWRUVWKDWPRGHUDWHWKHHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVPIHZVWXGLHVKDYHHPSLULFDOO\LQYHVWLJDWHGWKH
FRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKRVWUDFLVPHOLFLWVWKHVHGLIIHUHQWVRFLDOFRJQLWLYHELDVHVIRUVRPHH[FHSWLRQVVHH0DQHUHWDO
7DQDND	,NHJDPL7XVFKHUHUHWDO
$VZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHPD\KDYHUHIOHFWHGWKHDIILOLDWLYHUHVSRQVHWRH[FOXVLRQ/\\UDHWDO
LWPLJKWRQO\RFFXUZKHQH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVSHUFHLYHDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQ,QWKLVHDUOLHUVWXG\
SDUWLFLSDQWVSOD\HGDEDOOWRVVLQJJDPHRVWHQVLEO\ZLWKRWKHUVORFDWHGLQWKHVDPHURRP7KXVDIWHUWKHJDPH
RVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVFRXOGDWWHPSWWRUHDIILOLDWHZLWKWKHDOOHJHGVRXUFHVRIWKHRVWUDFLVP*LYHQWKHGLYHUVH
PXOWLIDFHWHGUHVSRQVHVWRRVWUDFLVPLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRLQYHVWLJDWHKRZVLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUVPRGHUDWHWKHHIIHFWVRI
RVWUDFLVPRQJD]HMXGJPHQWV,QDFRQWH[WZKHUHUHDIILOLDWLRQZLWKWKHRVWUDFL]HUVRURWKHUVLVQRWSRVVLEOHRVWUDFLVP
FRXOGQDUURZUDWKHUWKDQZLGHQWKHJD]HFRQH7RH[DPLQHWKLVK\SRWKHVLVZHFRQGXFWHGWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\LQZKLFKZH
PHDVXUHGparticipants’ gaze cone after the Cyberball ostracism manipulation. +RZHYHUXQOLNHLQWKHSUHYLRXVVWXG\
/\\UDHWDOSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHOHGWREHOLHYHWKHJDPHZDVSOD\HGRQOLQHZLWKRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVORFDWHGLQRWKHU
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ODERUDWRULHV7KXVVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQZDVOLPLWHGWRWKHEDOOWRVVLQJJDPHDQGUHDIILOLDWLRQZRXOGQRWEHSRVVLEOHIRUWKH
RVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWV
$VHFRQGLPSRUWDQWJRDORIWKLVVWXG\ZDVWRLQYHVWLJDWHLIWKHHIIHFWVRIWKH&\EHUEDOOPDQLSXODWLRQRQ
WKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHDVZHOODVRQDIIHFWDUHLQGHHGGULYHQE\RVWUDFLVPDVSURSRVHGLQHDUOLHUVWXGLHVRULIVRFLDO
LQFOXVLRQDOVRKDVDQHIIHFW2QHOLPLWDWLRQRIPRVWHDUOLHUVWXGLHVXVLQJWKLVPDQLSXODWLRQLVWKDWWKH\ODFNDQRQVRFLDO
FRQWUROFRQGLWLRQIRUH[FHSWLRQVVHH'ULVFROO%DUFOD\	)HQVNH5LYD:LOOLDPV7RUVWULFN	0RQWDOL
([FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHW\SLFDOO\FRPSDUHGWRLQFOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVDQGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRJURXSVDUH
LQWHUSUHWHGWRUHIOHFWHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVP+RZHYHUZLWKRXWDFRQWUROJURXSLWLVLPSRVVLEOHWRYHULI\ZKHWKHUWKH
REVHUYHGGLIIHUHQFHVDUHGXHWRH[FOXVLRQLQFOXVLRQRUERWK(QJDJLQJLQVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQV0F,QW\UH:DWVRQ&ODUN
	&URVVDQGUHFHLYLQJFXHVRILQFOXVLRQVXFKDVGLUHFWJD]H&KHQ+HOPLQHQ	+LHWDQHQRUDVPLOH
0XUSK\	=DMRQFHYRNHSRVLWLYHDIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHVDQGWKXVVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQPLJKWQRWEHDVXIILFLHQWFRQWURO
FRQGLWLRQZKHQLQYHVWLJDWLQJWKHHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVP,QGHHGPHWDDQDO\WLFHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWVRPHRIWKHHIIHFWV
REVHUYHGLQH[FOXVLRQVWXGLHVPD\EHSDUWO\GULYHQE\LQFOXVLRQDVVWXGLHVFRPSDULQJVRFLDOO\H[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVWR
DFFHSWHGSDUWLFLSDQWVUHSRUWODUJHUHIIHFWVRQPRRGWKDQVLPLODUVWXGLHVZLWKQHXWUDOFRQWUROJURXSV%ODFNKDUW1HOVRQ
.QRZOHV	%DXPHLVWHU7RUXOHRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKHHIIHFWVRIWKH&\EHUEDOOPDQLSXODWLRQRQWKHJD]H
FRQH/\\UDHWDOPRRGVDWLVIDFWLRQRIEDVLFVRFLDOQHHGV:LOOLDPVDQGVRFLDOSDLQ(LVHQEHUJHU	
/LHEHUPDQDUHGULYHQE\LQFOXVLRQZHLQFOXGHGDQRQVRFLDOFRQWUROJURXSLQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\,QWKLVJURXS
SDUWLFLSDQWVSOD\HGDYDULDQWRI&\EHUEDOOZLWKQRVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ
,QWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\DIWHUWKH&\EHUEDOORVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQSDUWLFLSDQWVILOOHGDVKRUWTXHVWLRQQDLUH
PHDVXULQJVDWLVIDFWLRQRIEDVLFVRFLDOQHHGVPRRGDQGVRFLDOSDLQ$IWHUWKLVSDUWLFLSDQWVMXGJHGZKHWKHUIDFHV
SRUWUD\LQJGLUHFWJD]HDQGVXEWOHGHYLDWLRQVIURPGLUHFWJD]HZHUHORRNLQJDWWKHPRUQRW:HK\SRWKHVL]HGWKDW
RVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVFRPSDUHGWRWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSVZRXOGKDYHDQDUURZHUJD]HFRQHLHWKH\ZRXOG
MXGJHDVPDOOHUUDQJHRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDVEHLQJGLUHFW$OWHUQDWLYHO\LIVLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUVGRQRWPRGXODWHWKHHIIHFWRI
ostracism on evaluations made of others’ gaze directions, RVWUDFLVPVKRXOGOHDGWRZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHOLNHLQD
SUHYLRXVVWXG\E\/\\UDHWDODQGRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVZRXOGKDYHDZLGHUJD]HFRQHWKDQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQG
FRQWUROJURXSV:HH[SHFWHGWRILQGQRGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHEHWZHHQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWURO
JURXSV7KHVHUHVXOWVZRXOGLQGLFDWHWKDWLWLVRVWUDFLVPDQGQRWLQFOXVLRQWKDWLQIOXHQFHVWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQH
$VIRUWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHGDWDZHK\SRWKHVL]HGWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVZRXOGUHSRUWORZHUEDVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQ
DQGPRRGDQGPRUHVRFLDOSDLQWKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSVZKLOHWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWURO
JURXSVZRXOGQRWGLIIHUIURPHDFKRWKHURQDQ\RIWKHVHPHDVXUHPHQWV
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
3DUWLFLSDQWV3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHYROXQWHHUVPDOHVMDJH \HDUVSDDJH ZLWKQR
GLDJQRVHGSV\FKLDWULFRUQHXURORJLFDOGLVRUGHUV3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHUDQGRPO\DVVLJQHGLQRQHRIWKUHHJURXSVLQFOXVLRQ
H[FOXVLRQRUFRQWURO:HGLGQRWFRQGXFWDSULRULSRZHUDQDO\VHVEXWWKHDLPZDVWRJHWDSSUR[LPDWHO\SDUWLFLSDQWV
SHUFRQGLWLRQLQWKHILQDOVDPSOHDVLQ/\\UDHWDOWKHPLQLPXPVDPSOHVL]HUHFRPPHQGHGE\6LPPRQV
1HOVRQ	6LPRQVRKQVHHWKH'DWDDQDO\VLVVHFWLRQIRUGHWDLOVRIWKHILQDOVDPSOH'XULQJGDWDFROOHFWLRQLW
EHFDPHDSSDUHQWWKDWDODUJHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHH[FOXVLRQJURXSZRXOGKDYHWREHH[FOXGHGIURPWKHDQDO\VHV
GXHWRVXVSLFLRQVHHWKH'DWDDQDO\VLVVHFWLRQIRUH[FOXVLRQFULWHULD7KXVZHDGMXVWHGWKHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWV
DVVLJQHGWRHDFKJURXSWRHQVXUHDQHYHQGLVWULEXWLRQRISDUWLFLSDQWVLQHDFKJURXSLQWKHILQDOVDPSOH3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
UHZDUGHGZLWKHLWKHUSDUWLDOFRXUVHFUHGLWRUDPRYLHWLFNHW$OOSDUWLFLSDQWVVLJQHGDIRUPRILQIRUPHGFRQVHQW$Q
HWKLFDOVWDWHPHQWIRUWKHVWXG\ZDVREWDLQHGIURP(WKLFV&RPPLWWHHRIWKH7DPSHUH5HJLRQ
6WLPXOLDQGDSSDUDWXV6timuli were presented on a 19” LCD monitor with a resolution of 1280 × 
1024 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants’ viewing distance from the monitor was fixed at 63 cm using chin and 
IRUHKHDGUHVWVZLWKSDUWicipants’ eye area vertically and horizontally leveled with that of the stimulus characters’. E
3ULPHVRIWZDUHZDVXVHGWRFRQWUROWKHVWLPXOXVSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGWRDFTXLUHGDWD7KH&\EHUEDOOJDPHZDV
SUHVHQWHGRQ)LUHIR[,QWHUQHWEURZVHU
)RUWKHRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQWKUHHGLIIHUHQWYHUVLRQVRI&\EHUEDOO:LOOLDPV	-DUYLV
ZHUHHPSOR\HG,QWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQVWKUHHFKDUDFWHUVRQHFRQWUROOHGE\WKHSDUWLFLSDQWDQGWKH
RWKHUVFRQWUROOHGE\WKHFRPSXWHUZHUHWKURZLQJDEDOOZLWKHDFKRWKHU,QWKHLQFOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQWKHSDUWLFLSDQW
UHFHLYHGDSSUR[LPDWHO\RQHWKLUGRIDOOWRVVHV,QWKHH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWUHFHLYHGWKHEDOORQFHIURP
HDFKFKDUDFWHUDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHJDPHDQGWKHQQHYHUDJDLQ7KHWRWDOQXPEHURIWRVVHVLQWKHJDPHZDV,QWKH
FRQWUROFRQGLWLRQWKHWZRRWKHUFKDUDFWHUVZHUHUHSODFHGE\SLFWXUHVRIEDVNHWVLQZKLFKWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWKURZLQJ
WKHEDOOVHH)LJ$IWHUHDFKWKURZWKHEDOOUHWXUQHGWRWKHSDUWLFLpant’s character. The total number of throws was 
UHGXFHGVRWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQVPDGHWKHVDPHQXPEHURIWKURZV7KHSDFHRIWKH
JDPHZDVDGMXVWHGVRWKDWWKHJDPHOHQJWKZDVVLPLODUDFURVVFRQGLWLRQV

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
)LJ,OOXVWUDWLRQRIWKHFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQLQ&\EHUEDOO

)RUWKHJD]HFRQHWDVNZHXVHGSLFWXUHVRIIRXUYLUWXDOFKDUDFWHUVZLWKIURQWDOKHDGRULHQWDWLRQWZR
PDOHVWZRIHPDOHVFUHDWHGZLWK'DQLPDWLRQVRIWZDUH'$=6WXGLR3LFWXUHVZHUHFKRVHQIURPWKHVHWXVHGE\/\\UD
HWDO,QWKHSLFWXUHVHDFKFKDUDFWHUSRUWUD\HGQLQHGLIIHUHQWJD]HGLUHFWLRQVGLUHFWJD]HDQG
DYHUWHGWRZDUGVOHIWDQGULJKW,QDGGLWLRQHDFKSLFWXUHZDVIOLSSHGKRUL]RQWDOO\WRDFFRXQWIRUDQ\HIIHFWFDXVHGE\
IDFHDV\PPHWU\7KHFKDUDFWHUVKDGDPLOGO\IULHQGO\H[SUHVVLRQWRDYRLGDVXOOHQQHJDWLYHIDFHZKLFKWRJHWKHUZLWK
GLUHFWJD]HPLJKWVLJQDOH[FOXVLRQUDWKHUWKDQLQFOXVLRQHJ$GDPV	.OHFN7KHVL]HVRIWKHFKDUDFWHUVZHUH
DSSUR[LPDWHO\YHUWLFDOO\DQGKRUL]RQWDOO\
3URFHGXUH3DUWLFLSDQWVDUULYHGLQWKHODERUDWRU\DORQH7KH\ZHUHWROGWKHDLPRIWKHH[SHULPHQWZDV
WRVWXG\“PHQWDOYLVXDOL]DWLRQ”7RHQKDQFHWKHFRYHUVWRU\SDUWLFLSDQWVILOOHGDTXHVWLRQQDLUHRVWHQVLEO\PHDVXULQJ
WKHLUWHQGHQF\WRPHQWDOO\YLVXDOL]H3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWROGWKH\ZRXOGEHSOD\LQJDEDOOWRVVLQJJDPHRQDFRPSXWHU
DQGZHUHLQVWUXFWHGWRPHQWDOO\YLVXDOL]HWKHJDPHLQGHWDLO3DUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGH[FOXVLRQJURXSVZHUHWROG
WKHJDPHZDVSOD\HGRQOLQHZLWKWZRRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVEDVHGLQRWKHUODERUDWRULHV7RHQVXUHWKHH[SHULPHQWZDVDV
VLPLODUDVSRVVLEOHDFURVVFRQGLWLRQVSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQZHUHWROGWKDWWKHH[SHULPHQWZDVFRQGXFWHG
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\LQWKUHHODERUDWRULHV7RLQFUHDVHSODXVLELOLW\RIWKHFRYHUVWRU\WKHH[SHULPHQWHUPDGHDIDNHYLGHR
FDOOLQZKLFKKHDQGWZRRWKHUH[SHULPHQWHUVPDGHVXUHHYHU\WKLQJZDVUHDG\LQHDFKODERUDWRU\7KLVZDV
LPPHGLDWHO\IROORZHGE\WKH&\EHUEDOOPDQLSXODWLRQ
%DVLFQHHGPRRGDQGSDLQPHDVXUHPHQWV$IWHU&\EHUEDOOSDUWLFLSDQWVFRPSOHWHGDVKRUWVL[LWHP
TXHVWLRQQDLUHPHDVXULQJVDWLVIDFWLRQRIEDVLFVRFLDOQHHGVof belonging (“I felt rejected”), control (“I felt I had the 
ability to significantly alter events”), meaningful existence (“I felt important”), and selfesteem (“I felt insecure”), as 
ZHOODVERWKSRVLWLYHPRRG(“I felt happy”)DQGQHJDWLYHPRRG(“I felt angry”)7KHLWHPVZHUHFKRVHQIURPDEDVLF
QHHGTXHVWLRQQDLUHXVHGLQVHYHUDORVWUDFLVPVWXGLHVHJ0ROHW0DFTXHW/HIHEYUH	:LOOLDPV:LUWK	
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:LOOLDPV2QO\RQHLWHPPHDVXULQJHDFKEDVLFQHHGDQGERWKSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHPRRGZDVFKRVHQWRHQVXUH
WKHLQWHUYDOEHWZHHQWKHRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQDQGWKHJD]HFRQHWDVNZDVDVVKRUWDVSRVVLEOH$OVRPDQ\RIWKH
LWHPVLQWKHEDVLFQHHGTXHVWLRQQDLUHZHUHQRWVXLWDEOHIRUWKHQRQVRFLDOFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQ7KHEDVLFQHHGLWHPVZHUH
UHYHUVHVFRUHGZKHUHQHFHVVDU\DQGDYHUDJHGWRFUHDWHDQLQGH[RIEDVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQĮ 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
DOVRDVNHGKRZPXFKSDLQWKH\ZHUHH[SHULHQFLQJGXULQJWKHJDPH$GGLWLRQDOO\WZRPDQLSXODWLRQFKHFNLWHPVZHUH
SUHVHQWHGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRDVVHVVZKDWSHUFHQWDJHRIWKURZVLQWKHJDPHZDVPDGHE\WKHPDQGDVNHGWR
ZKDWH[WHQWWKH\IHOWH[FOXGHGRULQFOXGHGLQDJURXS$OOLWHPVZHUHRQDYLVXDODQDORJXHVFDOHVFRUHG
*D]HFRQHWDVN$IWHUWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHSDUWLFLSDQWVFRPSOHWHGWKHJD]HFRQHWDVN,QHDFKWULDOD
IL[DWLRQFURVVZDVGLVSOD\HGIRUPVDIWHUZKLFKDVWLPXOXVIDFHZDVVKRZQIRUPVVHH)LJ$IWHUWKH
VWLPXOXVIDFHSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKWZRFRQVHFXWLYHUHVSRQVHZLQGRZV5DQG5,QWKHILUVWUHVSRQVH
ZLQGRZ5SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGZKHWKHUWKH\IHOWWKHSHUVRQLQWKHSLFWXUHZDVORRNLQJDWKLPKHURUQRW7KH
UHVSRQVHZDVJLYHQXVLQJQXPEHUVRQWKHNH\ERDUG \HV QR,QWKHVHFRQGUHVSRQVHZLQGRZ5SDUWLFLSDQWV
ZHUHDVNHGWRHYDOXDWHWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHIHHOLQJRQDSRLQWVFDOH VWURQJ LQWHUPHGLDWH ZHDN,IWKH
SDUWLFLSDQWGLGQRWUHVSRQGZLWKLQVHYHQVHFRQGVWKHQH[WLWHPHLWKHUWKHQH[WUHVSRQVHZLQGRZRUWKHQH[WWULDOZDV
GLVSOD\HG


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
)LJ,OOXVWUDWLRQRIDVLQJOHWULDOLQWKHJD]HFRQHWDVN5DQG5VWDQGVIRUUHVSRQVHZLQGRZVDQG,Q5
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQGLFDWHGZKHWKHUWKH\IHOWWKHSHUVRQLQWKHSLFWXUHZDVORRNLQJDWKLPKHURUQRW,Q5SDUWLFLSDQWV
LQGLFDWHGWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHIHHOLQJRQDSRLQWVFDOHVWURQJLQWHUPHGLDWHZHDN


7ZREORFNVRIWULDOVZHUHFRPSOHWHGE\WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV,QHDFKEORFNHDFKJD]HGLUHFWLRQLQFOXGLQJ
KRUL]RQWDOO\IOLSSHGSLFWXUHVRIWZRUDQGRPO\FKRVHQFKDUDFWHUVRQHPDOHRQHIHPDOHZHUHSUHVHQWHGLQDUDQGRP
RUGHU,QWKHVHFRQGEORFNWKHSLFWXUHVRIWKHRWKHUWZRFKDUDFWHUVZHUHSUHVHQWHG7KLVUHVXOWHGLQDWRWDORIWULDOV
SHUJD]HGLUHFWLRQZLWKWULDOVSHUEORFN,QEHWZHHQWKHEORFNVSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDOORZHGWRUHVWDQGZHUHUHPLQGHG
RIWKHLQVWUXFWLRQV7KHOHQJWKRIWKHSDXVHEHWZHHQWKHEORFNVZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHSDUWLFLSDQWVWKHPVHOYHV7KH
QXPEHURIWULDOVZDVFKRVHQEDVHGRQDSUHYLRXVILQGLQJWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIDQRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQRQWKHJD]HFRQH
GLVVLSDWHGLQWKHODWWHUKDOIRIDWULDOWDVN/\\UDHWDO6RPHRWKHUSUHYLRXVVWXGLHVXVLQJDVLPLODUWDVNDOVR
XVHGDFRPSDUDEOHQXPEHURIWULDOV&KHQ1XPPHQPDD	+LHWDQHQ
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'HEULHILQJAt the end of the experiment, participants’ suspicions concerning the Cyberball task were 
FKHFNHGZLWKDQLQWHUYLHZ$IWHUWKLVSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWKRURXJKO\GHEULHIHG7KH\ZHUHWROGWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHVWXG\
DQGH[SODLQHGWKHGHFHLWFRQFHUQLQJWKH&\EHUEDOOWDVN
'DWDDQDO\VLV:HDQDO\]HGWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHIRUHDFKSDUWLFLSDQWE\FDOFXODWLQJWKHSRLQWRI
VXEMHFWLYHHTXDOLW\36(WKHSRLQWZKHUHWKHSHUFHLYHUFDQQRWGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWZRGLIIHUHQWVWLPXOL7KHWZR
EORFNVLQWKHJD]HFRQHWDVNZHUHFRPELQHGLQWRRQHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVDQDO\VLVDVWKHUHZHUHQRWHQRXJKWULDOVWR
UHOLDEO\FDOFXODWHWKH36(IRUWKHEORFNVVHSDUDWHO\)LUVWZHFDOFXODWHGDELQDU\ORJLVWLFUHJUHVVLRQPRGHOIRUHDFK
SDUWLFLSDQWEDVHGRQWKHLUDQVZHUVRQWKHILUVWUHVSRQVHZLQGRZ5VHH/\\UDHWDO)ROORZLQJSUHYLRXV
UHVHDUFKHJ/REPDLHU	3HUUHWW/\\UDHWDO8RQR	+LHWDQHQZHFROODSVHGWKHWULDOVZLWKJD]H
DYHUWHGWRWKHOHIWDQGWKHULJKWUHVXOWLQJLQILYHGLIIHUHQWJD]HGLUHFWLRQV7KHWULDOVRQZKLFK
SDUWLFLSDQWVGLGQRWUHSO\ZLWKLQVHYHQVHFRQGVLQ5ZHUHUHPRYHGIURPWKHGDWDEHIRUHWKHDQDO\VHV:H
FDOFXODWHGWKH36(IURPWKHUHJUHVVLRQPRGHOE\VROYLQJIRUWKHJD]HGHYLDWLRQGHJUHHZKLFKWKHSDUWLFLSDQWZDV
HTXDOO\OLNHO\WRFRQVLGHUDVGLUHFWRUDYHUWHGJD]H7KHGLVWDQFHIURP]HURGHJUHHVWRWKH36(PXOWLSOLHGE\WZRWR
FRYHUERWKOHIWDQGULJKWVLGHVZDVXVHGDVDQDSSUR[LPDWLRQRIWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHVHH(ZEDQNHWDO
 *D]HFRQHZLGWKVDVZHOODVEDVLFQHHGPRRGDQGSDLQLWHPVZHUHVXEMHFWHGWRRQHZD\$129$V
ZLWKLQFOXVLRQDU\VWDWXVLQFOXGHGH[FOXGHGFRQWURODVWKHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH3RVWKRFWHVWVZHUHFRQGXFWHGXVLQJ
Tukey’s HSD test. In case of unequal variances between groups, the analyses were conducWHGXVLQJWelch’s robust test 
RIHTXDOLW\RIPHDQVDQG*DPHV+RZHOOSRVWKRFWHVWV)RUWKHVDNHRIFODULW\XQFRUUHFWHGGHJUHHVRIIUHHGRPDUH
SUHVHQWHGwith Welch’s test$QDO\VHVRIQHJDWLYHPRRGDQGSDLQLWHPVZHUHFRQGXFWHGXVLQJ%R[&R[WUDQVIRUPHG
VFRUHVWRFRUUHFWIRUQRQQRUPDOGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHGDWD8QWUDQVIRUPHGPHDQVDQGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQVDUHSUHVHQWHG
)URPWKHWRWDOVDPSOHRISDUWLFLSDQWVZHH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVEHIRUHIXUWKHUDQDO\VHV)LUVWQLQH
SDUWLFLSDQWVRQHLQWKHLQFOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQHLJKWLQWKHH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQZHUHH[FOXGHGEHFDXVHWKH\LQGLFDWHGWKH\
GLGQRWEHOLHYHWKH\ZHUHSOD\LQJWKH&\EHUEDOOJDPHZLWKRWKHUSHRSOH)RXUPRUHSDUWLFLSDQWVRQHLQWKHLQFOXVLRQ
FRQGLWLRQWZRLQWKHH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQDQGRQHLQWKHFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQZHUHH[FOXGHGEHFDXVHWKHZLGWKRIWKHLU
gaze cone could not be calculated because the number of ‘direct’ responses was more than 50% for each gaze direction 
VHH(ZEDQNHWDO)LQDOO\ZHH[FOXGHGRQHPRUHSDUWLFLSDQWLQWKHH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQDVDQRXWOLHUDVWKH
ZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHZDVQRWZLWKLQWKUHHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQVIURPWKHPHDQ7KHILQDOVDPSOHFRQVLVWHGRI
SDUWLFLSDQWVnLQFOXGHG nH[FOXGHG nFRQWURO PDOHVMDJH \HDUVSDDJH 


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5(68/76

0DQLSXODWLRQFKHFNV0DQLSXODWLRQFKHFNVVXJJHVWWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVSHUFHLYHGWKHRVWUDFLVP
PDQLSXODWLRQDVLQWHQGHG7KHJURXSVGLIIHUHGLQWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIDOOWKURZVWKH\UHFDOOHGmaking (Welch’s F 
pȘp2 3DUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHFRQWUROJURXSLQGLFDWHGPDNLQJDODUJHUSHUFHQWDJHRIDOOWKURZVM 
SD WKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQM SD t pd DQG
H[FOXVLRQJURXSVM SD t pd ,QFOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVLQGLFDWHGPDNLQJD
ODUJHUSHUFHQWDJHRIWKURZVWKDQH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVt pd 7KHJURXSVDOVRGLIIHUHGLQ
KRZLQFOXGHGRUH[FOXGHGWKH\SHUFHLYHGEHLQJWelch’s F pȘp2 3DUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH
H[FOXVLRQJURXSLQGLFDWHGEHLQJPRUHH[FOXGHGM SD WKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQM SD 
t pd DQGFRQWUROJURXSVM SD t pd 
3DUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHFRQWUROJURXSGLGQRWLQGLFDWHEHLQJPRUHH[FOXGHGWKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQJURXSt 
p d 
7KHJD]HFRQH6HH7DEOHDQG)LJIRUPHDQVDQGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQVRIJD]HFRQHZLGWKVLQWKH
WKUHHH[SHULPHQWDOJURXSVDVZHOODVVWDWLVWLFVIRUWKHRQHZD\$129$DQGPXOWLSOHFRPSDULVRQV7KHUHVXOWVLQGLFDWH
WKDWWKHRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQKDGDQHIIHFWRQWKHZidth of the participants’ gaze coneDVH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVKDG
VLJQLILFDQWO\QDUURZHUJD]HFRQHWKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQJURXSDQGPDUJLQDOO\QDUURZHUJD]HFRQHWKDQ
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHFRQWUROJURXS7KHUHZDVQRGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHEHWZHHQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH
FRQWUROJURXSDQGWKHLQFOXVLRQJURXS


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
)LJ0HDQJD]HFRQHZLGWKVLQWKHWKUHHH[SHULPHQWDOJURXSV,QWKHXSSHUSDUWRIWKHILJXUHWKHJD]HFRQHZLGWKVDUH
projected on the perceiver’s eye region (observer’s interpupillary distance 64 mm). 7KHZLGWKRIWKHDUURZLQGLFDWHVWKH
UDQJHRIODWHUDOO\DYHUWHGJD]HGLUHFWLRQVZKLFKWKHSHUFHLYHUVWLOOFRQVLGHUVDVGLUHFWJD]H,QWKHORZHUSDUWRIWKH
ILJXUHWKHHUURUEDUVVWDQGIRUVWDQGDUGHUURURIWKHPHDQV


%DVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQPRRGDQGSDLQ6HH7DEOHIRUPHDQVDQGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQVRIEDVLFQHHG
PRRGDQGSDLQVFRUHVLQHDFKH[SHULPHQWDOJURXSDVZHOODVVWDWLVWLFVIRURQHZD\$129$VDQGPXOWLSOHFRPSDULVRQV
7RVXPPDUL]HWKHVHUHVXOWVLQGLFDWHWKDWH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVUHSRUWHGORZHUEDVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQDQGORZHUSRVLWLYH
PRRGWKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSV3DUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSVUHSRUWHG
VLPLODUOHYHOVRIEDVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQDQGSRVLWLYHPRRG,QQHJDWLYHPRRGZHIRXQGDVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
WKHLQFOXVLRQDQGWKHH[FOXVLRQJURXS+RZHYHUQHLWKHUWKHLQFOXVLRQQRUWKHH[FOXVLRQJURXSGLIIHUHGVLJQLILFDQWO\
IURPWKHFRQWUROJURXSLQQHJDWLYHPRRG7KHRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQKDGQRHIIHFWRQUHSRUWHGOHYHOVRISDLQ
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'LVFXVVLRQ

*D]HFRQH,QWKLVVWXG\ZHH[DPLQHGKRZRVWUDFLVPLQIOXHQFHVWKHHYDOXDWLRQVof others’ gaze 
GLUHFWLRQV:HIRXQGWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSV
WRHYDOXDWHWKDWIDFHVZHUHSRUWUD\LQJDYHUWHGJD]HLHWKH\KDGDQDUURZHUJD]HFRQH2XUUHVXOWVVKRZWKDWRVWUDFLVP
FDQKDYHYDULDEOHHIIHFWVRQWKHJD]HFRQHDVRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVVKRZHGZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHLQDSUHYLRXV
VWXG\XVLQJWKHVDPHVWLPXOXVPDWHULDOVDQGH[SHULPHQWDOGHVLJQDVLQWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\/\\UDHWDO7KHPRVW
VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHFXUUHQWDQGWKHSUHYLRXVH[SHULPHQWZDVWKDWLQWKHSUHYLRXVVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
RVWHQVLEO\LQFOXGHGRURVWUDFL]HGE\RWKHUVSUHVHQWLQWKHODERUDWRU\ZKLOHLQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQWKH
ODERUDWRU\DORQHDQGZHUHOHGWREHOLHYHWKH\ZHUHLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKRWKHUVRQOLQH7KXVSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\
FRXOGQRWUHDIILOLDWHZLWKWKHRVWUDFL]HUVRUQHZLQWHUDFWLRQSDUWQHUV2XUILQGLQJOLNHO\VXJJHVWVWKDWRVWUDFLVP
LQIOXHQFHVWKHJD]HFRQHGLIIHUHQWO\GHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHURUQRWWKHRVWUDFL]HUVDUHSK\VLFDOO\SUHVHQW7KHUHVXOWVRI
WKHFXUUHQWVWXG\FRQWULEXWHVWRDQHPHUJLQJERG\RIHYLGHQFHVKRZLQJWKDWH[FOXVLRQFDQKDYHYDULDEOHHIIHFWVRQ
FRJQLWLYHHYDOXDWLYHDQGSHUFHSWXDOSURFHVVHVGHSHQGLQJRQVLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUV%HUQVWHLQ6DFFR<RXQJ	
+XJHQEHUJ6PDUW5LFKPDQHWDO7XVFKHUHUHWDO
6HFRQGO\WKHSUHVHQWVWXG\VKRZHGWKDWRVWUDFLVPEXWQRWLQFOXVLRQPRGXODWHGWKHJD]HFRQHDVWKHUH
ZHUHQRGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSV7KLVLVLPSRUWDQWDVSUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKKDV
QRWEHHQDEOHWRFRQFOXVLYHO\GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHJD]HFRQHEHWZHHQRVWUDFL]HGDQGLQFOXGHG
SDUWLFLSDQWVFRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWRH[FOXVLRQRULQFOXVLRQ/\\UDHWDO$VSUHVXSSRVHGLQHDUOLHUUHVHDUFKWKH
FXUUHQWVWXG\VXJJHVWVWKDWVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQLVDVXLWDEOHFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQZKHQLQYHVWLJDWLQJKRZRVWUDFLVPDOWHUVJD]H
GLUHFWLRQMXGJPHQWVXVLQJWKH&\EHUEDOORVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQ6LPLODUO\ZHDOVRIRXQGWKDWLQFOXVLRQGLGQRW
influence participants’ satisfaction of basic social needs or positive mood (see below for more detailed discussion). Of 
FRXUVHZHFDQQRWGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQLVDVXLWDEOHFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQZKHQLQYHVWLJDWLQJRWKHURXWFRPHV
RIRVWUDFLVPVXFKDVLWVHIIHFWVRQDWWHQWLRQHJ;XHWDORUEHKDYLRUHJ.RWKJDVVQHUHWDO:KLOHQR
VWXG\WRGDWHKDVVKRZQWKDWLQFOXVLRQLQ&\EHUEDOOHYRNHVFRJQLWLYHEHKDYLRUDORUDIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHVVHHDOVR5LYD
HWDOWKLVSRVVLELOLW\FDQQRWFXUUHQWO\EHGLVUHJDUGHGHLWKHU6RFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQVLQIOXHQFHDIIHFW0F,QW\UHHWDO
DQGLQFOXVLYHFXHVVXFKDVGLUHFWJD]HFDQKDYHYDULRXVDIIHFWLYHFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOHIIHFWVRQWKH
SHUFHLYHU&RQW\HWDO7KXVWRGHWHUPLQHWKDWDQHIIHFWLVGULYHQE\RVWUDFLVPIXWXUHVWXGLHVVKRXOGFRPSDUH
RVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVWRDQRQVRFLDOFRQWUROJURXSLQDGGLWLRQWRDVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQJURXS
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1DUURZLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHDPRQJH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVPD\EHLQGLFDWLYHRIDVRFLDOO\DYRLGDQW
PRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQF\DQGLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKQDUURZHGJD]HFRQHPD\EHXQOLNHO\WRHQJDJHLQLQWHUDFWLRQV3HRSOHWHQG
WRGHYDOXHWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKRWKHUVZKRDUHDYRLGLQJH\HFRQWDFWFRPSDUHGWRWKRVHZKRDUHSRUWUD\LQJGLUHFW
JD]H:LUWK6DFFRHWDODQGVHHLQJDQRWKHUSHUVRQORRNLQJDZD\KDVEHHQVKRZQWRHOLFLWEUDLQUHVSRQVHV
UHODWHGWRDYRLGDQFHPRWLYDWLRQ+LHWDQHQHWDO:KLOHRVWUDFL]HGLQGLYLGXDOVPD\EHKLJKO\PRWLYDWHGWRVDWLVI\
WKHLUQHHGIRUEHORQJLQJ:LOOLDPVWKH\VRPHWLPHVUHVSRQGE\UHIUDLQLQJIURPLQWHUDFWLRQV5HQHWDO
,QGLYLGXDOVKLJKLQVRFLDODYRLGDQFHPRWLYDWLRQWHQGWRLQWHUSUHWXQFOHDUSLFWXUHVRIIDFHVDVSRUWUD\LQJDQJU\IDFLDO
H[SUHVVLRQV1LNLWLQ	)UHXQG6LPLODUO\LQGLYLGXDOVZKRUHVSRQGWRRVWUDFLVPE\VHHNLQJVROLWXGHPD\VWDUWWR
YLHZRWKHUVDVSDUWLFXODUO\XQDSSURDFKDEOHIt should be noted, however, that we did not directly measure participants’ 
PRWLYDWLRQVRUEHKDYLRUDQGWKXVPRUHUHVHDUFKLVQHHGHGWRVKRZWKDWQDUURZLQJDQGZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHDUH
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDYRLGDQFHDQGDSSURDFKRULHQWHGPRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQFLHVUHVSHFWLYHO\
,QWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\ZHKDYHVXJJHVWHGWKDWZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHRFFXUVZKHQWKHRVWUDFL]HG
SDUWLFLSDQWVKDYHDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQDQGQDUURZLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHRFFXUVZKHQWKH\GRQRW$FFRUGLQJWR
WKHPXOWLPRWLYHPRGHOIRURVWUDFLVPWRHOLFLWSURVRFLDOUHVSRQVHVLQGLYLGXDOVQHHGWRSHUFHLYHDQRSSRUWXQLW\WR
UHDIILOLDWHZLWKHLWKHUWKHVRXUFHVRIWKHH[FOXVLRQRURWKHUV6PDUW5LFKPDQ	/HDU\VHHDOVR&XDGUDGRHWDO
5RPHUR&DQ\DVHWDO:KHQUHDIILOLDWLRQLVQRWSRVVLEOHWKHLQGLYLGXDOLVOLNHO\WRUHVSRQGWRH[FOXVLRQE\
ZLWKGUDZLQJIURPLQWHUDFWLRQVRUZLWKDJJUHVVLRQ6PDUW5LFKPDQ	/HDU\,QWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWV
ZHUHXQHTXLYRFDOO\XQDEOHWRUHDIILOLDWHZLWKWKHRVWHQVLEOHRVWUDFL]HUVDVWKH\ZHUHDOOHJHGO\ORFDWHGLQRWKHU
ODERUDWRULHVXQOLNHLQWKHSUHYLRXVVWXG\/\\UDHWDO:HDOVREHOLHYHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVGLGQRWDFWXDOO\SHUFHLYH
WKHVWLPXOXVIDFHVLQWKHJD]HFRQHWDVNDVSRWHQWLDOLQWHUDFWLRQSDUWQHUV:KLOHHYDOXDWLRQVRIWKHLUJD]HGLUHFWLRQVZHUH
PRGXODWHGE\RVWUDFLVPLWVHHPVXQOLNHO\WKDWWKHVHFKDQJHVUHIOHFWWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV’ZLOOLQJQHVVWRDIILOLDWHZLWKWKHVH
VWLPXOXVFKDUDFWHUVLQSDUWLFXODU$UHFHQWVWXG\IRXQGWKDWUHFHLYLQJGLUHFWJD]HIURPDSLFWXUHRIDIDFHZDVQRW
VXIILFLHQWWRPDNHRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVIHHOUHFRQQHFWHGSRVVLEO\EHFDXVHSLFWXUHVDUHQRWSHUFHLYHGDVSRWHQWLDO
VRXUFHVRIUHLQFOXVLRQ6\UMlPlNL/\\UD3HOWROD	+LHWDQHQ
:HVWUHVVWKDWWKHFXUUHQWH[SHULPHQWGRHVQRWDOORZXVWRGHILQLWLYHO\GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDSRVVLELOLW\
IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQLVWKHFULWLFDOIDFWRUWKDWPRGXODWHVWKHHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVPRQWKHJD]HFRQHDVZHGLGQRWPDQLSXODWHLW
DVDIDFWRUZLWKLQWKHH[SHULPHQW0HWDDQDO\WLFHYLGHQFHVKRZVWKDWWKHHIIHFWVRIH[FOXVLRQRQDIIHFWDUHGLIIHUHQW
GHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHH[FOXGHGE\RWKHUVSUHVHQWLQWKHODERUDWRU\RURVWHQVLEO\ORFDWHGHOVHZKHUH
%ODFNKDUWHWDO:HFRQGXFWHGDVHFRQGVPDOOscale experiment in which we tested if participants’ experiences 
UHODWHGWRIXOILOOPHQWRIEDVLFQHHGVGHVLUHIRUVROLWXGHDQGKRVWLOLW\WRZDUGVRWKHUVDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVDUHDOVR
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GLIIHUHQWGHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHUWKH\DUHRVWUDFL]HGE\RWKHUVSUHVHQWLQWKHODERUDWRU\RUORFDWHGHOVHZKHUHEXWWKH
UHVXOWVZHUHLQFRQFOXVLYH:HFDQQRWYHULI\RUUXOHRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWVRPHRWKHUGLIIHUHQFHVEHVLGHVWKH
SRVVLELOLW\IRUUHDIILOLDWLRQFRXOGH[SODLQWKHRSSRVLQJHIIHFWVRQWKHJD]HFRQHLQWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\DQGWKHSUHYLRXV
VWXG\/\\UDHWDOFor instance, the presence of other individuals could influence participants’ selfDZDUHQHVV
ZKLFKFRXOGK\SRWKHWLFDOO\PRGXODWHWKHHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVP,QFRQFOXVLRQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\VKRZVWKDWRVWUDFLVPFDQ
FDXVHQDUURZLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHEXWPRUHUHVHDUFKLVQHHGHGWRFRQFOXVLYHO\GHWHUPLQHWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFK
QDUURZLQJDQGZLGHQLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHRFFXU
2QHLQWULJXLQJTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUFKDQJHVLQWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHDUHDQWHFHGHQWVRU
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHPRWLYDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHWRRVWUDFLVP2QHSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWRVWUDFLVPHOLFLWVSHUFHSWXDOELDVHVVHH
HJ%HUQVWHLQ<RXQJ%URZQ6DFFR	&OD\SRRO6DFFR:LUWK+XJHQEHUJ&KHQ	:LOOLDPVZKLFK
then influences the individual’s motivational tendencies. If ostracized individuals perceive faces in an altered way, these 
HIIHFWVFRXOGPHGLDWHWKHHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVPRQPRWLYDWLRQDVSHUFHLYLQJIDFHVDVQRWVLJQDOLQJDSSURDFKDQG
DIILOLDWLRQPLJKWHOLFLWVRFLDOO\DYRLGDQWPRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQFLHV$QRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWRVWUDFLVPILUVWHYRNHVD
PRWLYDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHZKLFKWKHQELDVHVSHUFHSWXDOMXGJPHQWVDFFRUGLQJO\:KLOHZHFDQQRWGHWHUPLQHFDXVDO
UHODWLRQVKLSVEDVHGRQWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFKZHEHOLHYHWKHODWWHUH[SODQDWLRQEHWWHUDFFRXQWVIRUWKHHIIHFWRIRVWUDFLVP
RQWKHJD]HFRQH:HVXJJHVWWKDWELDVHGMXGJPHQWVRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDUHDUHVXOWUDWKHUWKDQDFDXVHRIDPRWLYDWLRQDO
UHVSRQVHWRRVWUDFLVP7KHPRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQFLHVHOLFLWHGE\RVWUDFLVPDUHPRUHOLNHO\FDXVHGE\DQHHGWRPDLQWDLQ
satisfaction of basic social needs (Williams, 2007), as well as an individual’s inferences of the ostracism episode and 
UHDIILOLDWLRQRSSRUWXQLWLHV6PDUW5LFKPDQ	/HDU\$IWHUUHVSRQGLQJPRWLYDWLRQDOO\DQLQGLYLGXDOWKHQMXGJHV
SHUFHSWLRQVRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDFFRUGLQJO\:HVXJJHVWWKDWFKDQJHVLQWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQHPD\LQIOXHQFHDQ
individual’s behavior in social interactions, but they are not the cause of theJHQHUDOPRWLYDWLRQDOWHQGHQF\DURXVHGE\
RVWUDFLVP1HYHUWKHOHVVIXUWKHUVWXGLHVDUHUHTXLUHGWRUHVROYHWKHLVVXH
,IQDUURZLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHDQGRWKHUHYDOXDWLYHSHUFHSWXDODQGFRJQLWLYHELDVHVSURPRWH
ZLWKGUDZDODIWHURVWUDFLVPWKH\FRXOGKDYHYDULRXVVKRUWDQGORQJWHUPFRQVHTXHQFHV7KHVHELDVHVPD\EHDGDSWLYH
LQWKHVKRUWWHUPDVZLWKGUDZDOFDQVKLHOGWKHRVWUDFL]HGLQGLYLGXDOIURPIXUWKHUKXUW+RZHYHUWKH\PD\DOVREH
GHWULPHQWDODVVXJJHVWHGE\&DFLRSpo and Hawkley’s (2009) model of loneliness. They described a regulatory loop, in 
ZKLFKORQHO\LQGLYLGXDOVVKRZDK\SHUYLJLODQFHWRZDUGVQHJDWLYHVRFLDOVWLPXOLVHHDOVR%DQJHH+DUULV%ULGJHV
5RWHQEHUJ	4XDOWHU4XDOWHUHWDOZKLFKLQFUHDVHVWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIWKHPHQJDJLQJLQEHKDYLRUWKDW
IXUWKHULVRODWHVWKHPDQGIXUWKHUUHLQIRUFHVWKHVHELDVHV,GHQWLI\LQJWKHELDVHVWRZDUGQHJDWLYHVRFLDOVWLPXOLWKDW
RVWUDFLVPFDXVHVDQGWKHERXQGDU\FRQGLWLRQVIRUZKHQWKH\HPHUJHLVLPSRUWDQW,WZRXOGDOORZUHVHDUFKHUVDQG
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FOLQLFLDQVWRXQGHUVWDQGZK\DQGZKHQRVWUDFL]HGLQGLYLGXDOVDUHDWULVNRIHQWHULQJWKHVHOIUHLQIRUFLQJUHJXODWRU\ORRS
ZKLFKFDQOHDGWRFKURQLFLVRODWLRQDQGWKHUHVSHFWLYHSK\VLFDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDOSUREOHPVVHH&DFLRSSR	+DZNOH\
2009). The current study, together with Lyyra et al.’s VWXG\PD\VXJJHVWVRPHRIWKHERXQGDU\FRQGLWLRQVIRU
ZKHQRVWUDFLVPFDQFDXVHDELDVWRZDUGH[FOXVLRQDU\VRFLDOVWLPXOL+RZHYHUPXFKPRUHUHVHDUFKLVQHHGHGWR
XQGHUVWDQGWKHZKROHVSHFWUXPRIFRJQLWLYHDQGSHUFHSWXDOUHVSRQVHVWRRVWUDFLVPDQGWKHIDFWRUVWKDWLQIOXHQFHWKHP
%DVLFQHHGVPRRGDQGSDLQIn addition to the gaze cone, we measured participants’ basic need 
VDWLVIDFWLRQPRRGDQGVRFLDOSDLQZLWKDTXHVWLRQQDLUH$UHFHQWPHWDDQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVRVWUDFL]HGLQ
&\EHUEDOOFRQVLVWHQWO\UHSRUWORZHUEDVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQWKDQLQFOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWV+DUWJHULQNYDQ%HHVW:LFKHUWV
	:LOOLDPV0DQ\VWXGLHVKDYHDOVRIRXQGWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVUHSRUWORZHUPRRGHJ*URVV
:LOOLDPVHWDODQGPRUHSDLQHJ:LUWK/\QDP	:LOOLDPVWKDQLQFOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWV+RZHYHU
EHFDXVHWKHVHVWXGLHVUDUHO\XVHQRQVRFLDOFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQVIRUH[FHSWLRQVVHH'ULVFROOHWDO5LYDHWDO
LWLVSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHREVHUYHGHIIHFWVDUHSDUWO\GULYHQE\LQFOXVLRQ,QRXUVWXG\ZHFRPSDUHGRVWUDFL]HGDQG
LQFOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVWRDFRQWUROJURXS7KHUHVXOWVVXJJHVWHGWKDWEDVLFQHHGVDWLVIDFWLRQDQGSRVLWLYHPRRGZDV
ORZHUHGE\RVWUDFLVPDQGQRWLPSURYHGE\LQFOXVLRQDVWKHLQFOXVLRQJURXSGLGQRWGLIIHUIURPWKHFRQWUROJURXSRQ
WKHVHPHDVXUHPHQWV,QQHJDWLYHPRRGKRZHYHUZHRQO\IRXQGDGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQLQFOXGHGDQGRVWUDFL]HG
SDUWLFLSDQWV1HLWKHURIWKHVHJURXSVGLIIHUHGVLJQLILFDQWO\IURPWKHFRQWUROJURXS,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDWRVWUDFLVPVOLJKWO\
LQFUHDVHGQHJDWLYHPRRGDQGLQFOXVLRQVOLJKWO\GHFUHDVHGLW3UHYLRXVPHWDDQDO\WLFHYLGHQFHVKRZVWKDWVWXGLHV
FRPSDULQJUHMHFWHGSDUWLFLSDQWVWRDFFHSWHGSDUWLFLSDQWVUHSRUWODUJHUHIIHFWVRQPRRGWKDQVWXGLHVXVLQJQHXWUDOFRQWURO
JURXSV%ODFNKDUWHWDO6LPLODUO\LQVWXGLHVXVLQJ&\EHUEDOOWKHHIIHFWVL]HRQQHJDWLYHPRRGPD\EHVOLJKWO\
RYHUHVWLPDWHGLIWKHLQFOXVLRQJURXSLVXVHGDVWKHVROHFRQWUROJURXS
:HZDQWWRVWUHVVWKDWWKHVHILQGLQJVVKRXOGEHLQWHUSUHWHGZLWKFDXWLRQ:HXVHGDQDEEUHYLDWHGEDVLF
QHHGDQGPRRGTXHVWLRQQDLUHWRHQVXUHDVKRUWLQWHUYDOEHWZHHQWKHRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQDQGWKHJD]HFRQHWDVN
:KLOHZHFKRVHWKHLWHPVIURPDEDVLFQHHGTXHVWLRQQDLUHWKDWKDVEHHQIRXQGWRKDYHDYHU\KLJKLQWHUFRUUHODWLRQ
DPRQJLWHPVĮVFRQVLVWHQWO\H[FHHGVHH0ROHWHWDO6\UMlPlNLHWDO:LUWK	:LOOLDPV=DGUR
%RODQG	5LFKDUGVRQLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWDEEUHYLDWLQJWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHORZHUVWKHYDOLGLW\DQGUHOLDELOLW\RI
WKHPHDVXUHPHQWV7KXVRXUUHVXOWVPD\EHPRUHVXJJHVWLYHWKDQFRQFOXVLYH1HYHUWKHOHVVZHVXJJHVWWKDWIXWXUH
VWXGLHVFRXOGH[DPLQHLILQFOXVLRQDVZHOODVH[FOXVLRQLQ&\EHUEDOOLQIOXHQFHVparticipants’ affect.
 &RQWUDU\WRRXUK\SRWKHVLVZHGLGQRWILQGDQHIIHFWRIWKHRVWUDFLVPPDQLSXODWLRQRQUHSRUWHGOHYHOVRI
SDLQ$ODUJHQXPEHURISUHYLRXVVWXGLHVXVLQJWKH&\EHUEDOOPDQLSXODWLRQKDYHIRXQGWKDWRVWUDFLVPFDXVHVSDLQHJ
%HUQVWHLQ	&OD\SRRO(LVHQEHUJHU/LHEHUPDQ	:LOOLDPV:LUWK/\QDP	:LOOLDPV7KHQXOO
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UHVXOWLVPRVWOLNHO\GXHWRW\SH,,HUURUDQGVKRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHLQWHUSUHWHGZLWKFDXWLRQ+RZHYHUIXWXUHUHVHDUFK
FRXOGH[DPLQHLIWKHUHDUHIDFWRUVWKDWFDQUHQGHUH[FOXVLRQOHVVSDLQIXO)RULQVWDQFHLWZDVUHFHQWO\VXJJHVWHGWKDW
DQWLFLSDWHGH[FOXVLRQFRXOGEHOHVVSDLQIXOWKDQXQH[SHFWHGH[FOXVLRQ:HVVHOPDQQ:LUWK	%HUQVWHLQ
/LPLWDWLRQV2QHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\LVWKDWZHKDGWRH[FOXGHDODUJHQXPEHURI
SDUWLFLSDQWVIURPWKHDQDO\VHV0RVWRIWKHPZHUHH[FOXGHGEHFDXVHWKH\LQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\EHOLHYHG
WKHFRXUVHRIWKH&\EHUEDOOJDPHZDVSUHGHWHUPLQHGRUWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRWSOD\LQJWKHJDPHZLWKRWKHUSHRSOH2QO\
RQHSDUWLFLSDQWLQWKHLQFOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQH[SUHVVHGVXFKVXVSLFLRQVZKLOHDWRWDORIHLJKWSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHH[FOXVLRQ
FRQGLWLRQGLGVRVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQZDVPRUHOLNHO\WRDURXVHVXVSLFLRQ$IWHULQFOXGLQJVXVSLFLRXV
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHDQDO\VHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQJURXSVLQWKHJD]HFRQHUHPDLQHGLQWKHVDPHGLUHFWLRQDVEHIRUH
MLQFOXGHG SDLQFOXGHG MH[FOXGHG SDH[FOXGHG MFRQWURO SDFRQWURO EXWWKHHIIHFWVL]HZDV
GLPLQLVKHGDQGWKHGLIIHUHQFHGLGQRWUHDFKVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLILFDQFHF p Șp2 ,WLVSRVVLEOH
WKDWDVHOHFWLRQELDVPD\KDYHVNHZHGWKHILQDOVDPSOHVRWKDWWKHH[FOXVLRQJURXSGLIIHUHGIURPWKHRWKHUWZRJURXSV
ZKLFKFRXOGH[SODLQWKHHIIHFWRIWKH&\EHUEDOOPDQLSXODWLRQRQWKHJD]HFRQH:HDWWHPSWHGWRILQGHYLGHQFHIRUWKLV
E\FRQWDFWLQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVDIWHUZDUGVDQGDVNLQJWKHPWRFRPSOHWHWKH6RFLDO3KRELD6FDOH6360DWWLFN	&ODUNH
DQG6KRUW)LYH6.RQVWDEHO/|QQTYLVW:DONRZLW].RQVWDEHO	9HUNDVDORDQLQYHQWRU\EDVHGRQWKH
%LJ)LYHPRGHORISHUVRQDOLW\7KHUHVSRQVHUDWHZDV+RZHYHUZHGLGQRWILQGGLIIHUHQFHVLQ636RU6VFRUHV
EHWZHHQVXVSLFLRXVDQGQRQVXVSLFLRXVSDUWLFLSDQWVKLJKHVWtZDVIRUFRQVFLHQWLRXVQHVVMVXVSLFLRXV SDVXVSLFLRXV 
MQRQVXVSLFLRXV SDQRQVXFSLFLRXV t p d DOORWKHUpV!:KHQDQDO\]LQJRQO\
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQFOXGHGLQWKHPDLQDQDO\VHVZHGLGQRWILQGGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQLQFOXGHGH[FOXGHGDQGFRQWURO
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQ636RU6VFRUHVHLWKHUKLJKHVWFZDVIRUDJUHHDEOHQHVVF p Șp2 DOORWKHUpV
!,QFRQFOXVLRQZHFRXOGQRWILQGHYLGHQFHRIDVHOHFWLRQELDVVNHZLQJWKHILQDOVDPSOHDOWKRXJKLWLVLPSRVVLEOH
WRFRQFOXVLYHO\UXOHRXWWKLVSRVVLELOLW\
)LQDOO\LWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWDOWKRXJKRXUFRQWUROFRQGLWLRQDOORZHGXVWRLQIHUWKDWVRFLDOH[FOXVLRQ
DQGQRWVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQZDVGULYLQJWKHHIIHFWRIWKH&\EHUEDOOPDQLSXODWLRQRQWKHJD]HFRQHLWGLGQRWDOORZXVWR
FRQFOXVLYHO\UXOHRXWDOOSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQVDVWRZKDWLQIOXHQFHGWKHZLGWKRIWKHJD]HFRQH)RULQVWDQFHZHFDQQRW
UXOHRXWWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWQDUURZLQJRIWKHJD]HFRQHDPRQJH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVZDVDUHVXOWRIORZHUHGPRRG
DOWKRXJKVHH&KHQ1XPPHQPDD	+LHWDQHQIRUHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWLQJRWKHUZLVHH[SHFWDQF\YLRODWLRQ
LQKHUHQWWRWKHH[FOXVLRQFRQGLWLRQRI&\EHUEDOOVHH6RPHUYLOOH+HDWKHUWRQ	.HOOH\RURWKHUIDFWRUVZHGLG
QRWFRQWUROIRU
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&RQFOXVLRQ7KHSUHVHQWVWXG\WRJHWKHUZLWKHDUOLHUUHVHDUFK/\\UDHWDOVKRZVWKDW
VLWXDWLRQDOIDFWRUVGHWHUPLQHKRZRVWUDFLVPLQIOXHQFHVJD]HGLUHFWLRQMXGJPHQWV7KLVILQGLQJFRQWULEXWHVWRDJURZLQJ
ERG\RIUHVHDUFKZKLFKKDVIRXQGWKDWYDULRXVVLWXDWLRQDODQGLQGLYLGXDOIDFWRUVFDQPRGHUDWHWKHHIIHFWVRIRVWUDFLVP
RQVRFLDOFRJQLWLRQHJ%HUQVWHLQHWDO7DQDND	,NHJDPL8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFK
RVWUDFLVPHOLFLWVGLIIHUHQWFRJQLWLYHELDVHVLVLPSRUWDQWDVWKHVHELDVHVPD\SUHGLFWKRZDQLQGLYLGXDOZLOOFRSHZLWK
VRFLDOH[FOXVLRQ7KHPXOWLPRWLYHPRGHO6PDUW5LFKPDQ	/HDU\DSSHDUVWRSURYLGHDXVHIXOIUDPHZRUNIRU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJZKHQWKHVHGLIIHUHQWELDVHVRFFXUDOWKRXJKPRUHHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKRQWKHLVVXHLVGHILQLWHO\VWLOO
QHHGHG


1RWHV

,QWHUHVWLQJO\LWKDVEHHQIRXQGWKDWDZDUHQHVVWKDWRQHLVEHLQJRVWUDFL]HGE\DFRPSXWHUSURJUDPGRHVQRWPDNHWKH
H[SHULHQFHDQ\OHVVGLVWUHVVLQJ=DGUR:LOOLDPV	5LFKDUGVRQ+RZHYHULWFRXOGPRGHUDWHRWKHURXWFRPHVRI
RVWUDFLVPVXFKDVLWVHIIHFWVRQPRWLYDWLRQDQGEHKDYLRU)RULQVWDQFHDUHFHQWVWXG\IRXQGWKDWRVWUDFLVPGHFUHDVHG
participants’ SURVRFLDOEHKDYLRURQO\ZKHQWKH\ZHUHOHGWREHOLHYHWKH\ZHUHLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKRWKHUKXPDQEHLQJV
rather than with a computer (Kothgassner et al., 2017). To ensure our results would not be influenced by participants’ 
VXVSLFLRQVZHFKRVHWRH[FOXGHSDUWLFLSDQWVZKRLQGLFDWHGDZDUHQHVVRIWKHGHFHSWLRQLQ&\EHUEDOO7KLVGHFLVLRQZDV
PDGHEHIRUHFROOHFWLQJWKHGDWD

:HDOVRDQDO\]HGH\HFRQWDFWLPSUHVVLRQVWUHQJWKFRPELQLQJGDWDIURPERWKUHVSRQVHZLQGRZV5DQG57KH
LPSUHVVLRQVWUHQJWKVZHUHVHWLQDQDVFHQGLQJRUGHU QRWORRNLQJDWPHVWURQJLPSUHVVLRQ QRWORRNLQJDWPH
LQWHUPHGLDWHLPSUHVVLRQ QRWORRNLQJDWPHZHDNLPSUHVVLRQ ORRNLQJDWPHZHDNLPSUHVVLRQ ORRNLQJDW
PHLQWHUPHGLDWHLPSUHVVLRQ ORRNLQJDWPHVWURQJLPSUHVVLRQ$.UXVNDO:DOOLVWHVWUHYHDOHGWKDWWKHUHZHUH
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHJURXSVLQWKHPHDQH\HFRQWDFWLPSUHVVLRQVWUHQJWKVFRUHVʖ2 p 0DQQ
:KLWQH\8WHVWVVKRZHGWKDWH[FOXGHGSDUWLFLSDQWVUHSRUWHGZHDNHUH\HFRQWDFWLPSUHVVLRQVWUHQJWKVWKDQSDUWLFLSDQWV
LQWKHLQFOXVLRQJURXSPHDQUDQNVZHUHDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\U p DQGWKHFRQWUROJURXS
PHDQUDQNVZHUHDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\U p 7KHUHZHUHQRGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKH
LQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWUROJURXSVPHDQUDQNVZHUHDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\U p 7KHVHUHVXOWV
H[SDQGRQRXUPDLQILQGLQJE\VKRZLQJWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVFRPSDUHGWRSDUWLFLSDQWVLQLQFOXVLRQDQGFRQWURO
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JURXSVQRWRQO\FRQVLGHUHGDQDUURZHUUDQJHRIJD]HGLUHFWLRQVDVEHLQJGLUHFWHGDWWKHPEXWDOVRUHSRUWHGZHDNHU
LPSUHVVLRQVRIEHLQJORRNHGDW

,QWKHVPDOOVFDOHH[SHULPHQWZHUDQGRPO\DOORFDWHGSDUWLFLSDQWVN WREHLQFOXGHGRUH[FOXGHGLQ&\EHUEDOO
LQFOXVLRQDU\VWDWXVEHWZHHQVXEMHFWVIDFWRURVWHQVLEO\SOD\HGZLWKRWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWVHLWKHUSUHVHQWLQWKHODERUDWRU\
RUORFDWHGHOVHZKHUHH[SHULPHQWVHWWLQJEHWZHHQVXEMHFWVIDFWRU$IWHUWKHPDQLSXODWLRQSDUWLFLSDQWVFRPSOHWHGEDVLF
QHHGPRRGDQGSDLQTXHVWLRQQDLUHVDVZHOODVWKH1HHGWR%HORQJ6FDOH/HDU\.HOO\&RWWUHOO	6FKUHLQGRUIHU
6ROLWXGHVHHNLQJ6FDOH5HQHWDODQG6WDWH+RVWLOLW\6FDOH$QGHUVRQ'HXVHU	'H1HYH:H
GLGQRWILQGHYLGHQFHWKDWRVWUDFL]HGSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHWZRGLIIHUHQWVHWWLQJVUHVSRQGHGGLIIHUHQWO\RQWKHVHVFDOHV
7ZRZD\EHWZHHQVXEMHFW$129$VIRXQGDQH[SHFWHGHIIHFWRILQFOXVLRQDU\VWDWXVRQEDVLFQHHGVPRRGDQGSDLQDOO
pVEXWQRHIIHFWRIH[SHULPHQWVHWWLQJDOOpV!RUDQLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRIDFWRUVDOOpV!2QWKH
RWKHUVFDOHVZKLFKZHUHPRUHFUXFLDOIRURXUUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQZHIRXQGQRPDLQHIIHFWVDOOpV!RULQWHUDFWLRQV
DOOpV!:HFKRVHQRWWRSURFHHGIXUWKHUZLWKWKLVUHVHDUFKDVWKHVFDOHVGLGQRWDSSHDUWREHYHU\VHQVLWLYHWRRXU
PDQLSXODWLRQVDQGDYHU\ODUJHVDPSOHVL]HZRXOGOLNHO\EHQHHGHGWRGHWHFWLQWHUDFWLRQVDQGWKLVZDVRXWVLGHWKHVFRSH
RIWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\

$FNQRZOHGJPHQWV7KLVUHVHDUFKZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKH)LQQLVK&XOWXUDO)RXQGDWLRQDQGWKH$FDGHP\RI)LQODQG
0,1'SURJUDPPHJUDQWWR-+DQGDSHUVRQDOJUDQWIURPWKH(PLO$DOWRQHQ)RXQGDWLRQWR$6:HZRXOG
OLNHWRWKDQN-DPHV+:LUWKIRUKLVFRPPHQWVRQDQHDUOLHUGUDIW:HDOVRWKDQN+DQQHOL6LQLVDORIRUFROOHFWLQJGDWDIRU
WKHVPDOOVFDOHH[SHULPHQW

&RPSOLDQFHZLWKHWKLFDOVWDQGDUGV

)XQGLQJ7KLVUHVHDUFKZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKH)LQQLVK&XOWXUDO)RXQGDWLRQDQGWKH$FDGHP\RI)LQODQG0,1'
SURJUDPPHJUDQWWR-+DQGDSHUVRQDOJUDQWIURPWKH(PLO$DOWRQHQ)RXQGDWLRQWR$6
 &RQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW7KHDXWKRUVGHFODUHQRFRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVW
 (WKLFDODSSURYDO$OOSURFHGXUHVLQVWXGLHVLQYROYLQJKXPDQSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH
HWKLFDOVWDQGDUGVRIWKH(WKLFV&RPPLWWHHRIWKH7DPSHUH5HJLRQDQGZLWKWKH+HOVLQNLGHFODUDWLRQDQGLWVODWHU
DPHQGPHQWVRUFRPSDUDEOHHWKLFDOVWDQGDUGV
 ,QIRUPHGFRQVHQW,QIRUPHGFRQVHQWZDVREWDLQHGIURPDOOSDUWLFLSDQWVLQFOXGHGLQWKHVWXGLHV
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 'DWDDYDLODELOLW\7KHGDWDVHWVDQDO\VHGGXULQJWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\DUHQRWSXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHWRQRW
FRPSURPLVHSDUWLFLSDQWFRQVHQWEXWDUHDYDLODEOHIURPWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJDXWKRURQUHDVRQDEOHUHTXHVW
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Abstract
The present study investigated whether another person’s direct gaze holds a perceiver’s visuospatial attention and whether 
social exclusion or social inclusion would enhance this eﬀect. Participants were socially excluded, socially included, or 
underwent a non-social control manipulation in a virtual ball-tossing game. The manipulation was followed by an attentional 
disengagement task, in which we measured manual response times in identiﬁcation of peripheral stimuli shown to the left or 
right of centrally presented faces portraying direct or downward gaze. Contrary to our hypotheses, the response times were 
not, in general, longer for direct gaze trials than downward gaze trials, and exclusion did not increase the delay in direct 
gaze trials. Instead, we discovered that, in the social inclusion group, the response times were longer for direct gaze trials 
relative to downward gaze trials. Thus, social inclusion might have activated aﬃliation-related cognitive processes leading 
to delayed attentional disengagement from faces cueing aﬃliation.
Introduction
Social exclusion threatens the fundamental human need to 
belong (Williams, 2007), lowers mood (Gerber & Wheeler, 
2009) and elicits social pain (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). 
Excluded individuals have an acute need to regain other 
people’s acceptance (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009; Wil-
liams, 2007), and thus they may exhibit aﬃliative behavior, 
such as increased conformity (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 
2000) and nonverbal mimicry (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 
2008). Interestingly, when people are socially excluded, they 
become more eﬃcient in processing of social information, 
leading to, for instance, increased acuity in identiﬁcation 
of facial expressions (Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & 
Claypool, 2008), and enhanced memory for social informa-
tion (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000). These ﬁndings 
suggest that excluded individuals allocate a large amount 
of attentional resources toward socially salient information.
Attentional deployment consists of several diﬀerent pro-
cesses such as shifting, engagement, and disengagement of 
attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990). When an unattended 
stimulus attracts attention, an individual may shift attention 
towards it. Some categories of stimuli, such as faces, attract 
attention more than others so that when several stimuli com-
pete for attention, it is more likely that attention is shifted 
to these stimuli (Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 
2008). Biases in the initial shifts of attention toward stimuli 
belonging to speciﬁc categories have been suggested to help 
in rapid detection of important stimuli (e.g., Cisler & Koster, 
2010). After a shift of attention, attention can be engaged by 
the stimulus, allowing deeper processing of relevant stimulus 
features. When a novel stimulus suddenly demands attention, 
attention has to be disengaged from the attended stimulus. 
Research has revealed that attentional biases can also occur 
at the stage of attentional disengagement so that disengage-
ment from speciﬁc categories of stimuli is delayed. For 
instance, disengagement is slower from faces than from non-
social control pictures (Bindemann, Burton, Hooge, Jenkins, 
& Haan, 2005), and individuals suﬀering from anxiety have 
diﬃculties in disengaging attention from threatening stimuli 
(Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
Van IJzendoorn, 2007).
To cope with exclusion, people often allocate attention 
toward aﬃliative cues containing information that is par-
ticularly important for individuals whose social status is 
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threatened. For instance, in studies where participants have 
been presented with two faces with diﬀerent facial expres-
sions, exclusion has been shown to increase the tendency 
to shift attention toward a smiling face (DeWall, Maner, & 
Rouby, 2009, Experiment 4; Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015; Xu 
et al., 2015). It has also been reported that excluded partici-
pants are faster than controls in locating smiling faces, but 
not other emotional faces, from a crowd of faces (DeWall 
et al., 2009, Experiment 1; but see Tuscherer et al., 2015). 
Other studies have presented participants simultaneously 
with several diﬀerent emotional faces over a period of time, 
and found that excluded participants, compared to control 
groups, ﬁxate more on smiling faces, but not other emotional 
faces (Buckner, DeWall, Maner, & Schmidt, 2010; DeWall 
et al., 2009, Experiments 2–3; but see Kraines, Kelberer, 
& Wells, 2018). These ﬁndings suggest that excluded indi-
viduals tend to shift their attention toward smiling faces, 
and engage their attention with these faces, possibly because 
attending to aﬃliative cues helps them cope with the adverse 
experience.
Not only facial expressions, but also eye gaze is an impor-
tant social cue to signal aﬃliation or exclusion. Direct gaze 
(gaze directed at the observer’s eye region) indicates that 
the observer is in the center of the looker’s attention (Conty, 
George, & Hietanen, 2016). Seeing another’s direct gaze 
evokes positive aﬀective responses in the perceiver (e.g., 
Chen, Helminen, & Hietanen, 2017; Chen, Peltola, Ranta, 
& Hietanen, 2016; Hietanen et al., 2018), and activates brain 
mechanisms related to approach motivation (Hietanen, Lep-
pänen, Peltola, Linna-aho, & Ruuhiala, 2008). Gaze aver-
sion, on the other hand, is a common way to indicate social 
exclusion (Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998), and it can 
indeed evoke feelings of exclusion and relational devalua-
tion in the observer (Leng, Zhu, Ge, Qian, & Zhang, 2018; 
Wirth, Sacco, Hugenberg, & Williams, 2010).
Exclusion has been found to modulate responses to 
others’ gaze directions. In a recent study, participants 
were excluded or included in a virtual ball-tossing game 
Cyberball (see Williams & Jarvis, 2006), which was 
played ostensibly with other participants present in the 
laboratory (Lyyra, Wirth, & Hietanen, 2017). After the 
manipulation, participants judged whether faces with 
varying gaze directions were looking at them or not. It 
was discovered that excluded participants, compared to 
included participants, were biased to view others as por-
traying direct gaze, suggesting that they viewed others 
as signaling aﬃliation with their gaze. However, another 
study showed that when this game was played ostensibly 
online with players located in other laboratories, excluded 
participants tended to judge others as portraying averted 
gaze instead (Syrjämäki, Lyyra, & Hietanen, 2018). It was 
suggested that this was because the online setting oﬀered 
no opportunity for reaﬃliation. Exclusion has also been 
shown to amplify attentional shifts triggered by other 
people’s gaze. Wilkowski, Robinson, and Friesen (2009) 
showed that the gaze-cuing eﬀect (the tendency to shift 
attention toward others’ gaze directions) was larger among 
individuals with low self-esteem, compared to high self-
esteem (Experiment 1), and among participants who had 
reﬂected on social exclusion, as compared to those having 
reﬂected on inclusion (Experiment 2).
As well as averted gaze, also direct gaze influences 
perceivers’ attention. Faces portraying direct gaze attract 
attention more than faces showing other gaze directions 
(e.g., Böckler, van der Wel, & Welsh, 2014; Conty, Tijus, 
Hugueville, Coelho, & George, 2006; Lyyra, Astikainen, & 
Hietanen, 2018; von Grünau & Anston, 1995). Importantly, 
it has also been suggested that direct gaze holds the perceiv-
er’s visuospatial attention so that attentional disengagement 
from the face is delayed. This was proposed based on a result 
that manual response times in detection of peripheral stimuli 
were longer when participants were shown, in the ﬁxation, 
a face portraying direct gaze compared to downward gaze 
or closed eyes (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). Similarly, a later 
study reported that delays in saccades to peripheral stimuli 
were longer from schematic faces suddenly shifting eyes 
into direct gaze, compared to faces shifting gaze upward 
or downward (Ueda, Takahashi, & Watanabe, 2014). In 
another study measuring saccadic latencies and saccadic 
peak velocities to peripheral targets after pictures of faces 
with static direct gaze and closed eyes, there was no eﬀect of 
gaze direction on saccadic latencies, but compatible with the 
previous studies suggesting delayed attentional disengage-
ment, the peak velocity of the saccades was lower after faces 
with direct gaze (Dalmaso, Castelli, & Galfano, 2017). Inter-
estingly, however, a recent study found that manual response 
times in the identiﬁcation of peripheral stimuli were shorter, 
not longer, when participants viewed live faces portraying 
direct gaze, compared to downward gaze (Hietanen, Myl-
lyneva, Helminen, & Lyyra, 2016). The authors suggested 
that eye contact with the live person increased physiological 
arousal, and this led to shortened response times after direct 
gaze stimuli. Thus, the current evidence suggests that only 
pictures of faces with direct gaze, but not real faces portray-
ing direct gaze, slow down disengagement of attention from 
the stimulus.
If pictures portraying faces with direct gaze hold perceiv-
ers’ visuospatial attention, this eﬀect might be ampliﬁed by 
social exclusion. As exclusion increases allocation of atten-
tion to aﬃliative cues (e.g., DeWall et al., 2009), and ampli-
ﬁes attentional shifts triggered by averted gaze (Wilkowski 
et al., 2009), it could be expected that the attention hold-
ing eﬀect of direct gaze might be particularly strong among 
excluded individuals. This should lead to further slowing of 
response times to peripheral target stimuli in the context of 
direct gaze, as compared to downward gaze.
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In the current study, we manipulated participants’ feel-
ings of social exclusion and social inclusion using Cyberball 
(Williams & Jarvis, 2006), followed by a similar attentional 
disengagement task as that used by Senju and Hasegawa 
(2005). In the widely used Cyberball manipulation, par-
ticipants engage in a virtual ball-tossing game ostensibly 
with other individuals. Unbeknownst to the participants, 
the other characters in the game are actually controlled by 
the computer and are preprogrammed to either include the 
participants in the game or exclude them from it. Exclusion 
from this game, compared to inclusion, consistently evokes 
aﬀective responses associated with social exclusion, such as 
lowered satisfaction of basic social needs (Hartgerink, van 
Beest, Wicherts, & Williams, 2015).
A limitation of most studies using the Cyberball manipu-
lation is that they cannot disentangle the eﬀects of social 
exclusion from the eﬀects of social inclusion. In a typical 
experiment, excluded participants are compared to included 
participants, and any diﬀerences between the two groups are 
inferred to reﬂect eﬀects of social exclusion. However, with-
out a control group it is impossible to determine whether 
exclusion, inclusion or both caused the observed diﬀerences. 
In the current study, we included a non-social control group, 
in which participants played a similar ball-tossing game as 
in the other groups, but the game contained no social inter-
action (the manipulation has been previously used in Syr-
jämäki et al., 2018).
The non-social control group also allowed us to inves-
tigate the possibility that social inclusion could also slow 
down attentional disengagement from direct gaze. It has 
been shown that social inclusion, but not social exclusion, 
increases interest in mating (Brown, Young, Sacco, Bern-
stein, & Claypool, 2009; Sacco, Brown, Young, Bernstein, 
& Hugenberg, 2011). If inclusion can alter social behavior, 
then it might inﬂuence the allocation of attention to social 
cues as well. Recent evidence shows that the eﬀect of direct 
gaze, compared to downward gaze, on self-reported arousal 
is stronger when participants have been primed with aﬀec-
tive sentences related to positive social interactions, or social 
interactions involving the self, compared to negative inter-
actions, or interactions involving other individuals, respec-
tively (McCrackin & Itier, 2018). This suggests that activa-
tion of aﬃliation-related cognitive processes can cause an 
observer to experience another’s direct gaze as a particularly 
potent and salient cue. Furthermore, one study found that 
participants induced with positive mood made more eye 
contact than participants induced with negative or neutral 
mood (Natale, 1977). Based on these ﬁndings, it seems pos-
sible that a positive social experience such as an inclusive 
social interaction could also modulate responses to others’ 
gaze, and thus possibly slow down disengagement of atten-
tion from faces with direct gaze. On the other hand, only 
one study has found inclusion in Cyberball causing eﬀects 
compared to a condition with no manipulation (increased 
interest in mating; Brown et al., 2009), whereas several stud-
ies have found no diﬀerences on various measurements when 
comparing inclusion to non-social control manipulations 
(Dvir, Kelly, & Williams, 2018; Riva, Williams, Torstrick, 
& Montali, 2014; Syrjämäki et al. 2018). Thus, exclusion 
would be more likely to exert an eﬀect on attentional disen-
gagement from direct gaze than social inclusion.
After the social exclusion, social inclusion, or control 
manipulation, participants completed a task, in which we 
examined attentional disengagement from faces. We used 
realistic, computer-generated face stimuli. These kinds of 
face stimuli have proved useful substitutions for photographs 
in studies on attention to faces because they provide precise 
control over many important properties of the stimuli, such 
as their gaze direction, head orientation, and facial expres-
sion (e.g., Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 
2011). Similar to earlier research on attentional disengage-
ment from direct gaze, the faces were rotated laterally (Hie-
tanen et al., 2016; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). In the atten-
tional disengagement task, participants were ﬁrst shown a 
face portraying direct or downward gaze in the middle of the 
computer screen, and after a brief delay (200 ms or 500 ms), 
a target stimulus appeared on either the left or the right side 
of the face. Participants were instructed to identify the target 
stimulus as quickly as possible using one of two keys on a 
keyboard. We hypothesized that participants in all groups 
would be slower to identify the target stimuli when presented 
with a picture of a face portraying direct gaze as compared to 
downward gaze. Most importantly, we investigated whether 
social exclusion, and possibly social inclusion, would 
enhance this eﬀect. We hypothesized that the diﬀerence 
in response times between direct and downward gaze tri-
als would be larger in the social exclusion group, compared 
to the non-social control group, which would indicate that 
excluded participants’ attention is particularly strongly held 
by direct gaze. As described above, there was some basis to 
expect that the attention holding eﬀect by direct gaze could 
be enhanced also in the included individuals relative to the 
control group.
Method
Participants
74 participants (26 males, Mage = 25.4 years,  SDage = 6.8) 
with self-reported normal or corrected to normal vision, 
and no psychiatric or neurological disorders, volunteered for 
the experiment. They were randomly assigned to exclusion, 
inclusion, and non-social control groups. Our aim was to 
get 20 participants in each condition in the ﬁnal sample (as 
suggested by Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). We 
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excluded a number of participants because they indicated 
awareness of the deception in the Cyberball manipulation 
(see “Data analysis” section for details). These participants 
were replaced to ensure the ﬁnal sample only consisted 
of participants not aware of the deception, with suﬃcient 
number of participants in each group. The ﬁnal, analyzed 
sample after all data exclusions, consisted of 62 partici-
pants (nexclusion = 21, ninclusion = 21, ncontrol = 20, 21 males, 
Mage = 24.8 years,  SDage = 6.0). All participants signed a 
form of informed consent and were rewarded with either a 
movie ticket or partial course credit.
Apparatus
All stimuli were presented on a 19Ǝ LCD monitor with a 
resolution of 1280 × 1024 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Par-
ticipants’ head position was ﬁxed at 57 cm from the monitor 
using chin and forehead rests. The experiment was run using 
E-Prime® 2.0 software. The Cyberball game was presented 
on a Firefox Internet browser. Participants gave responses 
using standard keyboards. The right bracket key and the w 
key were marked with a horizontal line and a vertical line 
(order counterbalanced across participants) and were used 
as the response keys in the attentional disengagement task. 
To align the response keys horizontally, the keyboard was 
rotated 90° clockwise. To prevent distractions, participants 
wore acoustic earmuﬀs during the experiment.
Social exclusion, social inclusion, and control 
manipulations
We used three versions of Cyberball 4.0 (Williams & Jarvis, 
2006) for the social exclusion, inclusion, and control manip-
ulations. In the inclusion and exclusion conditions, three 
characters, one controlled by the participant, were throwing 
a ball with each other. Participants in the inclusion condition 
received approximately one-third of all tosses. Participants 
assigned to the exclusion condition only received the ball 
once from each character in the beginning of the game, and 
then never again. The game lasted for 30 throws in total. In 
the control condition, the other two characters were replaced 
by pictures of baskets, in which the participants were throw-
ing the ball. After each throw, the ball returned to the partici-
pant’s character. Participants in the control condition made 
10 throws, i.e., the same number as in the inclusion condi-
tion. The game pace was adjusted to ensure the length of the 
game was similar in all conditions.
Stimuli
The face stimuli in the attentional disengagement task 
were faces of four virtual characters (two females), created 
with 3D animation software DAZ Studio. The whole head, 
including the neck, was displayed. The characters were 
rotated 20° on a vertical axis. The eyes in the direct gaze 
stimuli were individually rotated so that the pupils pointed 
directly at the camera. The eyes in the downward gaze 
stimuli were rotated similarly on the vertical axis, but they 
pointed 24.1° down. The stimuli were 11.7° (± 0.4°) high, 
and 8.1° (± 0.8°) wide. The target stimuli were horizontal 
and vertical lines, 1.3° of visual angle.
Attentional disengagement task
Each trial in the attentional disengagement task began with 
showing a ﬁxation cross in the middle of the screen. After 
a random delay between 650 ms and 850 ms, the ﬁxation 
cross was replaced with the face stimulus. The stimulus was 
positioned so that both eyes were at the same distance from 
the center of the screen. After a stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) of 200 ms or 500 ms, the target stimulus appeared 
on either the left or the right side of the face (15.5° from the 
center of the screen). Participants were instructed to press 
the corresponding response key as fast as possible while try-
ing not to make mistakes. If the participant did not respond 
within 2000 ms, the next trial was presented. The interstim-
ulus interval was a random duration between 800 ms and 
1200 ms. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of a single trial.
Participants completed two blocks of trials, each con-
taining two of each possible combination of the factors 
of face identity, gaze direction, SOA, target stimulus, and 
target side. This resulted in two blocks of 128 trials each. 
The trial order was pseudorandomized so that there were 
no more than four successive repetitions on any of the fac-
tors. In one of the blocks, horizontally ﬂipped face stimuli 
were displayed (order counterbalanced across participants). 
In between the blocks, participants were allowed to take a 
short break.
Procedure
Participants arrived in the laboratory in groups of three. 
They were instructed by a female experimenter, blind to the 
condition each participant was assigned to. As a cover story, 
participants were told the study was about “mental visu-
alization” and attention. They were told that they would do 
a mental visualization task, followed by an attention task. 
To enhance the cover story, participants ﬁlled in a bogus 
mental visualization questionnaire in the beginning of the 
experiment. After this, they completed a 16-trial practice 
block of the attentional disengagement task, followed by 
the Cyberball manipulation, described above. The instruc-
tions for the game were presented on the computer screen. 
Participants in the exclusion and inclusion conditions were 
told that the game would be played with the other two par-
ticipants present in the laboratory via a local area network. 
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In reality, the other characters in the game were controlled 
by the computer.
After the manipulation, we evaluated its eﬀectiveness 
by administering a six-item questionnaire measuring ful-
ﬁllment of basic social needs of control (“I felt I had the 
ability to signiﬁcantly alter events”), meaningful existence 
(“I felt important”), belonging (“I felt rejected”), and self-
esteem (“I felt insecure”), as well as positive mood (“I felt 
happy”), and negative mood (“I felt angry”). The items 
were chosen from a questionnaire used in previous social 
exclusion studies (e.g., Molet, Macquet, Lefebvre, & Wil-
liams, 2013; Wirth & Williams, 2009). The questionnaire 
was abbreviated, because the eﬀects of exclusion in Cyber-
ball have been found to diminish quickly (e.g., Lyyra et al., 
2017; Wesselmann, Wirth, Mroczek, & Williams, 2012), 
and thus it was important to ensure the interval between the 
manipulation and the attentional disengagement task was as 
short as possible. We reverse-scored the basic need scores 
when necessary, and averaged them to calculate a basic need 
satisfaction score for each participant (α = 0.78). The partici-
pants also rated the amount of pain they were experiencing 
during the game on a 0–100 scale. As a manipulation check, 
they assessed what percentage of all throws in the game 
was made by them. After the questionnaire, participants per-
formed the attentional disengagement task, described earlier.
After completing the task, we measured participants’ 
awareness of the deception in the Cyberball manipulation 
with a funnel-type suspicion questionnaire (the method 
has been previously used in Syrjämäki, Lyyra, Peltola, & 
Hietanen, 2017, Experiment 2). Participants typed out their 
answers to six questions, which started with vague ques-
tions about the experiment and ended with asking explicitly 
about their suspicions. We inferred that the more suspicious 
the participants were, the more likely they would voice 
their suspicions, even spontaneously to vague questions. 
The questions were as follows: (1) How did you feel about 
the experiment? (2) What do you think the experiment was 
about? (3) What do you think was the purpose of the ball 
game you played? (4) Was there anything confusing or odd 
about the ball game? (5) Do you think there was something 
about the ball game the experimenter did not tell you about? 
If yes, what was it? (6) If the experimenter would now tell 
you that she misled you with something about the ball game, 
what do you think she would tell you? After all participants 
were ﬁnished with the questionnaire, they were thoroughly 
debriefed, rewarded, and thanked for their participation.
Fig. 1  Illustration of a single trial in the attentional disengagement 
task. A ﬁxation cross was displayed for 650–850  ms, after which a 
face stimulus (portraying direct or downward gaze) appeared on the 
screen. After 200 ms or 500 ms (SOA), the target stimulus (either a 
horizontal or a vertical line) was displayed on the left or the right side 
of the face. Participants were instructed to identify the target stimulus 
as quickly as possible using one of two keys on the keyboard. The 
displayed stimuli are not to scale
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Data analysis
Suspicion
Each item in the suspicion questionnaire was scored 1 if 
the participant indicated awareness that the course of the 
Cyberball game was predetermined, or that the game was 
not played with the other participants. An item was scored 
0 if the participant did not indicate such awareness. Thus, 
we received an ordinal scale suspicion score, ranging from 
0 to 6 for each participant.
Data exclusions
From the total sample of 74 participants, we excluded 12 
participants before the analyses. Before analyzing the data, 
we decided to remove all participants who received suspi-
cion scores of 3 or higher (11 participants, 2 in the inclusion 
group, 9 in the exclusion group), as we considered them 
aware of the deception in Cyberball. Exclusion of suspicious 
participants did not inﬂuence the statistical signiﬁcance of 
the analyses. Finally, we excluded one participant (in the 
control group) as an outlier. For this participant, the diﬀer-
ence in response times between direct and downward gaze 
trials in the attentional disengagement task was very large 
(41 ms longer for direct gaze trials, more than three standard 
deviations higher than the mean diﬀerence in the sample).
Attentional disengagement task
For analysis of the response times, we ﬁrst removed all trials 
in which participants did not respond (< 0.1% of all trials), 
trials with incorrect responses (3.8% of all trials), and tri-
als with response times (RTs) not within 2.5 SD from the 
individual mean (2.6% of the remaining trials). We then cal-
culated individual mean RTs for each combination of SOA, 
Gaze Direction, and Block Position. For the statistical analy-
ses, we performed a square root transformation to correct for 
non-normal distribution of the data. For the sake of clarity, 
untransformed values are presented in the ﬁgures and text 
in the “Results” section. For analysis of the error rates, we 
calculated the total number of incorrect responses in each 
combination of SOA, Gaze Direction, and Block Position 
for each participant. For the statistical analyses, these values 
were square root transformed to reduce skewness. For the 
sake of clarity, untransformed values are presented in the 
“Results” section.
Results
Questionnaires
The means and standard deviations for manipulation check, 
basic need, mood and pain scores for each experimental 
group, as well as statistics for the between-group compari-
sons are presented in Table 1. Because the data violated 
normality assumptions of parametric tests, the comparisons 
were conducted using non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis tests, 
and the follow-up pairwise comparisons using Mann–Whit-
ney U tests.
To summarize, these results show that participants expe-
rienced the social exclusion and inclusion manipulation 
as intended. Participants were aware of their inclusionary 
status, as the manipulation checks showed that the control 
group reported making a larger proportion of the throws 
than the inclusion or the exclusion groups, and the inclusion 
group reported making a larger proportion of the throws than 
the exclusion group. Exclusion also elicited the expected 
affective responses: participants in the exclusion group 
reported less basic need satisfaction and positive mood, and 
more negative mood and pain than either the inclusion or the 
control group. There were no diﬀerences between the inclu-
sion and control groups on these measurements, although 
the diﬀerence in basic need satisfaction was approaching 
statistical signiﬁcance.
Table 1  Manipulation check, basic need, mood, and pain scores for each experimental group, and statistics for the between-groups comparisons
Manipulation check and pain scores are on a 0–100 visual analogue scale; basic need and mood scores are on a 1–5 Likert scale; pairwise com-
parisons done with Mann–Whitney U test
Exclusion M (SD) Inclusion M (SD) Control M (SD) Kruskal–Wal-
lis test
Pairwise comparisons
Exclusion-
inclusion
Exclusion-
control
Inclusion-control
χ2(2) p U p U p U p
Manip. check 11.0 (6.1) 36.6 (8.0) 83.3 (31.2) 42.84 < 0.001 0.50 < 0.001 29.00 < 0.001 45.00 < 0.001
Basic needs 2.01 (0.84) 3.85 (0.65) 3.46 (0.78) 30.92 < 0.001 29.00 < 0.001 40.50 < 0.001 136.50 0.054
Pos. mood 2.14 (1.06) 3.67 (1.24) 3.10 (1.21) 14.49 0.001 82.50 < 0.001 116.00 0.011 151.00 0.108
Neg. mood 2.29 (1.19) 1.10 (0.30) 1.20 (0.52) 21.30 < 0.001 85.50 < 0.001 93.50 0.001 197.50 0.556
Pain 24.4 (23.3) 1.5 (3.8) 6.0 (16.8) 17.11 < 0.001 82.50 < 0.001 97.50 0.002 197.50 0.685
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Response times in the attentional disengagement 
task
The response time data were analyzed using a 3 (inclusion-
ary Status: inclusion/exclusion/control; between subjects 
factor) × 2 (gaze direction: direct/down; within subjects fac-
tor) × 2 (SOA: 200 ms/500 ms; within subjects factor) × 2 
(block position: block 1/block 2; within subjects factor) 
mixed-design ANOVA, with response time (RT) as the 
dependent variable. For RTs divided by each of these fac-
tors, see Fig. 2.
The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of SOA (F(1, 
59) = 235.42, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.80). RTs were longer for tri-
als at a SOA of 200 ms (M = 536.7, SD = 77.7), as compared 
to trials at a SOA of 500 ms (M = 497.0, SD = 71.3). Short-
ening of the RTs as a function of the SOA is a typical ﬁnding 
that reﬂects subjective expectancy, among other things (for 
a review, see Niemi & Näätänen, 1981). The main eﬀect 
of Block Position was also signiﬁcant (F(1, 59) = 10.91, 
p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.16). RTs were longer in block 1 (M = 525.0, 
SD = 85.3) than in block 2 (M = 508.7, SD = 66.2), suggest-
ing that performance in the task improved with repetition. 
No main eﬀects of gaze direction or inclusionary status were 
found (ps > 0.73).
The most important ﬁnding was an interaction between 
inclusionary status and gaze direction (F(2, 59) = 3.97, 
p = 0.024, ηp2 = 0.12; see Fig. 3). To break down this inter-
action, we conducted a series of t tests. They revealed that, in 
the exclusion and control groups, there were no statistically 
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between RTs in direct and downward 
gaze trials (exclusion group: t(20) = 0.77, p = 0.452, d = 0.16; 
control group: t(19) = 1.89, p = 0.074, d = 0.44), whereas 
the RTs were longer for direct than downward gaze trials in 
the inclusion group (t(20) = 2.41, p = 0.026, d = 0.56). No 
between-group diﬀerences for RTs in direct or downward 
gaze trials were found (ps > 0.50). We found no other inter-
actions (highest F was for inclusionary status × SOA × block 
position interaction, F(2, 59) = 2.18, p = 0.123, ηp2 = 0.07).
Error rates
For analysis of the error rates, we conducted a similar 
mixed-design ANOVA as in the analysis of the RT data. 
The only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect was an interaction 
between gaze direction and SOA (F(1, 59) = 5.34, p = 0.024, 
ηp2 = 0.08; all other ps > 0.08). t tests revealed that, at the 
SOA of 200 ms, participants made more errors on direct 
gaze trials (M = 1.40 errors, SD = 1.18) compared to down-
ward gaze trials (M = 1.15 errors, SD = 1.38; t(61) = 2.21, 
p = 0.031, d = 1.26). Participants also made more errors on 
direct gaze trials at the SOA of 200 ms than at the SOA of 
500 ms (M = 1.15 errors, SD = 1.26; t(61) = 2.19, p = 0.032, 
d = 0.43). There were no diﬀerences in the number of errors 
between direct gaze trials at the 500-ms SOA, downward 
gaze trials at the 500-ms SOA (M = 1.22 errors, SD = 1.27), 
and downward gaze trials at the 200-ms SOA (ps > 0.33). 
Fig. 2  Mean response times in milliseconds in each condition. The error bars stand for standard error of the means
Fig. 3  Mean response times in milliseconds in each experimen-
tal group on direct and downward gaze trials, averaged over the 
two SOAs and blocks. The error bars stand for standard error of the 
means. *p < 0.05, †p < 0.10
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These results suggest that participants were especially prone 
to make errors on direct gaze trials at the short SOA, pos-
sibly because direct gaze takes up the perceiver’s cognitive 
resources (see Conty, Gimmig, Belletier, George, & Huguet, 
2010), consequently hindering performance in tasks that 
require rapid deployment of cognitive resources.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated whether the attentional 
holding eﬀect of direct gaze (see Senju & Hasegawa, 2005) 
would be enhanced by social exclusion, and possibly also 
by social inclusion. We hypothesized that participants in 
all groups would be slower to identify the target stimuli 
when presented with a face portraying direct gaze relative 
to downward gaze, but more importantly, we hypothesized 
that this diﬀerence in response times would be larger among 
socially excluded participants than in the non-social control 
group. Neither of these hypotheses were supported. The 
results showed that, in the control and exclusion groups, the 
response times tended to be shorter for direct gaze trials than 
downward gaze trials. We also investigated the possibility 
that social inclusion would delay the disengagement of atten-
tion from faces with direct gaze. Consistent with this, we 
found that, in the inclusion group, the response times were 
signiﬁcantly longer for direct gaze trials than downward gaze 
trials. In summary, we received no support for that direct 
gaze would typically delay attentional disengagement, and 
that this delay would be increased after an exclusion manipu-
lation. Instead, we observed that it was the inclusion manip-
ulation which caused delayed disengagement of attention 
from faces with direct gaze compared to downward gaze.
Exclusion and attentional disengagement
As noted above, social exclusion did not inﬂuence atten-
tional disengagement from direct gaze, in the present study. 
The exclusion manipulation as such was eﬀective, as exclu-
sion, compared to inclusion and the non-social control 
group, lowered mood and satisfaction of basic social needs, 
and increased self-reported pain, as in earlier research (e.g., 
Hartgerink et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2000; Wirth, Lynam, 
& Williams, 2010). Several researchers have suggested that 
exclusion increases the level of attention allocated to socially 
salient information (e.g., Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004; 
Shilling & Brown, 2016), and previous research has found 
increased attention toward aﬃliative cues, such as smiling 
faces, among excluded participants (e.g., DeWall et al., 
2009). Just like facial expressions, also other people’s gaze 
is an important cue that excluded individuals use to navigate 
in their social environment. This is evidenced by ﬁndings 
that exclusion alters gaze direction judgments according 
to the individual’s motivational states (Lyyra et al., 2017; 
Syrjämäki et al., 2018), and that reﬂecting on exclusion, 
compared to inclusion, enhances attention shifts toward the 
direction of another person’s gaze (Wilkowski et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the exclusion manipulation did not delay 
the disengagement of attention from direct gaze. Perhaps 
excluded individuals do not maintain their attention in faces 
with direct gaze, because seeing direct gaze may not reduce 
the aﬀective distress elicited by exclusion (see Syrjämäki 
et al., 2017). Attending to smiling faces, on the other hand, 
could be an eﬀective way of regulating one’s aﬀective state 
and therefore many people may have learned to habitually 
direct their attention toward smiling faces, and maintain their 
attention in these cues, as a response to exclusion.
Another possible interpretation of our ﬁnding is that 
exclusion does not exert its inﬂuence at the attentional dis-
engagement stage. Previous research has investigated how 
exclusion modulates attentional shifts toward facial expres-
sions (e.g., Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015), and ﬁxation times 
to emotional faces (e.g., DeWall et al., 2009, Experiments 
2–3), as well as performance in visual search for diﬀerent 
facial expressions (e.g., DeWall et al., 2009, Experiment 1). 
However, the current experiment is the ﬁrst to investigate 
how exclusion modulates attentional disengagement from 
a social cue1. Thus, it is possible that exclusion facilitates 
attentional shifts toward aﬃliative cues and engagement of 
attention with these cues (see DeWall et al., 2009), but does 
not slow down disengagement from them. Of course, we 
cannot draw ﬁrm conclusions because there are signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences between this and earlier studies, such as in the 
types of stimuli used (emotional faces versus faces with dif-
ferent gaze directions). Future research should investigate 
whether exclusion modulates the tendency to shift attention 
toward faces with direct gaze (e.g., Böckler et al., 2014; von 
Grünau & Anston, 1995), and disengagement of attention 
from faces showing diﬀerent facial expressions. This would 
provide a more detailed understanding of the time-course 
of the eﬀects of exclusion on attention to diﬀerent types of 
social cues.
1 DeWall et  al. (2009, Experiment 4) investigated the eﬀects of 
exclusion on attention to diﬀerent facial expressions using a dot-
probe task. They interpreted their result as indicating that exclusion 
modulated attentional disengagement from a smiling face, but not the 
speed at which attention was engaged with a smiling face. However, 
the dot-probe task used in that experiment only reveals which of two 
stimuli (a neutral face or an emotional face) attention was focused on 
at the time the target probe was presented (1  s after presentation of 
the faces in that experiment), and thus it cannot distinguish between 
eﬀects at diﬀerent stages of attentional deployment (see Cooper & 
Langton, 2006). Thus, the current experiment is in fact the ﬁrst to 
speciﬁcally investigate the eﬀects of exclusion on attentional disen-
gagement from a social stimulus.
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It should be noted that, based on the present study, we 
cannot conclusively determine that exclusion did not modu-
late attentional disengagement from faces, in general, even 
though there were no differences in the response times 
between the groups. A limitation of the present experi-
ment is that we did not include non-social control stimuli 
in the attentional disengagement task. Exclusion could 
have speeded up response times to targets generally, while 
simultaneously it may have slowed down attentional disen-
gagement from face stimuli speciﬁcally. For instance, it has 
been shown that exclusion increases autonomic arousal (see 
Kelly, McDonald, & Rushby, 2012), which could generally 
speed up reaction times. If exclusion simultaneously slowed 
down disengagement of attention from faces, regardless of 
their gaze direction, these two opposite eﬀects could have 
canceled each other out, so that no eﬀect of the manipula-
tion on response times was observed. However, based on 
previous research, there is no reason to assume that exclu-
sion modulated attentional disengagement from all faces. No 
study to date has shown that excluded individuals allocate 
increased levels of attention to all types of face stimuli, but 
instead they tend to allocate more attention to speciﬁc types 
of faces, such as those who are portraying a smiling expres-
sion (e.g., DeWall et al., 2009; Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015).
Inclusion and attentional disengagement
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, our results showed 
that social inclusion had an eﬀect on attentional disengage-
ment, as the response times were longer in trials with direct 
gaze compared to downward gaze, when the attentional dis-
engagement task followed an inclusive social interaction, but 
not after social exclusion or a non-social control task. This 
result suggests that social inclusion does not only increase 
interest in mating behavior (Brown et al., 2009; Sacco et al., 
2011), but it also modulates allocation of attention to social 
cues. The ﬁnding was surprising, however, as we originally 
predicted that exclusion would be more likely than inclusion 
to inﬂuence attentional disengagement. One possible expla-
nation to this ﬁnding is that social inclusion activated aﬃlia-
tion-related cognitive processes, which modulated responses 
to direct gaze. A recent study suggested that the experiential 
responses evoked by direct gaze are particularly powerful 
when participants have been primed with aﬀective sentences 
related to positive social interactions or interactions involv-
ing the self, relative to negative interactions or interactions 
involving other people, respectively (McCrackin & Itier, 
2018). Similarly, an inclusive social interaction could acti-
vate aﬃliation-related cognitive processes, and cause the 
individual to experience direct gaze as a particularly salient 
cue. Thus, increased allocation of attention to faces portray-
ing direct gaze would make it diﬃcult to disengage attention 
from the face.
An alternative possibility is that activating cognitive 
contents related to social inclusion increased attention to 
stimuli belonging to this category of social behavior. For 
instance, it has been reported that participants who wrote 
about a speciﬁc ethnic group showed faster visual search 
for faces belonging to that group compared to participants 
who had written about a diﬀerent ethnic group (Chiao, Heck, 
Nakayama, & Ambady, 2006). Similarly, being included in 
a social interaction could cause the individual to allocate 
more attention to aﬃliative stimuli, and consequently delay 
disengagement of attention from these stimuli.
Future research could directly test whether a priming 
eﬀect explains the delayed attentional disengagement from 
direct gaze. For instance, participants could be primed with 
sentences related to social acceptance and with non-social 
control sentences followed by measurements of attentional 
disengagement from direct and downward gaze. It would 
be expected that direct gaze, compared to downward gaze, 
would hold attention only when preceded by primes related 
to aﬃliation. Furthermore, if the eﬀect was caused by a 
prime activating cognitive processes related to the category 
of the perceived stimulus, then a similar eﬀect on attentional 
disengagement might occur by priming diﬀerent types of 
categories of stimuli as well. Primes related to, for instance, 
animals, might lead to delayed attentional disengagement 
from pictures of animals, compared to control stimuli such 
as pictures of plants. This hypothesis could be investigated 
in future research to determine if the eﬀect of social inclu-
sion on attentional disengagement from direct gaze reﬂects 
a typical response to various types of primes and stimuli, or 
if this response is speciﬁc to aﬃliative social cues followed 
by aﬃliation-related aﬀective priming.
Even though we have interpreted our results in the context 
of attentional engagement, is it possible that the observed 
diﬀerence in response times between direct and downward 
gaze trials can be explained by some other eﬀects? This 
seems improbable, as several alternative explanations can 
be ruled out. First, we can rule out the possibility that the 
diﬀerence in response times would reﬂect the eﬀect of gaze 
direction on autonomic arousal. It has been demonstrated 
that gaze direction in pictures of faces does not inﬂuence 
autonomic arousal, unlike gaze direction in live faces (e.g., 
Hietanen et al., 2008; Pönkänen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2011). 
Even if the face stimuli had inﬂuenced autonomic arousal 
in this experiment, direct gaze would have been expected 
to increase arousal, which in turn, should have led to short-
ening rather than lengthening of the response times. Sec-
ond, the eﬀect was not likely caused by the manipulation 
altering socially included participants’ perceptions of gaze 
directions. Previous research has shown that social exclu-
sion modulates judgments of others’ gaze directions, but 
importantly, social inclusion does not (Lyyra et al., 2017; 
Syrjämäki et al., 2018). Thus, if the modulation of response 
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times would have reﬂected changes in perception of gaze 
directions, we should have observed the eﬀect of gaze in the 
social exclusion group, rather than in the social inclusion 
group. Finally, it is unlikely that the diﬀerence in response 
times was due to included participants having diﬃculties 
in making a saccade from the faces to the target stimuli, 
rather than having diﬃculties in disengaging attention as 
such. Attentional shifts precede saccades (Zhao, Gersch, 
Schnitzer, Dosher, & Kowler, 2012), and thus if the direct 
gaze stimuli only delayed oculomotor disengagement, 
but not attentional disengagement, participants’ attention 
would have shifted to the target stimuli equally quickly on 
both types of trials. It is clear from previous research that 
responding to peripheral stimuli is possible without moving 
eyes away from a central stimulus (e.g., Hermens, 2015), and 
in the current study, the visual diﬀerence between the two 
target stimuli was discernible while ﬁxating on the centrally 
presented face. Because participants were attempting to 
respond as quickly as possible, it is unlikely that they would 
have deliberately waited for the saccade before responding 
if their attention was already focused on the target stimulus.
Non-social control condition
From a methodological standpoint, the most important 
implication of the current study is that social inclusion is 
not always a suitable control condition when investigating 
the eﬀects of social exclusion using the Cyberball manipu-
lation. In a typical experiment using this manipulation, any 
diﬀerences between the exclusion and the inclusion groups 
are inferred to reﬂect eﬀects of exclusion (Hartgerink et al., 
2015). A growing body of evidence suggests that the eﬀect 
of the manipulation on aﬀect is indeed driven by exclu-
sion and not inclusion (Dvir et al., 2018; Riva et al., 2014; 
Syrjämäki et al., 2018). The current results are consistent 
with these ﬁndings, as we found no statistically signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences between included participants and the control 
group in basic need satisfaction, mood, or self-reported 
pain (although in basic need satisfaction, the diﬀerence was 
approaching statistical signiﬁcance). Furthermore, previ-
ous research also shows that the eﬀects of the manipula-
tion on gaze direction judgments (Syrjämäki et al., 2018), 
and compliance (Riva et al., 2014) are caused by exclusion, 
and not inclusion. However, the current study shows that 
inclusion, but not exclusion in Cyberball modulated disen-
gagement of attention from faces with direct gaze, compared 
to downward gaze. This shows that some of this manipula-
tion’s eﬀects are driven by inclusion and, therefore, future 
research should use non-social control groups to ﬁrmly show 
that diﬀerences between exclusion and inclusion groups are 
driven by exclusion (for a similar argument, see Brown et al., 
2009). However, we do not imply that previously reported 
eﬀects of exclusion manipulations on attention are driven by 
inclusion, as many studies on this issue have used control 
groups other than social inclusion (e.g., Buckner et al., 2010; 
DeWall et al., 2009).
We propose that the non-social task used in this experi-
ment provides an appropriate and convenient control con-
dition for future studies investigating the eﬀects of social 
exclusion and social inclusion using Cyberball. Other types 
of control manipulations have been used as well, but the 
manipulation used in the current study has a few strengths 
over them. Riva et al. (2014) instructed participants to men-
tally visualize natural scenery, and Dvir et al. (2018) showed 
participants pictures of trees, which they were instructed 
to mentally visualize and to click on them with a mouse 
to emulate the motor actions done during Cyberball. Like 
these tasks, the currently used control task was devoid of 
any social interaction, but unlike in these other control tasks, 
participants performed identical actions as in the standard 
version of Cyberball, i.e., mouse clicks to throw a ball in a 
simple computer game. Moreover, in this task, participants 
were not led to mentally visualize nature, which might evoke 
unwanted responses. Even passive viewing of natural scenes 
can improve the perceiver’s aﬀective state (e.g., Ulrich et al., 
1991) and inﬂuence recognition of aﬀectively congruent 
facial expressions (Hietanen, Klemettilä, Kettunen, & Kor-
pela, 2007).
Direct gaze and attentional disengagement
An important ﬁnding of this study was that, in general, 
there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in response times in 
identiﬁcation of the target stimuli between direct and down-
ward gaze trials, suggesting that direct gaze did not hold 
observers’ visuospatial attention. A few other recent studies 
have also found convergent evidence. Dalmaso et al. (2017) 
reported that only in one out of three experiments, delays 
in saccades from faces to peripheral stimuli were longer in 
the context of direct gaze compared to downward gaze. In 
the other two experiments, the delays were similar for the 
two conditions (but see Ueda et al., 2014, for a ﬁnding that 
saccadic latencies were longer from faces suddenly shifting 
eyes toward the perceiver, compared to faces shifting gaze 
upward or downward). Strikingly, another recent study found 
that eye contact with a live confederate enhanced, rather than 
impaired, attentional disengagement as measured by manual 
response times to peripheral stimuli (Hietanen et al., 2016). 
In other words, the result was opposite to what Senju and 
Hasegawa (2005) reported. The authors suggested that the 
engagement of visual attention by direct gaze was possibly 
overridden due to increased physiological arousal elicited 
by eye contact with a live confederate and that the increased 
arousal also facilitated perceptual-motor processes involved 
in discriminating and responding to the visual targets.
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A comparison between the original experiment by Senju 
and Hasegawa (2005) and the studies mentioned above is 
somewhat problematic because the stimuli (Hietanen et al., 
2016) or the behavioral measurements (Dalmaso et al., 2017) 
diﬀered from those used in the Senju and Hasegawa study. 
The current study provides the ﬁrst reported replication 
attempt of the original ﬁnding, measuring manual response 
times and using pictorial face stimuli as in the original study. 
Critically, we included a 500-ms SOA condition, in which 
the diﬀerence in response times between the two gaze con-
ditions was found earlier. Notably, there were diﬀerences 
between the tasks in the two studies as well. For instance, the 
current study used computer-generated face stimuli, whereas 
the original study used photographs. However, it seems 
unlikely that this diﬀerence explains the conﬂicting results, 
as previous studies have reported eﬀects of direct gaze on 
saccadic latencies even when using unrealistic schematic 
faces (Ueda et al., 2014). We cannot, of course, rule out the 
possibility that the discrepant results are explained by some 
other diﬀerence between the tasks (such as the 3°-diﬀerence 
in the positioning of the target stimuli, or diﬀerence in the 
task demands, i.e., identiﬁcation versus detection of the tar-
get stimuli), but we have no reason to believe this is the case.
One potential, albeit unlikely, explanation for why there 
was no general eﬀect of direct gaze on attentional disengage-
ment is that participants did not perceive the direct gaze 
stimuli as actually portraying direct gaze. Due to the Wol-
laston eﬀect, an objectively direct gaze can appear averted 
when the head is rotated (see Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 
2000). However, we believe it is unlikely that the Wollaston 
eﬀect distorted perception of gaze directions in this experi-
ment. While we did not directly assess whether participants 
perceived the faces as portraying direct gaze as intended, the 
answers to the open-ended questions in the post-experiment 
suspicion questionnaire suggest that they did. Nine partici-
pants explicitly indicated that the faces were occasionally 
portraying direct gaze, for instance by referring to the faces 
as “staring faces”. Eleven more participants referred to the 
gaze directions more vaguely, so that it was not possible to 
determine where they thought the faces were looking at. 
Importantly, however, no participant explicitly indicated that 
the faces were portraying averted gaze, suggesting that the 
Wollaston eﬀect did not inﬂuence gaze direction perception 
in this experiment.
It is also extremely unlikely that the failure to replicate 
the earlier result was due to low statistical power. Our exper-
iment had a signiﬁcantly larger sample size than the original 
study (62 participants after all data exclusions in the present 
study, 7 participants in the original study). Thus, our results 
strongly suggest that direct gaze does not generally slow 
down attentional disengagement from the face. However, 
while the experiment was well-powered to detect a general 
eﬀect of direct gaze on attentional disengagement, it had less 
statistical power to detect eﬀects of the exclusion and inclu-
sion manipulations on the attentional disengagement, and 
thus ﬁndings regarding the eﬀects of these manipulations 
should be interpreted more cautiously.
Conclusion
In the present study, we found no evidence that direct gaze 
would generally hold a perceiver’s visuospatial attention, 
or that social exclusion would slow down attentional dis-
engagement from direct gaze. Surprisingly, we found that 
a social inclusion manipulation modulated attentional dis-
engagement; following inclusion, disengagement of atten-
tion was slower from faces with direct gaze compared to 
downward gaze.
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In this article, we review the research investigating the effects of social exclusion on
processing of social information. We look into this topic from the point of view of
cognitive psychology aiming to provide a systematic description of the effects of
exclusion on workings of different cognitive mechanisms involved in social information
processing. We focus on four lines of inquiry. First, we present the research on the
effects of exclusion on memory for social information. Second, we review studies, which
have investigated how exclusion changes the way people view and evaluate their social
environment. Third, we look into the research which has investigated whether exclusion
modulates early social information processing at the perceptual level. Finally, we discuss
the research on the effects of exclusion on attentional processes. Importantly, we also
present gaps in our understanding on these issues and provide suggestions as to how
future research could provide a more detailed view on how exclusion modulates social
information processing.
Social exclusion1 is detrimental and can lead to depression, alienation (Williams, 2007),
and sometimes even to violent behaviour (Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003).
Laboratory studies (for a review of research methods, see Wirth, 2016) show that even a
brief episode of exclusion lowers mood (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009), causes social pain,
which is analogous to physical pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), and
elicits various behavioural responses, such as aggressive behaviour (Twenge, Baumeister,
Tice, & Stucke, 2001) or afﬁliation-seeking behaviour (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, &
Schaller, 2007).
One intriguing line of research suggests that exclusion does not only elicit emotional,
motivational, and behavioural responses, but also that it even modulates processing of
social information. For instance, it has been reported that exclusion improves
participants’ acuity in determining others’ facial expressions (Bernstein, Young, Brown,
Sacco, & Claypool, 2008) and enhances memory for social, but not for non-social
information (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000). Other studies have found that exclusion
inﬂuences attention, such as causing participants to selectively direct attention towards
*Correspondence should be addressed to Jari K. Hietanen, Human Information Processing Laboratory, Faculty of Social Sciences/
Psychology, Tampere University, Tampere FI-33014, Finland (email: jari.hietanen@uta.ﬁ).
1 Researchers use various terms, such as ostracism, rejection, and social exclusion to refer to similar phenomena. The common
characteristic of these phenomena is that they all threaten the fundamental human need to belong (Smart Richman & Leary,
2009). Discussing the distinctions between these phenomena is outside the scope of this article, and thus, we use the umbrella
term social exclusion to refer to all related concepts (as in Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009; Shilling & Brown,
2016, among others).
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smiling faces (DeWall,Maner, &Rouby, 2009), and enhancing attention shifts triggered by
others’ averted gaze (Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009). It has also been reported
that excluded individuals, compared to controls, evaluate social information in an altered
way: For instance, they have been found to estimate interpersonal distance as being
shorter (Knowles, Green, &Weidel, 2014), and to judge ambiguous social interactions as
more threatening (DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009).
According to the most inﬂuential model in this ﬁeld, humans have a social
monitoring system, which activates when belongingness needs are unmet (Pickett &
Gardner, 2005). Activation of the social monitoring system has been suggested to
result in ‘increased social monitoring’ (Pickett & Gardner, 2005, p. 216) and ‘greater
processing of socially relevant information in the environment’ (Gardner et al., 2000,
p. 494). The authors originally argued that the social monitoring system inﬂuences
attention (Pickett & Gardner, 2005), but other researchers have later suggested that it
might also modulate social information processing via another route, by modulating
basic perceptual processes (Pitts, Wilson, & Hugenberg, 2014; Sacco, Wirth,
Hugenberg, Chen, & Williams, 2011). To date, the research on this topic has not
been thoroughly reviewed and critically discussed, and thus, there is currently no
comprehensive view about what kinds of mechanisms mediate the effects of
exclusion on social information processing.
In this article, we will review the research on the effects of exclusion on processing
of social information. We will ﬁrst present a typical cognitive psychology model of
information processing, encompassing the main perceptual and cognitive stages
involved in social information processing. We believe this is essential. The currently
published literature on this topic, from the point of view of cognitive psychology, is
often quite vague in differentiating on which processes different social manipulations
exert their effects. For instance, researchers do not always make a clear distinction
between perceptual and attentional level processes (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009;
Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015), or between perception and the entailing judgements
(Knowles et al., 2014; Pitts et al., 2014). Moreover, some terms are vaguely used as
follows: For instance, ‘sensitivity’ has been used to refer to discrimination accuracy (as
the term is typically used in signal detection theory [SDT]; Bernstein et al., 2008), but
also to attentional biases (Xu et al., 2015) and biased judgements (Smart Richman,
Martin, & Guadagno, 2016). We hope that by providing a cognitive psychology
framework, we will help readers form a more detailed understanding of the different
phenomena involved in social information processing. We also hope it proves useful for
researchers in designing studies on the effects of exclusion on speciﬁc social cognitive
processes. After presenting the model, we will review the published research on the
topic and discuss what we currently know about the effects of exclusion on social
information processing. We will critically discuss some earlier propositions researchers
have offered and highlight important unanswered questions that future research should
investigate in order to get a clearer picture of how exclusion inﬂuences processing of
social information.
A typical model of information processing
Stages of information processing
In Figure 1, we present a typical cognitive psychology model of information processing,
which contains three separate stages: (1) perception, (2) cognitive and affective
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evaluation, and (3) (long-term) memory. Perception refers to a stage of processing after
sensory information has been received by the perceiver’s sensory organs. The information
is processed in the brain regions speciﬁc for different sensory modalities. Information
from some socially relevant categories of stimuli, such as faces, is processed in specialized
neural systems (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). The result of this stage of processing
is a subjectively experienced sensation, a percept (Firestone & Scholl, 2016). The
perceptual stage can be further divided into two distinct phases. First, the perceiver
detects a stimulus (determines that a stimulus is present; Merikle & Reingold, 1990) and
then identiﬁes it (determines what the stimulus is; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000).
After the stage of perception, the stimulus may undergo deeper cognitive and
affective evaluation. During this stage, the perceiver makes inferences about the
stimulus, while the stimulus may also evoke affective reactions in the individual. We
refer to the resulting attributions, interpretations, and affects collectively as judgements.
This broad deﬁnition encompasses a huge range of different types of processes, some of
which are relatively fast and straightforward (e.g., judging someone’s face as
trustworthy), whereas others are slower and more complex, such as those requiring
assessments of situational factors and cultural norms (e.g., judging someone as unlikable
because of laughing inappropriately at a funeral). We also want to emphasize that
judgements are not only shaped by high-level cognitive processes, but also different
types of evaluative and affective reactions can be triggered before conscious
judgements, and these automatic reactions can shape the conscious judgements
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993).
Finally, at the stage of memory processing, the information can be stored into long-
term memory systems. The memory stage can be further divided into three separate sub-
stages. First, at the encoding stage, the stimulus information is transferred to the memory
systems, in which some of the encoded material is then stored at the second stage
(Eichenbaum, 2017; Winters, Saksida, & Bussey, 2008). At the third sub-stage, the stored
material can be retrieved from thememory for further use. Two distinct processesmay be
involved in memory retrieval (Yonelinas, 2002). In recognition, the contents of memory
are matched to a cue (e.g., when asked whether a speciﬁc face was among previously
shown faces), and in recall, the contents of memory are searched without a cue (e.g.,
when asked to list details from a previously read story).
Figure 1. A model of information processing. The ﬁgure shows three stages, in which information is
processed: perception, cognitive and affective evaluation, and memory. The ﬁgure also shows how these
information processing stages interact with attention, and how memory inﬂuences earlier stages of
processing. For more information, see the main text.
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Distinction between perceptions and judgements
We emphasize that we use the term perception to strictly refer to processes, which
organize incoming sensory information in such a way that it is possible to mentally
represent an external stimulus. These processes are distinct from evaluative processes
that may follow perceptions. However, drawing a line between perceptions and
judgements is not always straightforward. Researchers cannot measure perceptual
phenomena directly, at least when relying on various behavioural measures. Thus, they
often have to rely, for instance, on recognition performance, subjective ratings, or motor
behaviour to infer what the participants perceive. The limitation of this approach is that
these types of measurements are subject to inﬂuences of higher-level cognitive processes
(Firestone & Scholl, 2015, 2016). Participants’ responses may reﬂect not only their
perceptions, but also their beliefs, motivations, expectations, and response styles. In
otherwords, perceptual reports also reﬂect judgements instead of just ‘pure’ perceptions.
For example, a facial expression can be judged as sad because of visually appearing sad,
but also for other reasons: An objectively neutral face can be judged as sad when
encountered at a funeral. Even in simple detection tasks, in which participants report
whether they perceive a stimulus or not, the responses are inﬂuenced by the participants’
response biases (Macmillan&Creelman, 1990). For instance, peoplemaybemore likely to
indicate having detected a stimulus ifmissing a stimuluswould be costly, as compared to a
situationwhere detecting all stimuli is not that critical, for example,when spotting people
on a warzone versus on a hiking trip.
It is difﬁcult to determine where exactly the line between perception and judgements
is (for discussion, see Pylyshyn, 1999), but importantly, there are ways to disentangle
between the two. The SDT (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) allows researchers to discern
participants’ response biases from their discrimination accuracy using statisticalmethods.
As for studies investigating subjective percepts, Firestone and Scholl (2016) offer
guidelines on howperception could be distinguished fromcognitive phenomena.Wewill
not present the details here but will return to the issue later when discussing at which
stage social exclusion exerts its inﬂuence.
The role of attention in information processing
Our senses are constantly ﬂooded with a plethora of sensory information, and not all of
this can be processed up to the higher stages. From the earliest perceptual stages,
attention ﬁlters the information that will undergo further processing (Carrasco, 2011).
Even detection does not happen without attention, as evidenced by studies showing that
surprisingly salient events can go completely undetected when attention is focused
elsewhere (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Also after detection, several stimuli often compete
for attention, and attention determines which stimuli will pass further in the information
processing pipeline.
Humans have two systems that control orienting of attention: endogenous (voluntary)
and exogenous (involuntary or automatic) attentional systems (Carrasco, 2011; Corbetta
& Shulman, 2002; Posner, 1980). In other words, individuals may direct their attention
voluntarily, but sometimes, the focus of attention is determined by automatic, involuntary
processes. For instance, suddenly appearing stimuli tend to automatically capture
attention (Yantis &Hillstrom, 1994), and this response can be difﬁcult or even impossible
to suppress (Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992). After automatic shifts of attention,
attention can be voluntarily directed, but voluntary attention control mechanisms take
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longer than the automatic mechanisms to deploy (approximately 300 ms; Carrasco,
2011).
The characteristics of the perceived stimuli inﬂuence whether attention will be
directed towards them or not. For instance, when participants are presented with several
different stimuli simultaneously, they tend to shift their attention towards socially salient
stimuli, such as faces, rather than towards non-social control stimuli (Langton, Law,
Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008). After attention has been engaged by a speciﬁc stimulus,
attention has to be disengaged from the stimulus if another stimulus demands attention.
However, attention may be held more by some stimuli than others and disengagement
may be delayed. For instance, individuals suffering from anxiety tend to have difﬁculties in
disengaging attention from threatening cues, such as angry faces (Bar-Haim, Lamy,
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). The tendency to have one’s
attention shifted towards, or being held by a speciﬁc category of stimuli, is called an
attentional bias (Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012). Some of these
biases, such as the tendency to direct attention to faces, are present even in neonates and
are thus likely inherent (Goren, Sarty, &Wu, 1975). Others, such as the tendency to direct
attention to emotional faces, may be learned, habitual responses related to emotion
regulation (Todd et al., 2012).
The role of memory in information processing
The contents of memory also have various inﬂuences on earlier stages of information
processing. As mentioned above, memory inﬂuences attention, as attentional biases can
reﬂect learned responses to speciﬁc types of stimuli (Todd et al., 2012). Thus, previously
stored information can potentially modulate information processing via attentional
mechanisms. In addition, memory has direct inﬂuences on perceptual and evaluative
processes, even at the earliest perceptual stages. For example, familiar stimuli (e.g.,
words) are more readily detected than unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., non-words; Merikle &
Reingold, 1990). At later stages, the inﬂuence of memory is, of course, even more central.
For instance, identiﬁcation is, by deﬁnition, an act of matching the perceived stimulus
with a memory representation. It is also clear that stored memory information can
modulate cognitive and affective evaluations. For instance, previous experiences can
inﬂuence a perceiver’s inferences drawn from a stimulus and the affective responses
evoked by the stimulus.
How does exclusion modulate social information processing?
Exclusion and memory
The idea that exclusion modulates social information processing was originally proposed
based on a study reporting that rejection, compared to control manipulations, improved
participants’ memory for social diary entries and impaired memory for non-social entries
in a surprise recall task (Gardner et al., 2000; see also Hess & Pickett, 2010). A later study
also reported that excluded participants, but not a control group, showed better
recognition for previously learned in-group faces as compared to outgroup faces (Van
Bavel, Swencionis, O’Connor, & Cunningham, 2012), suggesting that excluded individ-
uals were particularly good at remembering faces of individuals most likely to offer them
inclusion. Another group of researchers investigated whether exclusion would modulate
the ‘other-race effect’, that is, the tendency to better recognize faces of individuals
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belonging to the same racial group as the perceiver, as compared to individuals fromother
racial groups (Bernstein, Sacco, Young, & Hugenberg, 2014). The researchers found that
this effect was eliminated among participants whowere ﬁrst excluded bymembers of the
racial outgroup, but not among control groups. The results of these studies suggested that
excluded individuals show improved memory for social information, and especially for
information that is particularly important for them.
However, the studies did not reveal how exclusion caused these effects onmemory. In
all of the studies, participants underwent a social exclusion manipulation, and then
encoded the to-be-remembered material, and later retrieved the information from
memory. Exclusion may have exerted its inﬂuence at any stage between the initial
encoding of the information and retrieval of this material from the long-term memory. As
we will discuss in the following sections, exclusion exerts its inﬂuence on various earlier
information processing stages, and these effects could explain thememory effects aswell.
Changes at earlier processing stages can of course inﬂuence later stages: For instance,
enhanced memory encoding would later allow more information to be retrieved from
memory. When only retrieval is measured, it is difﬁcult to determine whether observed
differences between excluded and control participants are caused by changes in retrieval
processes or in processes at any of the preceding stages.
While some of the ﬁndings reviewed above may be driven by changes at earlier
processing stages, there is some basis to believe that exclusion could also inﬂuence
memory processes speciﬁcally. In one study, participants learned and later retrieved
(presumably non-social) information from text passages, and importantly, the researchers
led participants to expect social exclusion either during the learning phase or during the
memory retrieval phase (Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002, Experiment 2). The results
showed that expecting exclusion during the retrieval phase impaired memory retrieval,
but expecting exclusionduring the learningphasehadno effect on latermemory retrieval,
suggesting that exclusion inﬂuenced memory retrieval, but not encoding of information
intomemory.Of course, a single ﬁnding froma studywith amodest sample size should not
be taken as conclusive evidence, but importantly, the study offers an interesting example
of disentangling the effects of exclusion at differentmemory stages. Similarmethods could
be used in the future to investigate whether enhanced memory for social information is
also driven by changes at memory retrieval processes, or at some earlier information
processing stages.
Does exclusion modulate percepts or judgements?
Several studies have reported that exclusion caused individuals to view social information
in an altered way. Some studies have found excluded participants to view others
particularly positively and as promising sources of reinclusion. It has been shown that
exclusion manipulations, compared to control conditions, caused participants to rate
others as nicer, friendlier, and more attractive (Maner et al., 2007, Experiments 3–4), to
underestimate physical distance to potential afﬁliation partners, but not to objects
(Knowles et al., 2014; Pitts et al., 2014), to evaluate inanimate faces as being more
animate (Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley, & Heatherton, 2014), and to judge a
wider range of averted gaze directions as being directed at them (Lyyra,Wirth,&Hietanen,
2017). Other studies have found an opposite pattern of results reporting that excluded
participants viewed social stimuli particularly negatively, instead. Excluded participants,
compared to control groups, rated ambiguous actions as more hostile (DeWall, Twenge,
et al., 2009, Experiments 2–4), were slower to judge faces as happywhen the expression
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turned from neutral to a smile (Smart Richman et al., 2016), and were biased to view
others as portraying averted gaze (Syrj€am€aki, Lyyra, & Hietanen, 2018).
Now, it is important to note that, in all of the above-mentioned studies, the researchers
were measuring participants’ conscious judgements. Because these judgements occur
late in the chain of stages involved in information processing, they could reﬂect changes at
the level of evaluation, as well as at any of the previous stages. Maner et al. (2007) who
found that exclusion, as compared to control manipulations, caused participants to rate
others as nicer and more friendly, interpreted their ﬁnding to indicate ‘the presence of
motivated cognition (orwishful thinking)’ (p. 52). In otherwords, they suggested that the
effect might have occurred only at the level of judgements, as excluded participants
started to rate social stimuli according to their own motivations. However, other
researchers have argued that exclusion might exert its inﬂuence at an earlier stage,
modulating percepts. For instance, Pitts et al. (2014) who reported that exclusion
shortened the estimation of interpersonal distance suggested that exclusion made other
people visually appear closer. Knowles et al. (2014) who reported convergent ﬁndings
offered a similar interpretation, although they also acknowledged that the effect might
have occurred at the level of judgements aswell. Importantly, however, as wewill discuss
next, one of their experiments suggested that the manipulations might have altered
distance judgements, and not necessarily visual perception of distance.
One way of providing support for the notion that an effect on judgements reﬂects
changes at early, perceptual-level processing stages, is by demonstrating that the effect
occurs speciﬁcally in tasks involving perceptual judgements. However, if similar effects
are also observed for non-perceptual judgements, then it is possible that the effects
occurred only at the level of judgements (Firestone & Scholl, 2015, 2016). Importantly,
current evidence suggests that exclusion modulates non-perceptual and perceptual
judgements in similar ways. For instance, altered estimations of interpersonal distance
(Knowles et al., 2014; Pitts et al., 2014) also occur when participants do not see the
target. In one experiment, Knowles et al. (2014, Experiment 1) asked participants to
reﬂect on a time they had either been rejected or been accepted by another person. After
this, participants estimated the distance to the city where the individual was currently
residing. The results showed that participants estimated the distance to the accepting
person as shorter (relative to the real distance) than the distance to the rejecting
individual. Although this experiment does not reveal whether it was reliving the
acceptance or rejection, or both, that inﬂuenced the distance estimations, it clearly shows
that the relational status with another person can inﬂuence distance judgements, even
when this effect cannot be due to altered perception. Thus, it was premature to conclude
that exclusion causes potential reafﬁliation partners to visually appear closer – they may
only be judged closer (for a similar suggestion that physical effort inﬂuences distance
judgements, but not perception, see Woods, Philbeck, & Danoff, 2009). Of course, we
cannot rule out the possibility that exclusion also inﬂuences distance perception, but the
simpler explanation that only distance judgements are affected is sufﬁcient to explain the
current ﬁndings.
Exclusion has also been found to alter other non-perceptual judgements. For instance,
exclusion may cause individuals to rate contents of words and sentences as more hostile
(DeWall, Twenge, et al., 2009, Experiment 1). As these effects clearly do not reﬂect
changes in participants’ perceptions, it seems most plausible that altered judgements
among excluded individuals reﬂect changes at high-level cognitive processes, rather than
at the early perceptual-level processes. To ﬁnd if exclusion also modulates percepts,
future research needs to be extremely stringent in ruling out simpler, alternative
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explanations, such as that the observed effects reﬂect participants’ thinking rather than
perception (for guidelines, see Firestone & Scholl, 2016).
The altered judgements among excluded individuals likely reﬂect the affective states
andmotivational tendencies exclusion had aroused. DeWall, Twenge, et al. (2009) found
that hostile judgements mediated the link between exclusion and aggressive behaviour
(see also Dodge et al., 2003). Excluded individuals may start to rate social stimuli
according to their own motivations (Maner et al., 2007) and affective states, and act
accordingly. Theoretical models that describe the effects of exclusion on motivation
(Smart Richman & Leary, 2009; Williams, 2007) might therefore offer a useful framework
for understanding why excluded individuals sometimes judge social stimuli as positive
and afﬁliative (Maner et al., 2007), and sometimes as exclusive and threatening (DeWall,
Twenge, et al., 2009). To thoroughly understand this issue, future research should
carefully investigate how different situational factors (Syrj€am€aki et al., 2018), individual
traits (Smart Richman et al., 2016), and characteristics of the target stimuli (Brown, Sacco,
& Medlin, 2019) moderate the effects of exclusion on judgements.
Future research should also investigate whether exclusion exerts effects, not only on
controlled and conscious judgements, but also on automatic evaluative responses
(Williams, Case, & Govan, 2003). The affective priming paradigm would provide one
convenient way of investigating this question. In this type of task, participants are
typically primed with affective stimuli, such as positive and negative faces, after which
they judge the valence of non-affective stimuli. The primes can inﬂuence the following
judgements, even when the primes are presented below the level of perceptual
awareness, suggesting that the stimuli automatically trigger affective responses that
cannot be attributed to higher-level cognitive processes (Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller,
2008; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). If exclusion would enhance or otherwise modulate this
effect, it would suggest that exclusion inﬂuences the affective responses automatically
triggered by the affective social stimuli, rather than only altering judgements possibly
reﬂecting changes in high-level cognitive processes.
Exclusion and early social information processing
One way of investigating whether exclusion exerts its inﬂuence at the early processing
stages is by examining its effects on perceptual-level identiﬁcation and detection tasks.
Pickett, Gardner, and Knowles (2004) found that high reported need for belonging was
associated with higher accuracy in identifying whether faces were portraying happy,
angry, fearful, or sad expressions, andwhether wordswere read in a positive or a negative
tone (although no effect of an exclusion manipulation was found). In a later study,
participants reﬂecting on rejection were more accurate than a control group in
determining whether smiles were genuine or fake (Bernstein et al., 2008). Another
study showed that exclusion versus inclusion enhanced accuracy in distinguishing
between faces belonging to two different categories (e.g., between a mildly happy and a
mildly angry face), but reduced accuracy in discerning between faces within a category
(e.g., between two happy faces varying in the intensity of the expression; Sacco et al.,
2011). An important contribution of this study was that it showed that exclusion did not
inﬂuence acuity in distinguishing between non-social stimuli in a similar vein, suggesting
that this effect was speciﬁc to processing of social information.
While little research has been conducted on the topic so far, initial evidence suggests
that exclusion exerts its inﬂuence at an even earlier perceptual level, detection. One
recent study suggested that sources of exclusion may be more readily detected than
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sources of inclusion, as in a binocular rivalry task, participants reported detecting the
face of a person who had excluded them for a longer period than the face of the person
who had included them (Golubickis et al., 2017). Another recent study reported that in
two experiments, excluded participants were less accurate than included participants
in detecting whether vague videos contained human motion or not, suggesting that
exclusion might impair detection of social stimuli (Gorman, Harber, Shiffrar, & Quigley,
2017). This is interesting, as earlier studies suggest that exclusion improves social
stimulus identiﬁcation (Bernstein et al., 2008), that is, a process after detection. Of
course, this still scarce body of evidence using various types of tasks and stimuli does
not allow us to infer that exclusion modulates detection and identiﬁcation differently,
but this possibility might be worth investigating in the future. Detection and
identiﬁcation are partly separate, and driven by different neural mechanisms (Unger-
leider & Haxby, 1994), and thus, exclusion might modulate these two processes
differently. To widen our understanding on how exclusion inﬂuences performance in
perceptual tasks, future research should investigate its effects on both detection and
identiﬁcation.
Because of its excellent temporal resolution, electroencephalography (EEG) is a useful
method for investigating the earliest information processing stages. Kawamoto, Nittono,
and Ura (2014) provided initial evidence that exclusion may modulate event-related
potentials (ERPs) elicited by faces portraying different expressions (smiling, disgusted,
and neutral faces were displayed). Excluded, but not included participants, showed
greater P1 responses to disgusted faces, as compared to neutral faces. Although this
ﬁnding is not conclusive, as the interaction was only approaching statistical signiﬁcance,
it, nevertheless, offers support for the notion that exclusion modulates face processing at
the earliest perceptual stages. The visual P1 response is generated in the early visual
cortical areas as early as 80–100 ms after stimulus presentation (Rossion&Caharel, 2011).
Another interesting ﬁnding was that, while there was no effect of the manipulation on
face-sensitive N170 responses, low self-reported satisfaction of basic social needs
(Williams, 2007)was associatedwith a greater N170 response to all faces, providing initial
evidence that individuals with unmet social needs might show enhanced processing of
faces, in general.
Particularly, convincing evidence for the effects of exclusion on the early, perceptual
processes comes from studies utilizing the SDT (Bernstein et al., 2008; Gorman et al.,
2017; see also M€uller, Jusyte, Trzebiatowski, Hautzinger, & Sch€onenberg, 2017). This
approach is illuminating, as the SDT allows disentangling of participants’ discrimination
accuracy from their response styles and other similar biases. However, even these studies
do not allow determining which mechanisms cause the altered detection and identiﬁ-
cation performance. The ﬁndings could reﬂect altered attention allocation among
excluded participants (Pickett et al., 2004). For instance, enhanced accuracy in facial
expression recognition could result fromexcluded individualsmaintaining their attention
on the faces better than controls during the task (cf. Parasuraman, 1979), or from
increased attention to speciﬁc features of the stimuli, such as the eye region (cf. Hall,
Hutton, & Morgan, 2010). While this provides a plausible explanation for these ﬁndings,
the effects have also been suggested to reﬂect changes in perceptual processes via
mechanisms other than attention (Sacco et al., 2011). The current evidence does not
allow us to conclusively determine which explanation better accounts for the effects of
exclusion on perceptual-level processes (for discussion on why this distinction is
important, see Firestone& Scholl, 2016; Pylyshyn, 1999). The sole EEG study on this topic
(Kawamoto et al., 2014) also does not shed light into this question, as both ERP
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components investigated in that experiment, P1 and N170, are also modulated by
attention (Holmes, Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003; Taylor, 2002).
Future research could resolve the issue with an experiment in which excluded and
control participants would complete, for instance, a facial expression recognition task,
while concurrently doing a task that either loads their attention or not (for a similar
approach in other ﬁelds, see Cohen, Alvarez, & Nakayama, 2011; Do-Joon, Woodman,
Widders, Marois, & Chun, 2004; see also Firestone & Scholl, 2016). The attentional load
task could involve, for example, tracking of either fast-moving objects (high attentional
load) or slow-moving objects (low attentional load). If improved accuracy in facial
expression recognition among excluded participants is due to increased attention to the
task or speciﬁc parts of the stimuli, a concurrent high attentional load should greatly
diminish this effect, as there would not be excess attentional resources to be allocated to
the facial expression recognition task. If, on the other hand, it reﬂects altered perceptual
processing via some other mechanism, an attentional load should have little or no effect
on the outcome.
Exclusion and attention
We have argued that attention likely mediates many of the effects of exclusion on social
information processing, especially the effects that occur at early information processing
stages. In this section, we will review research, which has more directly investigated the
effects of exclusion on attention. We will look into several important questions. First, we
will look at studies, which have examined towards which kinds of stimuli excluded
individuals tend to allocate their attention. We will also discuss whether exclusion only
changes how individuals allocate attention voluntarily, or if exclusion also modulates
automatic, involuntary attentional processes (Carrasco, 2011). Finally, we will discuss
whether the attentional biases that individuals show after experiencing social exclusion
are driven by an inherent social monitoring system or if they reﬂect learned emotion
regulation strategies.
Exclusion and attentional biases
Several researchers have argued that exclusion causes individuals to allocate more
attention to social information (Pickett et al., 2004; Shilling & Brown, 2016). Curiously,
however, no experiment to date has actually provided ﬁrm evidence that this is the
case. The idea was originally proposed based on a study, in which participants ﬁrst
reﬂected on a time they had been rejected, and then completed an affective Stroop
task, in which they indicated the affective valence of meaning of words when the
words were read aloud in a tone that was either congruent or incongruent with
the semantic valence of the word (Pickett et al., 2004; Experiment 2). In this study, the
difference in response times between congruent and incongruent trials was larger
among participants who had reﬂected on rejection, as compared to control groups. The
authors interpreted that exclusion caused participants to pay more attention to vocal
tones, making it more difﬁcult to ignore this socially salient information. However, it is
not clear whether this effect reﬂects selective attention to social information
speciﬁcally. An alternative explanation is that exclusion impaired participants’ ability
to voluntarily direct their attention as instructed, and thus magnifying the Stroop effect
(Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005). In addition, even if the increased
Stroop effect did reﬂect excluded participants’ increased attention to the vocal tones, it
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does not show that exclusion increased attention to social information speciﬁcally, as
there was no control task showing that exclusion did not increase attention to non-
social information.
To investigate whether exclusion increases attention to social information, a future
experiment could, for instance, have social and non-social stimuli compete for
participants’ attention in a dot-probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), and
examine whether exclusion, as compared to control manipulations, increases partici-
pants’ tendency to direct attention towards the social stimuli. Alternatively, a study could
test if excluded participants, as compared to controls, are slower in disengaging attention
(Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) from social stimuli, but not from non-social stimuli.
These studies could potentially show that exclusion causes individuals to allocate more
attention to social stimuli speciﬁcally.
An interesting line of research relates to whether excluded individuals preferentially
direct attention towards speciﬁc categories of social stimuli. For example, several studies
have shown that being excluded elicits attentional biases to positive cues. DeWall, Maner,
&Rouby, (2009) found that excludedparticipants, compared to controls, looked longer at
a smiling face in an array of emotional faces (Experiments 2–3; see also Buckner, DeWall,
Schmidt, &Maner, 2010; see Figure 2a for an illustration and explanation of the task). In a
dot-probe task, exclusion has been shown to increase participants’ tendency to shift
attention towards smiling rather than neutral faces (Experiment 4; see Figure 2b).
Similarly, excluded individuals may also direct attention away from negative social
information. One study found that participants expecting exclusion, as compared to
participants expecting inclusion, showed less activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC) when viewing pictures of negative social scenes (Powers, Wagner,
Norris, & Heatherton, 2013; but see Powers & Heatherton, 2013). As dmPFC activation is
associatedwithmentalizing, the authors suggested that excluded individuals engaged less
than includedparticipants in the in-depth processing of the contents of the negative social
scenes, possibly by diverting attention away from these pictures (however, see Kraines,
Kelberer, & Wells, 2018, for a recent ﬁnding that exclusion increased ﬁxations on sad
faces).
Interestingly, exclusionmay not inﬂuence only voluntary control of attention, but also
involuntary shifts of attention. Xu et al. (2015, Experiments 2–3) found that excluded, but
not included, participants showed an attentional bias to smiling faces as early as 200 ms
after presenting the stimuli in a dot-probe task. This is interesting, as peoplemaybe unable
to voluntarily shift the locus of attention this fast (Johnson, 2009). This could suggest that
excluded individuals reﬂexively direct their attention towards smiling faces, although a
ﬁnding from a single study should of course not be taken as conclusive. Offering support
for the view, however, one experiment found that excluded participants were faster than
controls at ﬁnding a smiling face, but not other emotional faces in a visual search task
(DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009, Experiment 1; see Figure 2c). However, it should be
noted that it is not possible to determinewhether, in this study, the smiling faces attracted
the excluded participants’ attention towards them, or whether these participants were
particularly efﬁcient in performing serial search for smiling faces, due to spending less
time looking at each face. A future study could investigate this question by varying the
number of displayed distractor stimuli across trials. If excluded participants’ attention is
automatically shifted towards the smiling face, the number of distractor stimuli should
have little effect on the response times, whereas if they perform serial search for the
smiling face, the increased number of distractors should slowdown the response times, as
there would be more faces to go through (Wolfe, 1994).
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There is also some evidence that exclusion may cause individuals to shift their
attention towards negative rather than positive faces. In one experiment employing a
visual search task, participants who had imagined unfair exclusion were faster than other
experimental groups in locating an angry face, but not in locating a smiling face,
suggesting that these participants’ attention shifted towards angry faces, or the
participants were particularly efﬁcient in searching for angry faces (Tuscherer et al.,
2015, Experiment 4). In another study, Tanaka and Ikegami (2015) found one boundary
condition for when exclusion causes individuals to shift attention towards positive and
negative faces. In their study, excluded participants high in fear of negative evaluation
(FNE; a component of social anxiety) showed an attentional bias to angry faces in a dot-
probe task, while excluded participants low in FNE showed an attentional bias to smiling
faces. This may indicate that individuals low in social anxiety shift their attention to
Figure 2. Illustrations of three tasks used to measure attentional biases. (a) Eye tracking methods
(Buckner et al., 2010; Kraines et al., 2018). Participants are simultaneously presented with several
different stimuli, such as faces with different facial expressions. They are instructed to view them freely,
while their eye movements are measured with an eye tracker. Increased dwell times or ﬁxations to a
speciﬁc category of stimuli indicate selective attention to that category. Because the stimulus
presentation times are typically long (e.g., 30 s at a time), this method is useful for investigating
participants’ voluntary attentional processes. (b) Dot-probe task (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009,
Experiment 4; Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015). Participants are presented with two stimuli (e.g., a neutral face
and a smiling face) simultaneously. After a delay, one of the stimuli is replaced by a probe and the
participants are instructed to detect the probe as quickly as possible by pressing a response key. The
effects of different stimuli on participants’ attention can be assessed by comparing the reaction times in
the different types of trials. For instance, if reaction times are shorter for trials in which the probe was
presented at the location of a smiling face, as compared to a neutral face, this indicates that the smiling
face had ‘pulled’ the participants’ attention towards it. The length of the time between presenting the
face and the probe (stimulus-onset-asynchrony, SOA) can be manipulated to investigate the time-course
of the attentional biases. By using short SOAs (e.g., 200 ms), researchers can investigate early, reﬂexive
shifts in attention, while longer SOAs (e.g., 1,000 ms) can be used to investigate the voluntary control of
attention. As a caveat, the dot-probe paradigm has been criticized for low reliability (Waechter, Nelson,
Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). (c) Visual search task (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009, Experiment 1;
Tuscherer et al., 2015, Experiment 4). In this task, researchers typically measure the time participants
take to locate a target stimulus (e.g., a face showing an emotional expression) from a set of distractor
stimuli (e.g., neutral faces). Performance in visual search is inﬂuenced by various factors, such as the
capacity of the target stimulus to attract attention among the distractor stimuli, the number of
distractors present, and individuals’ performance strategies, among other things (for a review, see
Eckstein, 2011).
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smiling faces as a response to exclusion, while anxious individuals tend to direct
attention to signs of social threat (but see Buckner et al., 2010, for a different
interpretation).
Inherent or learned responses?
One vital question is whether the attentional biases that excluded individuals show are
inherent, biologically determined responses, or if they are learned. According to the social
monitoring system hypothesis, humans have a specialized system that directs attention to
social information when belonging needs are unmet (Pickett & Gardner, 2005). This
system has been suggested to be an evolutionary adaptation that helped our ancestors to
maintain social bonds, which is essential for survival and reproduction (Gardner et al.,
2000).
An alternative possibility is that the attentional biases reﬂect the individuals’ learned
styles of responding to exclusion. Todd et al. (2012) proposed that attentional biases are
one form of emotion regulation, and they reﬂect individuals’ habitual responses to
different emotional stimuli and affectively salient events. As social exclusion is a
common occurrence for many (Nezlek, Wesselmann, Wheeler, & Williams, 2012), most
people have learned various ways of coping with this adverse experience. As a part of
these learned coping responses, individuals might direct their attention towards speciﬁc
kinds of social and affective stimuli to help them navigate social environments more
efﬁciently, and to help them regulate their own affective state. For instance, they might
attend to threat cues to identify signs of threat and avoid further exclusion (cf. Cacioppo
& Hawkley, 2009). Attending to afﬁliative cues might help them pick out the most likely
sources of reinclusion (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009), or attenuate the negative
feelings elicited by exclusion (Xu et al., 2015; although see Syrj€am€aki, Lyyra, Peltola, &
Hietanen, 2017). Individual differences and situational factors might determine which
coping strategies individuals utilize as a response to different kinds of exclusion
experiences, explaining why exclusion inﬂuences attention differently in different
individuals (Tanaka & Ikegami, 2015; Tuscherer et al., 2015).
We cannot currently determine whether specialized neural and psychological
mechanisms mediate the effects of exclusion on attention to social information.
Considering how inﬂuential the social monitoring system hypothesis has been, it would
be important to stringently test its predictions. Crucially, future research should
determine whether the attentional biases that individuals show as a response to
exclusion are speciﬁc to social stimuli. Limited evidence suggests that this might not be
the case. DeWall et al. (2011, Experiment 6) found that excluded participants were
slower than control groups at disengaging attention from positive affective words, but
not from neutral or negative words. This ﬁnding suggests that exclusion increases
allocation of attention to affective stimuli generally, regardless of whether these stimuli
are social or not.
Future research should also investigate the neural basis of the hypothesized social
monitoring system. Previous research has identiﬁed brain regions, including the amygdala
and speciﬁc structures of the prefrontal cortex that play a role in attentional biases (Cisler
& Koster, 2010; Todd et al., 2012). If the effects of exclusion on attention operate via a
social monitoring system, then there might be neural mechanisms, whose activity is
speciﬁcally associated with attentional biases caused by social exclusion. Importantly,
activity in these mechanisms should be uncorrelated with other types of attentional
biases, such as those attributed to post-traumatic stress disorder (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) or
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to attentional bias modiﬁcation training interventions (Hakamata et al., 2010). These
hypotheses could be investigated in future research to determine whether the effects of
exclusion on attention are due to activation of a social monitoring system.
Conclusion
Attention has widespread inﬂuences on various stages of information processing, and
thus, research on the effects of exclusion on attention is particularly important. The
currently published research has largely focused on ﬁndingwhich types of stimuli socially
excluded individuals tend to direct attention towards. Future research could provide
further insight into how exclusion inﬂuences different attentional control mechanisms,
such as voluntary and involuntary attentional systems (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).
Furthermore, future research should investigate whether specialized social monitoring
mechanisms mediate the effects of exclusion on attention, as has been argued by
researchers in this ﬁeld (Pickett & Gardner, 2005).
Concluding remarks
The research reviewed in this article shows that exclusion inﬂuences social information
processing in various ways. However, there are also gaps in our understanding on this
issue, and some of the conclusions previously drawn from these studies are not ﬁrmly
supported by the empirical evidence. Future research would beneﬁt from paying close
attention to the speciﬁc mechanisms and information processing stages where exclusion
exerts its effects. Researchers should directly investigate which mechanisms mediate the
previously reported effects of exclusion on, for instance, memory performance, facial
expression recognition, and perceptual judgements. In a similar vein, future research
making strong claims about the processes where exclusion exerted its effects should
include control conditions, which show that the effects occurred at those processes
speciﬁcally. For instance, if concluding that exclusion altered perceptual stage processes,
it is vital to show that the observed effects actually reﬂect changes speciﬁcally in
perceptions, and not in attention allocation, or higher-level judgements. Of course,we are
not suggesting that all studies need to pinpoint the processes where the effects occurred,
as it is secondary to the main goals of many studies. In such cases, it is simply sufﬁcient to
avoid making far-reaching conclusions about these mechanisms, and to acknowledge
alternative explanations for the ﬁndings.
We conclude by emphasizing that research on social information processing is
important. Biases in information processing predict aggressive behaviour (Dodge et al.,
2003) and even play an important role in aetiology of various problems, such as loneliness
(Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009), depression (Lepp€anen, 2006), and anxiety (MacLeod,
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). Understanding how these biases
emerge in socially excluded individuals might help researchers to better understand why
exclusion sometimes leads to detrimental outcomes, andwhy some individuals are able to
respond to exclusion adaptively and restore their sense of belonging. Future research
should provide further understanding into how exclusion alters social information
processing, and clarify the psychological and neural mechanisms that drive these effects.
This would not only illuminate this interesting question, but might hypothetically also
provide a basis on which to develop interventions to mitigate the adverse effects of social
exclusion.
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